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ABSTRACT
Distinct behavioural patterns in response to exclusion have emergedand at
the forefront appear to be its impact on four fundamental human needs:
belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence. Evolutionary
theorists hypothesizethat the potential danger of exclusion,or isolation
from the group, has led to the developmentof a response system that is
designed to counteract and preventsocial exclusion, as well as to maximize
attempts towards re-inclusion. Various aspects of a modelfor social
exclusion weretested here. Thefirst two experiments investigated the
impactof social exclusion on four fundamental needsas well as its impact
on cognitive style and cognitive processing. Results showedthat social
exclusion negatively impacted belonging,control, and self-esteem and that
cognitive style as well as cognitive performance were impacted by
exclusion. A secondpair of studies investigated the neural correlates
associated with social exclusion and cooperation. Thefirst examined how
individuals’ responsesto social exclusion were impacted,not by level of
exclusion, but by the source’s (of exclusion) level ofresemblance to one’s
self. Results indicated that specific areas ofthe brain associated with social
pain wereactive in response to exclusion, and that activation was greater in
response to exclusion from in-group members(individuals of the same race
or self-resembling faces). Lastly, a hyperscanning {MRI study of
cooperation was conducted. Findings suggested that when two people
cooperated to complete a mazetask,a particular area of the brain involved
in reward, the caudate, was recruited. This suggests that compared to
workingalone,individuals found something inherently rewarding in
cooperating with another human. Therelevanceofthese findingsis
discussed, and they are incorporated into an existing modelofsocial
exclusion and ostracism.
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GLOSSARY
Social Exclusion: The experienceofdistress as a result of an actual or
perceived psychological or physical distance from others.
Rejection: Rejection incorporatesa distinct assertion that an individualis
no longer wanted in the group.
Ostracism: The ignoring and exclusion ofindividuals or groups by
individuals or groups.
Cooperation: Associations ofpersons for a commonbenefit.
Chapter 1 An Introduction to Social Exclusion and Cooperation
“Tfno one turned ‘round when we entered,
answered when we spoke, or minded what wedid,
but ifevery person we met “cut us dead” and
acted as ifwe were non-existing things, a kind of
rage and impotent despair would ere long well up
inside us, from which the cruellest bodily tortures
would be a relief; for these would makeusfeel
that, however bad might be ourplight, we had not
sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of
attentionatall.” -William James (1890/1950p.
293-94).
1.1. Introduction
William James’ words vividly capture the devastating feelings that
suffering from exclusion can create within the human mind. His depiction
extendsso far as to describe the experience of ostracism as even more
painful than the “cruellest bodily torture”in that he classifies the torture as
a relieffrom the agony ofostracism. If exclusion causes the traumathat
James describes,it is not surprising, then, that exclusion is often depicted
in very dramatic and compelling terms: Williams (2007) described
exclusion as “powerful and ubiquitous” and Ouwerkerketal. (2005)
identified it as the “social death penalty.” Since exclusion exists on so
many levels, and becauseofits pervasive nature, few amongus have
attained adulthood without experiencing somelevel of exclusion whetherit
occurs on the primary school playground,feeling like a third wheel in a
teenage/adolescenttrio, or a purposeful shunning and ultimate severing of
communication. Exclusionis universal and timeless, and it’s a purposeful
and potent tool (Kurzban and Leary, 2001; see also Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Williams describes the following,“The pervasiveness of ostracism
throughout a society, institutions and small groups is matched by the high
frequency of interpersonal dyadic relationships. Indeed the prevalence of
ostracism is such that most individuals will be both a target and a source of
ostracism in their close relationships, whether with colleagues, loved ones
or strangers” (2001, p. 9). In an issue ofEthology and Sociobiology
dedicated to the investigation of ostracism, Gruter and Masters (1986)
thematically illustrated that ostracism is often utilized as means by which
individuals are identified as targets and they are excludedin an effort to
“preserve the group’s cohesiveness and survival” (Williams, 2001, p. 9;
See also Gruter and Masters, 1986).
The investigation of social and exclusion and cooperationin this thesis was
conducted through the application of evolutionary principles and theory.
Evolutionary psychology and theory can help us to understand the ultimate
mechanismsbehind social exclusion, and howitis tied to and what purpose
it might have served in our evolutionary history. In fact, my examination of
social exclusionpresumesthat natural selection has shapeda series of
adaptationsin order to help species solve recurrent survival and reproductive
(i.e. adaptive) problems during evolutionary history (Darwin, 1859;
Williams, 1966). This perspective assumesthat group co-habitation has been
occurring for several million years, or has at least been a recurrentpart of
humanevolutionary history, and thus the human psyche has undergone
selection pressures which favoured adaptations to solve the recurrent
problemsassociated with co-habitation among group members (Kurzban
and Leary 2001; Caporael and Brewer, 1991; Cosmides and Tooby, 1989;
Gigerenzer, 1997; Humphrey, 1976; Williams, 1966). Because affiliation
and cooperation with individuals is likely to generate fitness benefits as well
as fitness costs, a system, a proximate evolutionary mechanism,to
differentiate and detect defectors (as well as cooperators) is presumedto
have evolvedin the brain. As a counterpart to this system, those who face
the threat of exclusion have mechanismsintact to cope with the threat of
exclusion. Using the application of evolutionary psychologicalprinciples,
this thesis examines the behavioural responses and neural correlates
associated with exclusion and cooperation,specifically relating to those who
are targeted for exclusion and the coordinated neuralactivity involved in a
cooperative game. Additionally, while evolutionary psychology provides the
majority ofthe theoretical framework for the research carried out in this
thesis, I do draw from manydisciplines within psychology throughoutthis
manuscript.It is important to mention this, as some portions and information
may seem disparate. Despite all of the existing theoretical approachesin
psychology,I believe thatall of these theories can be best characterized
using evolutionary psychology as an overarching metatheory; “Because all
behaviour owesits existence to underlying psychological mechanisms, the
central task according to evolutionary psychology is to discover, describe,
and explain the nature of those mechanisms”(Buss, 1995, p. 7). Given this,
the application of evolutionary principles is essential to any thorough
investigation of behaviour. Gruter and Masters (1986) are amongthefirst to
explain the merit of investigating social exclusion and ostracism from an
evolutionary perspective, “First, the process by which some individuals are
isolated or excluded from interaction with other members of a social group
is observed in manyother species as well as in virtually all known human
societies. Henceit is plausible to hypothesize that human ostracism may
have physiological substrates or biological functions in addition to cultural,
moral, and legal dimensions. Second, ethological studies of animal
behaviour have shown the complexinteraction between cooperation,
competition, and exclusion;particularly among non-humanprimates,
phenomenalike “scapegoating” and shunning seem toplayan integralrole
in the maintenanceofsocial order” (Gruter and Masters, 1986, p. 150). A
new perspective on social exclusion may be revealed by examiningit
through evolutionary lenses because ofthe relevance of social exclusion in
humanevolutionary history. This chapter will discuss the foundations of
ostracism, social exclusion andrejection, followed by a discussion of
evolutionary perspectives and group membership processes. In the latter
portion of the chapter, relevant literature will be reviewed providing a
backgroundonthe neural correlates of social exclusion andits relationship
to anxiety and impact on four fundamental (human) needs. The chapter
concludes with a description of William’s modelof ostracism and a
description of the remaining chapters that make up this manuscript.
1.1.1. Ostracism, Social Exclusion, and Rejection
Humansare inherently social creatures who seek out and enjoy the
companyofothers. This needfor social relationships seemsto have “deep
roots” in our evolutionary history. The incidence ofbeing intentionally
separated from a group has many namessuchasostracism, social
exclusion, and rejection. Each ofthese terms relates to some kind of
separation from a group orothers, but theyall have distinct definitions.
Ostracism refers to the ignoring of individuals or groups by other
individuals or groups (Williams, 2007). Social exclusion can be described
as the experienceofdistress as a result of an actual or perceived
psychological or physical distance from others (Eisenberger, Lieberman,
and Williams, 2003; Twenge, 2000). Finally rejection incorporates a
distinct assertion that an individual is no longer wanted in the group
(Leary, 2005). Whilst there are a variety of terms and definitions used to
describe these interpersonally aversive episodes, researchers tend to use the
terms interchangeably as will be the case in this manuscript.
No matter the name, ostracism has been around for a very long time. Some
ofthe first records of ostracism come from the Athenians in 500 BC
(ostrakismos). As mentioned previously, humanbeingsof all origins and
descents use exclusion, and it has even been observedin primitive tribes
throughout the world (Bohem, 1986; Gruter and Masters, 1986; Williams,
2007; Zippelus, 1986). There is, however,a great deal of convincing
evidence that ostracism and exclusion are not only observable among
humans, but also amongother social animals. Examining exclusionin other
species allowsfor the bolstering of the argument that social exclusionis
rooted in human evolutionary history. Kurzban and Leary state, “The
continuity of evidence across species at least makes the argument
plausible... that if these adaptations have occurred in other speciesthat face
adaptive problemsthat might have been similar to those faced by our
hominid ancestors” (2001, p. 191). For example, there have been many
instances of animal species such as non-humanprimates, lions, wolves,
buffalos, and bees employing exclusionin their social groups (Gruter and
Masters, 1986; Wilson, 1980). Territoriality is one way that non-human
animals exemplify exclusion. This is a form of exclusion where animals
exhibit behaviours that exclude conspecifics from certain areas to sequester
resources or mates (Kurzban and Leary, 2001; Wilson, 1980). Status
hierarchies are another mechanism for exclusion. Animals that are in the
upperechelonofthe hierarchy imposerestrictions on and exclude lower
ranking animals. These imposedlimits exclude animals from access to
certain food, mates, and preferential areas. Chimpanzees have also shown
evidence ofstigmatizing and excluding membersoftheir group whoareill.
Jane Goodall (1986) describes one polio-infected chimp,in particular, who
wasostracized from his group because he exhibited abnormal behaviour.
These examplesare not evidence substantiating that humans exclude each
other in the same waysorfor the same reasons, yetit is likely that many
non-human social animals have faced adaptive problemssimilar to those of
our early (social) human ancestors, thus evolving to deal with these selective
pressures by employing exclusionary tactics (Kurzban and Leary, 2001).
1.1.2. Evolutionary Perspectives: Evolution ofOstracism and Social
Exclusion
From an evolutionary perspective there are many benefits to be gained from
social group membership. For instance, group membership can include
benefits such as protection, sharing of food and resources, sharing of
information, defined social structure, bi-parental care and allo-parenting,
and general social support. Moreover, Gruter and Masters (1986) suggest
that there are benefits to a group if they employostracism asa tactic to weed
out useless and draining membersofthe group. Ostracizing burdensome
membersallows the group to become more cohesive as well as reducing
competition between membersfor reproductive opportunities and resources.
Giventhis perspective, one might argue that recognising, using, and
avoiding ostracism could be describedasbiologically significant and
reflects selection for adaptive preferences or adaptations. In someinstances,
the evolutionary psychology (EP) approachutilizes the term adaptation
differently from other approaches. Barrett, Dunbar and Lycett (2002)
characterise EP’s use as follows; “Evolutionary Psychology does not
consider the demonstration of reproductive benefits necessary to determine
whetherornot a particular feature is an adaptation. Instead they look for
999evidence of ‘good design’ (p. 13). Moreover, I am not comparing
reproductive success rates to determine whetherornot avoiding social
exclusionis adaptive, but I will presumethat since it appears to be a good
design thatit is adaptive. Kurzban and Leary (2001) outline three “suites of
adaptations”that are related to stigmatizing and excluding individuals:
dyadic cooperation, coalitional exploitation, and parasite avoidance. Allow
meto preface this by saying that it is debated whether a series of separate,
very specifically designed, systems or one or more general/overlapping
systems is driving these adaptations; howeverit is not the purposeofthis
thesis to make that determination. Instead, I will assume that these
mechanisms have evolved and doin fact exist as proximate neural
mechanismsthat drive human behaviour. Adaptationsrelating to dyadic
cooperation allow individuals to avoid involvement with poor/low quality
partners, those who posea social cost which exceedsthe benefit, as well as
those who do not measure upas social partners (Kurzban and Leary, 2001).
Group members engagein coalitional exploitation by keeping members of
other groupsout andseizing the resources of non-group members. Lastly,
parasite avoidance is another meansofexclusion whereby individuals can
detect possible parasite carriers (through appearance, facial symmetry,
masculinity, etc. for a review see Thornhill and Gangestad, 1993) and avoid
them by limiting exposure to them through exclusion. These adaptations
work well and to the advantage of the excluder, and most likely, without
these mechanismssocial exchange, cooperation, and group living might not
have evolved, as cheaters would havethe full advantage, reciprocity would
not be expected, and social exchange would not have been beneficial
(Kurzban and Leary, 2001). Indeed, exclusionis effective because of the
negative consequencesthatit poses for the target. Those who are not
membersof a group are faced with the burden of complete selfsufficiency,
and self-sufficiency can be a dangerousstatusfor individuals. Therefore,it
is in one’s bestinterest for survival to avoid exclusion from the group,
which is why detecting ostracism could be considered adaptive and most
likely co-evolved with the use of ostracism (Williams, 2007). Individuals
whoare goodat detecting possible exclusion would be at an advantage,
allowing them to effectively predict and avoid exclusion.
1.1.3. In- and Out- Group Membership and Processes
Group membership and groupidentification play an importantrole in social
exclusion and cooperation. As mentionedpreviously,in coalitional
exploitation, individuals will often exploit the resources of other groups and
exclude membersofthat group from access to resources simply because of
group membership (Kurzban and Leary, 2001). This assessment of group
interaction adopts an evolutionary perspective and suggeststhat individuals
have an evolved adaptation in the brain that is specifically designed towards
dealing with problemsin a group environment and group cooperation and
competition. However, there are many other perspectives regarding group
membership and intergrouprelations. For instance, Hogg and Abrams
(1998) also suggest that group membershipis important in the realm of
social exclusion. They state the following:“Social categories and groups are
clearly one type oftarget of exclusion, particularly if they are minorities, are
unfamiliar, and pose any kind of threat. Social categories are also powerful
agents of exclusion”(p. 17). This social psychology perspective is
applicable throughoutandis a good place to begin the discussion of in- and
out- group effects.
Sherif (1966) defines the term intergroup behaviour as,“Whenever
individuals belonging to one group interactcollectively or individually, with
another group or its members in termsoftheir group identification, we have
instances of intergroup behaviour”(p. 12). Humansdefine themselves by
their social group membership andas result social interaction and
behaviour are impacted (Hogg and Abrams, 1998). Group identification can
be very strong thus leading people to act in certain ways accordingto their
group membership.
Group impression and stereotype formation (Stallybrass, 1977) as well as
ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906; see also Tajfel, 1982) are terminology that
social psychologists have coined to describe the processes that establish
individuals’ “ideas” concerning out-groups and in-groups (Tajfel, 1982).
The main underlying themeinall of these theories and definitionsis that
individuals, in most cases, show an overwhelmingpreference fortheir in-
groups’ behaviours, beliefs, and practices. Brewer (1979) states, “Any
categorization rule that provides a basis for classifying an individualas
belonging to one social grouping as distinct from another can be sufficient to
produce differentiation of attitudes towards the two groupsin the absence of
any initial competitive interdependence”(p. 307). Tajfel and Turner (1986)
developed the theory of social identity, which suggests that thereis “a shift
towardsthe perception ofself as an interchangeable exemplar of somesocial
category and away from the perception ofself as a unique person” (Turner
et al. 1987, p. 50). In other words, social identity theory is a
“depersonalization shift from the self and “I” focused concept to a “we”
group focused identity” (Brewer, 1991, p. 478). The aforementioned
explains one possible way that cognitive representations for in-groups are
developed. While understanding the formation of these cognitive
representations is important, understandingtheinitial forces that may have
been the catalyst for group formation is essential. Brewer suggests that
grouplivingis the primary survival strategy for human beings. This strategy
was mostlikely selected for during a time of “environmental scarcity” and
where forming groupsledto an increasedlikelihood for survival.
Additionally, over time humanshave “abandoned” manyofthe natural
defences that may have once existed which allowedfor solitary or paired
survival; thus humansare left with “cooperative interdependence”as their
primary survival strategy (Brewer, 1999). According to the optimal
distinctiveness model ofsocial identity, “If social and intergroup boundaries
are functional for social cooperation, there should be psychological
mechanismsatthe individuallevel that motivate and sustain group
identification and differentiation” (Brewer, 1999, p. 434). Group
membership can be determined by any numberofcharacteristics including
race and genetic relatedness. Race is often a cue that is used to make group
membership determination,as is genetic relatedness. These cues for group
membership andtheir significance will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5.
Finally, two very important components of group membership andidentity
are inclusion and exclusion; individual and group differencesare treated as a
primary basisfor inclusion and exclusion (Abramset al., 2005). Individuals
often feel a need for inclusion, especially whenthey feel isolated or
removed from the group; however, there is also a need for distinctiveness,
which can be defined by group membership (Brewer, 1999). Furthermore,
inclusion can be used to benefit group members, and exclusion can be used
as a meansto punish defecting group membersor to protect resources from
intragroup competitors (e.g. coalitional exploitation) (Kurzban and Leary,
2001).
1.2. Neural Correlates of Social Exclusion: The Social Pain Response
System
Humanstend to seek out the companyofothers presumably because as a
species natural selection put a premium ontheability to maintain group
membership;as a result, proximate psychological (and neural) mechanisms
have developedto effectively cope with the problemsassociated with
sociality. It has been suggested that the intensity ofthe social distress
response, when facing potential exclusion or abandonment, may come as a
result of its overlap with physical pain matrix in the brain (specifically in
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex), and this link has an adaptive value
(DeWall and Baumeister, 2006; Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman, and
Naliboff, 2006; MacDonald, Kingbury, and Shaw-Binns, 2005). The
physical pain system may have “provided the foundation for some of the
physiological mechanismsthat regulate social behaviour” (MacDonaldet
al., 2005, p. 78). Pain sensation and pain affect combineto create the
“feeling”ofpain. Pain sensation is the actual physical response to pain by
the nervous system, whereaspain affect is the emotional counterpart. Pain
affect is responsible for creating a feeling of ““adversiveness” in response to
the injurious stimuli and motivating one to make necessary adjustments to
“end exposure” (MacDonald et al., 2005; Metzack and Casey, 1968; Price,
1999). Darwin (1859) noted that many complextraits evolved from earlier
traits that served a different function, and such maybethe case with the
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social pain system. MacDonaldetal. claim that, “painful feelings came to
be associated with the cues predictive of exclusion experiences because
evolutionary pressures madethe regulation of inclusionary status critical to
survival” (2005, p.79). Therefore, the pre-existing pain mechanisms
required for the prevention and detection of physical harm may have been
adopted by the later developing social attachment system in an effort to
avoid and detect separation. This is especially important for mammals,
which havea long period of dependence on maternal resources and care.
Since the need for close contact and proximity is important for mammalian
infant survival, especially altricial species such as humans, experiencing
“pain”in the event of separation would be an adaptive response that would
help to prevent harmful consequencesofthe separation as well asto re-
establish close proximity with a care taker (Panksepp, 1998; Panksepp,
Herman, Conner, Bishop, and Scott, 1978). Once one reaches adulthood,
the care of a motheris no longer necessary, and the protection and care of a
group becomesthe symbolic vestige of this attachment. Thus this system
remainsintact; howeverit is used to signal potential dangeras result of
separation(i.e. exclusion) from the group, not from the mother. This
adaptive distress response to separation is called social pain. Social pain
has been definedas, “the distressing experience arising from the perception
of actual or potential psychological distance from close others or a social
group” (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004, p. 294). In other words, social
exclusion and rejection have been found to engenderfeelings of distress or
social pain, and this social pain response seemsto share its neural
correlates with the physical pain system in the brain.
In one examination ofthis possible systemic overlap, Panksepp (1998)
reported that young mammals experiencing separation anxiety no longer
madedistresscalls after opiate injections, often usedto alleviate physical
pain symptoms, were administered to them. He inferred that perhaps the
social pain system is structured around the physical pain system,
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specifically around substrates sensitive to opiate action. This finding has
recently beenpartially replicated in humans. DeWall et al. (2010) showed
that administration of Tylenol, acetaminophen, reducedthe feeling of
social pain in a standard social exclusion paradigm. Neuroimaging studies
have presented evidence pointing to the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC)as structure responsible for acting as the neural alarm system for
social pain in humans(Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004). Notably, the
dACCis also associated with the “unpleasantness” response accompanying
physical pain (Rainville et al., 1997). Bachevalier and Loveland (2006)
reported that the ACCis instrumentalin directing attention toward sensory
stimuli and regulating components of exploratory behaviour. The dACC
also holds thetitle of conflict monitorin the brain. This region is involved
in response to incongruentinformation such as that presented in the Stroop
Task. Regulation ofaffiliation has also been attributed to this structure.
Lesionsto the anterior cingulate cortex have produced a marked decrease
in social interactions as well as in vocalizations between motherandinfant
(in squirrel monkeys), demonstrating a relationship betweenthis structure
andaffiliative behaviour (Eisenbergeret al., 2004). Eisenbergeretal.
(2003) conducted an {MRI study of social pain using social exclusion as a
meansto investigate the neural correlates of social pain in humans.
Individuals participated in a virtual ball toss game, ostensibly with two
other players, while they were in the {MRI scanner. Results revealed a
positive correlation between increasedactivity in the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC) andself-reported distress when participants were
excluded from the game, implicating that the dACCis directly connected
to feelings of social pain or rejection. Researchers haveset out to define the
relationship between physical and social pain and the underlying
computational mechanisms. Eisenberger and Lieberman (2005) argue that
“Because the dACCis involved in the experience of both physical and
social pain it is plausible that the underlying computational processes of
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the dACCare relevantin the processing of both types of pain” (p.109).
Eisenberger (2008) discusses that factors which causeor alleviate pain
should have an effect on both physical and socialpain. For instance, social
support, which is known to alleviate social pain, is also instrumental in
alleviating physical pain. Supplementary evidence to support the
relationship between social and physical pain comes from onestudy in
particular. MacDonaldet al. (2005) suggest that highly sensitive
individuals, prone to hurt feelings, have a highersensitivity to pain. As
emotional sensitivity increases so does physical pain sensitivity. In an
additional experiment, they discovered that individuals with a proclivity
towards hurt feelings demonstrated an increased distress response,
including a decreased pain threshold following exclusion. This response to
exclusion demonstrates that, to highly sensitive individuals, exclusion
poses a very serious threat (MacDonaldet al., 2005). One final link
betweensocial and physical pain indicated that pain is a mechanism
through which “perceived rejection promotes increased caution and
defensiveness” (MacDonaldet al., 2005, p. 86). While I cannot begin to
account for all of the research examining the overlap between social and
physical pain, I have attempted to highlight a selection of significant
findings here. The take homepointis that it has been hypothesized that the
humanbrain has developed a means, by piggy-backing on the physical
pain system, to cope with exclusion in a waythat signals to the individual
(via social pain) that exclusion poses a dangerandthe situation needs to be
reconciled to avoid this possible danger. In the next section I will discuss
the emotional and fundamental components that comprise “social pain.”
1.3. Anxiety and Fundamental Needs
The needto belong has been driven by evolutionary consequencesofbeing
excluded, whichlikely drove the evolution of proximate neural adaptations
in the brain; thus it might be described as a fundamental motivation
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(Baumeister and Leary, 1995). The need to belongfits the following
criteria of a fundamental motivation: it stimulates goal directed behaviour
to satisfy it, cognitive activity reflects a concern with the need, and
emotional reactions accompanysatisfaction or dissatisfaction. In this
section I am going to focus on the emotionalreactions that follow when
relationships are threatened or devalued: anxiety and impact on four
fundamental needs (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Before I continue,I
wantto note that there are many definitions and usesofthe term anxiety in
psychology. As Baumeister and Tice (1990) describe, anxiety can pertain
to a clinical diagnosis of anxiety (which needsto be treated with
medication or therapy), phobia, fear, panic,stress, as well as negative
affect. In this case, the use of the term anxiety pertains to the negative
feelings (feelings of anxiousness) and affect that accompanythethreat of
exclusion. Furthermore, the issues accompanyingthe definition of anxiety
are not important here for the same reasonsthat they were irrelevantto
Baumeister and Tice’s (1990) discussion, “The definitional problems
associated with the term anxiety, therefore, do not concern usgreatly here.
The central argumentis that humanbeings are prone to experience strong
doses of negative affect, akin to fear and panic, in connection with the
prospect ofbeing excluded from important social groups” (p. 166).
Throughout I will use the anxiety to describe the negative affect, or fear
(possible panic) associated with the threat of social exclusion.
Whensocial attachments are threatened there is a decrease in positive
affect. For instance, individuals demonstrate a variety of negative affects
after the loss of a relationship. Baumeister and Leary (1995) arguethat,
“People feel anxiousat the prospect of losing importantrelationships, feel
depressedorgrief stricken when their connections with certain other
people are severed, and feel lonely when they lack important relationships”
(p. 506). In accordancewiththis, social exclusion (loss ofbelonging) has
been targeted asoneof, if not, the most common causeofanxiety
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(Baumeister and Tice, 1990; Leary, 1990; Leary et al., 1995). Anxiety that
occursasthe result of a fear of exclusion or separation couldserve to help
a person from being excluded from the group altogether, as it may motivate
a response — a behavioural change — from the exclusiontarget. If one
accepts that anxiety is a componentoffear, then anxiety can be interpreted
the same wayas fearfulness; it serves to warn an individual that dangeris,
or maybe,lurking close by and they must act quickly to change the
situation or their behaviour in order to avoid danger (Baumeister and Tice,
1990). This scenario maytypically be related to avoidanceoffear
producing stimuli such as snakes and spiders (Ohman and Minkea, 2001);
howeverit can be appliedto social situations (i.e. group membership),
which are important to survival (Baumeister and Tice, 1990; Buss, 1990).
Baumeister and Tice (1990) write, “If anxiety serves as an interrupt
mechanism,the central benefit of anxiety prompts cognitive reassessment.
Hence anxiety should have strong effects on attention, for it must take the
mindoutof its current task and focus, and somehow promptit to re-
evaluate the project from a different perspective” (p.170). According to
exclusion theory, anxiety is the primary tenet that underlies the negative
affect, which accompanies exclusion (Baumeister and Tice, 1990;
Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Exclusion theory purports that when any
social bondis threatened anxiety ensues. Furthermore, uncertainty about
social bondscan also elicit anxiety (Baumeister and Tice, 1990). An
additional componentin exclusion theory accounts for the anxiety that
surroundsthe “‘fear” of death (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski,
1991). Baumeister and Tice (1990) have incorporated someideals from
Becker’s existentialist theory (1973). The connection betweensocial
exclusion and death can beclarified by returning to an evolutionary
perspective. In evolutionary history, exclusion likely had dire
consequences, and one of those consequences might have been death.
Becauseofthe close relationship between exclusion and death in humans’
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past, the threat of exclusion and death remain linked. Exclusion theory
suggests that because death and exclusion are linked and death is the
ultimate exclusion,it is another source of anxiety relating to social
exclusion (Baumeister and Tice, 1990). However, mentally healthy people
do not constantly experience feelings of anxiety about death, nor do they
ruminate about the possibility of exclusion from the rest of the world.
Research suggests that the strong correlation between self-esteem and
anxiety alleviate, or suppress this type of thinking (Leary, 1990). When
individuals feel that that they are important and significant to the world
(they have a meaningful existence) the anxiety surrounding death is
diminished (Baumeister and Tice, 1990; Solomonetal., 1991).
1.3.1. Four Fundamental Needs
Givenall of this, it seems that anxiety is at the root of social exclusion; yet
there are other feelings that may be diminished along with the increase in
anxiety. Williams (1997; 2007) argues that four fundamental needs are
impacted by exclusion; belonging,control, self-esteem, and meaningful
existence are jeopardized whenan individual is targeted for exclusion.I
haveparticularinterest in this model asI have usedit as the basis for my
assessmentofsocial exclusion. As mentioned previously the need to belong
sits at the core of this model. Whenthe needto belongis threatened by
ostracism it leads to a feeling of dissatisfaction (Williams, 1997; Baumeister
and Leary, 1995; Baumeister and Tice, 1990; Buss, 1990). Selfesteem is
also threatened by exclusion. Assumingthat one usesself-esteem as a
measureoftheir importanceto others (e.g. a group) and society (Greenberg
et al., 1992; Greenwald, 1980; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988), self-esteem is
thwarted when a personis excluded (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, and Downs,
1995). The third componentofthe modelis control. Seligman (1975, 1998)
contendsthat individuals needto feel control over their social environment
(see also Friedland, Keinan, Regev, 1992; Taylor and Brown, 1988; Taylor
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et al., 1992). There is a specific threat to control that comes from being
ostracized; thus this social motive is impacted by social exclusion.Finally,
meaningful existence can be threatened by exclusion. Williamset al., (2005)
ascribe to the same theoretical perspective as Baumeister and Tice (1990).
They claim that meaningful existence is a reminder of mortality (Solomon,
et al., 1991) and a “very palpable metaphorfor death”(p.23). When the
threat of exclusion is present, it can prompt thought of death, as death has
routinely been connected to social exclusion during humanevolution. While
other needs may be impactedbysocial exclusion, threat to these four basic
needsis the cornerstoneof social exclusion theory. Responsesto the threats
can be seen in the form of immediate upset, pain, and hurt feelmgs. Beyond
the immediate feelings individuals generally tend to fortify these needs by
making attemptsat increasing the feeling of belonging, regaining control, as
well as increasing feelings of self-esteem and meaningful existence.
1.4. Behavioural Responses to Social Exclusion
Responsesto exclusion are most commonly those that would be beneficial
in moving one towardreintegration into the group or “improving
exclusionary status” (Williams, 2007, p. 439). It seems logical to presume
that pro-social responsesincrease the likelihood that one will avoid
exclusion. Studies have shown thatthis is the case. For instance, female
participants respondedto exclusion by exhibiting a pro-social response
during a group collaborative task following exclusion. However, non-
excluded females, and all males (regardless of inclusion or exclusion
status), exhibited social loafing during the group task (Williams and
Sommer, 1997). Furthermore, excluded participants, regardless of gender,
agreed to an obviously incorrect assessment of a perceptual judgment task
when a majority of a group also agreed, whereasincludedparticipants did
not conform. Carter-Sowell and Williams (2005) report that compared to
includedparticipants, ostracized participants exhibited an increased
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willingness to comply during foot-in-the-door (Freedman andFraser, 1966;
Burger, 1999) and door-in-the face techniques (Cialdini, Vincent, Lewis,
Catalan, Wheeler, and Darby, 1975) which are tactics used to persuade
targets to agree to a suggestion or grant permission for something(e.g.
Foot-in-the-Door: “Would you be willing to read a chapter ofmy thesis?”
Followedby,“Actually, would you mind readingthe entire thesis?” Door-
in-the-face: “Would you read myentire thesis by tomorrow? Followed by
“Would you just read the first chapter?”’). In addition to this, excluded
individuals are willing to give an exaggerated positive rating to others
based on criteria that does not merit such a rating (Wheaton, 2001). Aside
from overt pro-social behaviour, unconscious behaviour changes seem to
also occur after exclusion. Excluded individuals tend to mimic group
members’ behaviour, and mimicry has been shown toincreaseaffiliative
behaviour (Lakin and Chartrand, 2005). Ostracism evoked increased
attention to social cues and tone of voice in an unconsciouseffort to
improvesocial standing and regain inclusion (Gardneret al., 2000; Pickett
and Gardener, 2005; Pickett et al., 2004). All of these responses seem to
be adaptive. It would be very beneficial for a person to regain inclusion by
employing prosociality, and it makes sense that these behaviours would
have evolved in an effort to do so.
Onthe other hand, ostracized individuals have also been reported to
demonstrate aggressive behaviour in the face of ostracism (Buckley,
Winkle, and Leary, 2003; Leary, Twenge, and Quinlivan, 2006; Twenge,
2005; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice and Stucke, 2001) as well as to decrease
prosocial behaviour towards excluders (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall,
Ciarocco, and Bartels, 2007) in a numbingresponseto social exclusion.
1.5. Social Exclusion and Cooperation
To this point, a majority of this chapter has focused on how individuals
control their avoidance of exclusion and howthey react when faced with
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exclusion. However, now I wantto shift focus and briefly discuss matters
associated with the causes and evolution of social exclusion, which I
touched uponbriefly in Section 1.2., and relate this to cooperation.
Functionally speaking, exclusion can be employedas a behavioural control
mechanism, which worksto motivate people to act in accordance with
group normsandrules,ultimately benefitting the group or partnership
(Gruter and Masters, 1986; Brewer, 2005; Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, and
Van Lange 2005; Kerr, 1999). Ouwerkerket al. (2005) have demonstrated
the utility of the threat of exclusion in generating and maintaining
cooperation among group members. Kurzban and Leary (2001) argue that
exclusion is useful to avoid inopportune cooperative partnerships, which
has resulted in the developmentofrestrictions. In turn, theserestrictions
allow cooperative interactions to be productive and provide punishmentfor
violators. Therefore, cooperation is benefited by exclusion, and the target
of exclusion benefits from cooperating. I have generated a figure to help
explain the relationship between exclusion and cooperation (See Figure
1.1.). This figure describes myinterpretation of the cyclical nature of the
relationship. Allow me to emphasize that I am not referring to cooperation
and inclusion synonymously. A person can be included and not be
cooperating. However from a functional perspective, exclusion and
cooperation require efforts from both parties and are not just a state of
being(asis the case with inclusion) but functional behaviours that have a
directed outcome.It is the function that both cooperation and exclusion
serve that connects them.
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Figure 1.1. Hypothesized
Relationship between Cooperation
and Social Exclusion.
In summary, the threat that exclusion poses to the fundamental needs requires that
humanshavea system in place to allow for the observation andprotection of their
level of social inclusion, and they must be able to respond with the necessary coping
strategies when threatened with exclusion (Ouwerkerket al., 2005; Leary,et al., 1995;
Pickett and Gardner, 2005). Possession of a system with such a purpose indicates that
the threat of exclusion is very a powerful tool that can be used by groupsto deter
behaviours that are damagingto the group,or the ultimate goals of the group.
Therefore, defection is deterred and cooperation is emphasized, and cooperation can
be stimulated by the threat of exclusion (Kerr, 1999).
20
 Taxonomic Dimensions
Visibility: Physical, cyber, social
punitive, defensive, oblivious
Quantity: Low to High
Clarity: Low to High 
Motive: Not ostracism,role prescribed,
 
  
Antecedents
(why sourcesostracize)
IndividualDifferences:
Non- confrontational, avoidant, stubborn
Role-Differences: Low Relative Power
Situational Pressures: Concerns for social
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\ é
Mediators or Moderators
 
 
Attributions: Taking or deflecting, responsibility/control, self-
derogation versus other blame
Individual Differences: Attachment styles, needs or belonging,
self-esteem, control, terrormanagement
 
Threatened Needs
Belonging, Self-Esteem, Control, and Meaningful Existence/
Fearof Death
 
Reactions
Immediate: Adversive impact, bad mood, hurt feelings,
psychological arousal
Short-term: Attempts to regain needs by strengthening bondsto
others, makingself-affirmations, taking control, maintaining
cultural buffers
Long-term: Self-imposedisolation, learned helplessness, low-
self esteem, despondency
Figure 1.2. Williams’ (1997) Model of Ostracism.
 
 
 
1.6. Introduction to theoretical model and incorporated experiments
Thusfar the reader has been introducedto the following: (1) the more
specific components of exclusion; (2) a foundation outlining the proposed
links between exclusion and cooperation; (3) a discussion of the four
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fundamental needs; and (4) the theoretical cornerstones supporting social
exclusion research. Allow me nowto introduce the model used as the
scaffolding for the theoretical investigation of three of the experiments
includedin this thesis (see Figure 1.2.). Williams’ Model of Ostracism
(1997; 2007) describesthe classification of the following: Taxonomic
Dimensions, Antecedents of ostracism, Moderators or Mediators of
ostracism, the Four Needs Impacted by Ostracism, and the Reactions to
ostracism with consideration for a temporal element (immediate, short-term,
long-term) (Williams, 2001). I found Williams’ model (1997; 2007) useful
for two reasons: 1) it helped to tie together ideas that alone may seem
disparate, and 2) it was useful in guiding the experiments, because as each
study progressedit helped clarify how my discoveries were related to each
other and to the model. Williams (2001) describes the primary aim ofthe
modelas follows, “Even thoughall forms of ostracism contain the common
elements of ignoring and excluding, my observations led me to believe that
various forms of ostracism werelikely to have different causes, serve
different purposes, produce different consequences, and havedifferent
interpretations” (p. 47). The model can beread as a top to bottom model,
howeverit is not predicated upon following that chronology. The first
module is the Taxonomic Dimensions, and it classifies ostracism in four
categories: visibility, motive, quantity, and causal clarity. These dimensions
help to define the type of ostracism episode. Visibility category includes the
following: physical ostracism, social ostracism, and cyberostracism.
Williams (2001) explains, “Separating ostracism into three levels of
visibility is important only insofar as the levels produce different effects on
the targets”(p. 49). Cyberostracism is particularly importantto this thesis,
and the model suggests that when individuals feel that they are in the
“communicative presence ofothers,” cyber-ostracism can have the same
effects as physical and social ostracism. The motive category recognisesfive
motives for ostracism that targets may ascribe to ostracism episodes: not
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ostracism, role-prescribed, defensive, punitive, and oblivious. The quantity
of ostracism refers to the degree of ostracism. For example, one could be
somewhatavoidantofthe target or one could completely ignore and never
speakto the target again. Causalclarity is the last category ofthe
Taxonomic Dimensions, and it can vary between episodes.In instances of
high causal clarity, the cause, or reason behind ostracism,is apparent. In
instances of low causalclarity, there is ambiguity surrounding the motive for
exclusion.
The second module of the model is Antecedents, which includes the
following: characteristics of the source, characteristics of the target, and
characteristics of the situation. This module is important in defining why a
source uses ostracism, whya target maybetherecipient of ostracism, and
the situations that may predicate the use of ostracism.
Moderators and Mediators is the third module. This module includes the
moderators and mediators of ostracism. Williams gives several examples of
possible moderators:attributions of responsibility for the ostracism (external
locus of control), personality of targets, and variation in attachmentstyles.
These moderators (and mediators) are important because they can have an
impact onthe ostracism episode and howthe target respondsto ostracism.
Following the Moderators and Mediators module is the Four Fundamental
Needs module. This moduleis the crux of Williams’ model. He suggests
that ostracism and exclusion uniquely impact four fundamental needs:
belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence. The Reactions to
Ostracism module lists three temporal stages: immediate, short-term, and
long-term. It appears that time is an important componentin a target’s
responseto ostracism. In the immediate temporal stage, the four
fundamental needswill be impacted. The short-term responses to ostracism
mayinclude attempts to reconnect with the sources or attempts to reinstate
the four fundamental needs. Long-term responsesinclude how individuals
respond after prolonged exposure to ostracism.
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Finally, the last module is Application ofthe model to sources: motives,
quantity, effects on fundamental needs, temporal related consequences. This
module allows for the examination of ostracism and its impact on the
source, because mostlikely the source is affected by the ostracism episode
as well.
This modelis useful in outlining and categorizing the consequences of
exclusion on the target(s) and allows for testable predictions to be
developed. The model focuses on the following: 1) the target’s perception of
ostracism, 2) explanations for the ostracism, 3) how targets can vary in
sensitivity to ostracism, 4) target’s reactions to ostracism, 5) and the length
of exposure to ostracism.
Each chapter on exclusion will emphasizea portion of the model and will
ultimately add information to the model and below I will providea brief
synopsis of each chapter.
Chapter 2 introduced and described the methodologyusedin this thesis and
providedjustification for the use of that methodology. Chapter 3 examined
how individual differences in social cognitive style impacted responses and
sensitivity to exclusion. Baron-Cohen (2003) argued that social cognitive
style could be measured on a continuum from extreme empathizing to
extreme systemizing (See also Baron-Cohen, 2002; Baron-Cohen, Ring,
Wheelwright, Bullmore, Brammer, Simmons, and Williams, 1999).It is
presumedthat division of labour and evolutionary pressures from our
ancestral environmentcauseda relative split in “brain type” leading to a
specialization of cognitive style. Men typically present the systemizing style
whereas womenpresent the empathizing style. Because empathy has been
linked to successful perceptions ofsocial cues during interpersonal
interaction,I hypothesized that individuals on the empathic end ofthe
continuum would demonstrate and increasedsensitivity to exclusion as
evidenced by a significant decrease in fundamental needs: belonging,
control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence. Furthermore, I hypothesized
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that individuals on the systemizing end of the continuum would demonstrate
a decreasedsensitivity to exclusion compared to empathizers; moreover,
there would be significant difference in the fundamental needs of excluded
individuals, which is connected to the empathizing and systemizing
continuum.
Chapter 4 addressed the question, how does exclusion impact cognitive
processing? This chapter applies to the Reactions to Ostracism module of
Williams’ model andspecifically pertains to the immediate reactions,
which often include negative affect, physiological arousal, anger, and hurt
feelings (Williams, 2001). Baumeister, Twenge and Nuss (2002) argue
that social exclusion reducesintelligent thought and that attention is
usurped by exclusion causing participants to show a decrease in memory
and overall “intelligence” immediately following the threat of exclusion.
Herein cognitive function (measured by response time) on an emotional
Stroop task wasassessed. The goal of this study wasto ascertain whether
or not exclusion impacted cognitive-emotional function, or impacted one’s
responsetime on the emotional Stroop task. Because past research has
shown that exclusion impactedintellectual function (scores on an
intelligent test and memory), this study investigated whether other
components of cognitive processing were also impacted. I hypothesized
that cognitive function would be impacted by social exclusion.
Specifically, those individuals in the exclusion condition would
demonstrate a slower response time on an emotional Stroop task and
participants in the inclusion condition would show an unaffected response
time, comparedto those in the exclusion condition, demonstrating that
attention and cognitive performanceare impacted by social exclusion.
fMRI was employedto investigate the neural correlates of social exclusion
and their relevance to in and out-group membership in Chapter 5. The
findings in this chapter pertain to the Antecedents and Mediators or
Moderator componentsofthe aforementioned model. It applies to
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Antecedents as it manipulates physical characteristics of the source of
exclusion, namely their race and degree of self-resemblance. Also, the race
of the target acts as a moderatoras their impression of the excluder may be
impacted bytheir shared race or different race. Evidence has shown that
individuals have a strong response to exclusion evidenced by increased
activation in the dACC (Eisenberger, Lieberman, and Williams, 2003;
Eisenbergeretal., 2007). Cues like race and genderare often used as cues
to determine group membership.I hypothesized that brain activation in the
dACC would increase and fundamental needs would decrease whenin-
group members excludedparticipants, compared to exclusion from out-
group members. Overall, I hypothesized that impact on the fundamental
needs and activation in the dACC would be on a continuum with the
greatest decrease in fundamental needs and increase in dACCactivation
occurring whenthe participant was excludedinthe self-resemblance
condition and the smallest decrease in fundamental needs andincrease in
dACCactivation occurring during the other-race exclusion condition.
Thelast data chapter discussed another {MRI study, this time using
hyperscanning (Montague etal., 2002) technology where twoparticipants
are scanned simultaneously. This experiment deviated from the
aforementioned model of exclusion; howeveras I attempted to explain in
the paragraphs precedingthis (See Section 1.6., Figure 1.1.), exclusion and
cooperation are related and may be considered to have a symbiotic
relationship where cooperation acts as a reward and exclusion acts as a
punishment. Chapter 6 speaks to the question of what happensin the brain
whenindividuals cooperate. I hypothesized that when two people
cooperated to complete a mazetask,particular areas of the brain involved
in theory ofmind and reward would be activated compared to when
participants workedalone to navigate through the maze.In particular,
whenparticipants completed the maze by working together, activation in
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reward centres of the brain would be significantly stronger than when the
maze was completed alone.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the four experiments.In this
discussion I make interpretations and draw conclusionsin orderto describe
a “big picture” application for this research programmeandits application
in the field of evolutionary psychology. Additionally, possible directions
for additional research are discussed.
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Chapter 2 Description of Methodology and Justification for Its Use
Throughoutostracism research several different methods of generating and
examining exclusion have beenutilized with regularity. Herein I review the
most popular methods, describe the methodsI used, and provide a
justification for my use ofthese methods.
2.1. Ostracism and Social Exclusion Paradigms
Several different paradigmsfor investigating social exclusion and
ostracism populate theliterature. All of these paradigms,as different as
they may seem, engendersimilar feelings of social exclusion. Each
experimental paradigm discussed below hasyielded meaningful inferences
about the nature and consequencesofexclusion; howeverresearchers do
not makethe claimsthat these paradigmsare the precise equivalent of
ostracism experiences that occur in everydaylife. Despite that, the
following paradigmsare considered to be valid and reliable, and have been
used in a multitude of studies examining different facets of social
exclusion.
2.1.1. Life Alone Paradigm
Thelife alone paradigm is an exclusion paradigm created by Twengeetal.
(2001) and Baumeisteret al. (2002). This paradigm incorporates a
personality test that assesses introversion and extraversion characteristics.
This, however,is just a front for the exclusion portion of the paradigm.
Participants are given accurate feedback regarding their personality type;
howeverthen they are randomly assignedto a future alone condition,
future belonging condition, or misfortune control condition all the while
believing that they have been placed based on their personality assessment.
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The future alone condition is the exclusion condition. Participants in the
future alone/exclusion condition are informed that the personality test
revealed that while they have friends and social relationships now,in the
future these relationships will dissolve and they will end up alone. In the
inclusion condition (future belonging) participants were told that they
would continue to have positive relationships with others, and that they
will mostlikely have a long and stable marriage. Lastly in the misfortune
control condition, participants were told that they are likely to be very
accident-prone in the future. This third condition is the control condition,
and while it has a negative implication for the person’s physical well being
in the future, there is no mention ofany social failure. This particular
paradigm hasbeenutilized in the investigation of aggression and social
exclusion as well as in the examination of emotional responses to social
exclusion. Results have indicated that this paradigm is successful in
engendering feelings of exclusion, andit is a paradigm that is used
frequently in the study of social exclusion.
2.1.2. The Getting Acquainted Paradigm
This paradigm is similar to the aforementioned paradigm. This paradigm
excludesparticipants based on ostensible ratings from other group
members (Nezlek et al., 1997). Participants partake in the study under the
guise that they are participants in research about decision-making.Initially,
individuals complete an information exchange questionnaire (consisting of
the self-rating scales and writing of twoself-reflective paragraphs) and
then other participants in the cohort review this (Williams, 2007).
Participants do actually rate each other’s essays on likeability as planned.
However,theseratings are not used. All of this elaborately sets up the
scenario for the exclusion condition to be introduced.In the exclusion
condition researchers report back to participants andtell that individuals
either chose to work with them in a small group or that they were not
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selected by others to be part of a group. Forthelatter they are informed
that they must workalone. In the non-exclusion condition participants are
told that they were randomly selected to be part of a group or to work
alone. These two conditions are then comparedto investigate the effects of
purposeful exclusion versus random assignment to working alone
(Williams, 2007).
2.1.3. Face-to-Face Ball Toss Game
Participants take part in a three way ball toss game. Twoofthe players are
confederates and are told by the experimenter whether to include or
exclude the participant. The participant is unawarethat the ball toss game
is pre-planned andthat the “other players” are actually research
confederates. In the exclusion roundparticipants are included in a few
roundsoftossing and catching. However,after a brief period of time
passesthe participants are excluded and the confederates no longer pass the
ball to them.In the inclusion roundparticipants receive andtosstheball
continually throughout the game. I will discuss this paradigm in more
detail in Section 2.2., where I explain whyI elected to use a computerized
version ofthis paradigm rather than carry out the face-to-face ball toss
game.
2.1.4. Cyberball
Cyberball (Williams etal., 2002) is a computerized ball toss game.In this
virtual version of the face-to-face ball toss gameparticipants play a ball
toss gameostensibly with two other players (See Figure 2.1.). The game
can be programmedto randomly include or excludeparticipants. I will
provide a more detailed description of Cyberball and its use in research in
Section 2.2.
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2.2. Comparison of the Face-to-Face Ball Toss and the Cyberball
Paradigm
Almost a decade ago, Cyberball (Williams, Cheng, and Choi, 2000) was
developedas an alternative to a face-to-face ball toss paradigm (Williams
1997) used to investigate social exclusion and ostracism. While the face-to-
face game produceda robust outcomeas far as engendering feelings of
exclusion, Williams, Cheng and Choi (2000) created this computerizedball
toss gamein orderto avoid several of the difficulties with implementing
the face-to-face ball toss paradigm. To fully understand the benefits of
Cyberball, it will be helpful to examine first the details and difficulties of
the face-to-face ball-tossing paradigm.
The face-to-face ball toss game proceedsin the following way:participants
are asked to wait in a waiting room with twootherparticipants (actually
two confederates) and one of these confederates beginstossing a ball
around.In the inclusion condition the ball is tossed betweenall three
people. However, in the exclusion condition the confederates exclude the
participant from the gameafter several tosses. The first difficulty that
Williams described wasthe “cumbersomeandinefficient” nature ofthe
face-to-face ball toss game (Williams and Jarvis, 2006). It is very time
consumingto recruit and train the confederates in addition to creating the
scenario that accompanies the experiment. Second,aside from training, the
use of confederates raises some specific concernsin this paradigm, because
the task of ignoring anotheris challenging and likely experienced in an
individually different mannerthat is beyondscientific control. That is, the
ability to control the behaviour of the confederates from day to day
severely limits the experimental control of this paradigm.It has been
documentedthat the targets’ responses can be very different; therefore,
ostracism can be idiosyncratic (Williams, 2001). Furthermore, the authors
noted that the confederatesfirst treated the exclusion episodes
sympathetically, but eventually they began to approach them with “sadistic
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glee” (Williams and Jarvis, 2006, p. 174). This description sounds vaguely
reminiscent of the typesof attitudes that occurred in the Stanford Prison
(Zimbardoet al., 1973) experiments and the infamous experiments on
coercion conducted by Stanley Milgram (1963) where individuals in both
of those experiments becamevery absorbedin their roles and werelater
remorseful about the behaviours they had exhibited while playing thatrole.
Because of these experimental and ethical drawbacks and complications
with using the face-to-face paradigm, Williams and colleagues developed
Cyberball as an alternative method for investigating social exclusion.
Cyberball is a computerized version ofthe ball toss game that was
developed to eliminate the need for the use of confederates and to lessen the
“traumatic nature”ofthe paradigm for participants (Williams, 2007). Since
the creation of Cyberball, it has been used extensively in the investigation of
social exclusion andostracism. Thefirst study using the Cyberball paradigm
included a cross-cultural sample of over 1,400 participants (Williams,
Cheung, and Choi, 2000).
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Figure 2.1. Cyberball Game Screen Shot
The gamewasset up online sothat participants could log on and play either
a virtual disk tossing gameora ball tossing game.In each ofthese studies,
participants tossed the ball ostensibly with two other players whom they
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believed were otherinternetplayers. Participants were randomly assigned to
different degrees of inclusion: over-inclusion, inclusion, partial-exclusion,
andtotal-exclusion conditions. In the over-inclusion condition participants
were includedin overhalf of the throws, while in the inclusion condition
participants received onethird ofthe throws.In the partial exclusion
condition participants received one sixth of the tosses, while in the total
exclusion condition the ball was not tossed to them at all during the game.
Participantsin the total-exclusion condition, who did not receive any tosses
of the ball, reported significantly lowerlevels of satisfaction of four needs in
the post experiment questionnaire.
Despite some concern that the Cyberball paradigm would benegligible,
because the game wasplayed over the computer with individuals who the
participant has norelationship with, results indicatedthat it produced
robustresults. Participants in the inclusion conditions exhibited more
positive responsesin the post game questionnaire comparedto participants
whoreceived a mere onesixth ofthe tosses (exclusion condition).
Participantsin the total-exclusion condition, who did not receive any tosses
of the ball, reported significantly lowerlevels ofsatisfaction of four needs
in the post experiment questionnaire. Moreover, Cyberball has
demonstrated significant effects not only in this study butalso in at least a
dozen subsequentstudies (Williams, 2001; Eisenbergeret al., 2006; Zadro
et al., 2004; Van Beest and Williams, 2006; Eisenbergeret al., 2003,
Gonsalkorale and Williams, 2007; Zadro et al., 2006; Eisenbergeretal.,
2007; Jarva and Oinonen, 2007; Oaten et al., 2008; Mastenet al., 2009)
including twostudiesthat I have led and published (Krill et al., 2008; Krill
and Platek, 2009).
Participants demonstrate strong effects in their responses on the post-
experimental questionnaire that assesses participantsatisfaction on four
fundamental needs (belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful
existence). Large effect sizes, ranging from 1.0 to 2.0, have been reported
33
(Williams, 2007). In fact, Williams and Jarvis (2006) report that as few as
three participants per condition are neededto reach levels of significance
(p = .05) on the post experimental questionnaire.
Questions have been raised about how meaningful ordistressing exclusion
from a computerized game(played with people that one never expects to
meet or comein contact with) can actually be. Aside from the
aforementioned cross-cultural study (Williamset al., 2000), there are many
other studies that provide support for the success of Cyberball (Williams,
2001; Eisenbergeret al., 2006; Eisenbergeret al., 2004; Zadroet al., 2004;
Van Beest and Williams, 2006; Eisenbergeret al., 2003, Gonsalkorale and
Williams, 2007; Zadro et al., 2006; Eisenbergeret al., 2007; Jarva and
Oinonen, 2007; Oatenet al., 2008; Mastenet al, 2009). Zadroet al. (2004)
conducted a study whereparticipants were informed that they were playing
Cyberball against other players or against a computer. There was no
significant difference on the post-experimental questionnaire between the
groupsthat were excluded bythe other players or by the computer
program. This suggests that exclusion and ostracism has an impact
regardless of the source of exclusion.
Several studies have made comparisons between Cyberball and other
social exclusion experiences. Eisenbergeret al. (2007) used {MRI to
investigate the neural correlates associated with being excluded in
Cyberball. They discoveredthat the areas of the brain that becomeactive in
responseto real life social and emotional experiences were also activated
in response to being excluded while playing Cyberball. Additionally,
MacDonald (2008) investigated the relationship between social exclusion
and pain threshold. He used Cyberball in one experiment anda rejection
recall writing task in the other experiment. Results indicated no significant
difference in response to pain betweenthe twosocial exclusion
experimental manipulations. However,differencesin attachmentstyle did
interact with pain threshold in the rejection recall study, but did not in the
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Cyberball study. The authorattributed these differential findings to the
control task that was used in the study. The baseline pain rating was used
as a control, but the author hypothesizesthat as participants became more
comfortable in Study 1 they wereless likely to keep up the appearance of
pain insensitivity. However, in Study 2 there wasless opportunity for
participants to become comfortable in the surroundings. Thusparticipants
in Study 2 kept up the pain insensitivity facade. Most importantly, despite
the difference in the control/baseline condition in each study, the
experimental condition, whetherit is Cyberball or writing recall task,
produced the sameresults.
Cyberball is by no means an experimentaltoolthat is without flaw. There
are a few methodological limitations associated with Cyberball, just as
there are with any experimental paradigm. Running Cyberball through the
internet and recruiting participants from the internet raises a few concerns:
researchers are unable to control the conditions ofparticipation, people can
be dishonest abouttheir identity (e.g. demographic information), and can
also attempt to take part in the experiment more than once. However,it is
possible to track participation time and network location confidentially(i.e.
IP address) which allowsresearchers to control for multiple participation.
Aside from this, very few criticisms of Cyberball are evidentin the
literature. A study assessing group memberrelationships and motivation
madetheassertion that the Cyberball gameis not a particularly effective
meansofcreating cohesion amongsocial groups. While this is in an
importantlimitation of the gameit is not one that affects the focus of my
research. Additional limitations in use of the Cyberball game will be
discussed at the end of the chapter.
Cyberball has been shown to be a valid and reliable task used to engender
social exclusion (Williams and Jarvis, 2006). While it is a convenient and
effective social exclusion task, it is not the only kind of social exclusion
task that has merit. The triadic face-to-face ball toss game does provide a
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very realistic scenario for social exclusion, and the social exclusion writing
recall task works, as well. However,for the intents and purposes ofmy
thesis Cyberball was the task that had the bestfit for my research dueto its
inherentflexibility in use. It would have beenideal, if not encumbered with
financial and time constraints, to run mystudies using all three of the major
exclusion methodologies. However, that was not an option. With the wide
spread use of Cyberball, and the plethora of research supportingits
effectiveness and easeofuse, I felt confident usingit in mystudies. I used
Cyberball not only in the behavioural realm, but also to assess the
neuropsychological components associated with social exclusion.
Examiningsocial exclusion from these different approaches gives a more
in depth look at social exclusion and demonstrates the versatility of
Cyberball.
2.3. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Functional magnetic resonance imaging ({MRI) allowsfor the detection of
brain areas that are involved in a process, task, or emotion, and I used this
methodology in two ofthe studies includedin this manuscript. It works by
detecting the increase in blood flow to the vasculature thatis associated
with neural activity in the brain (Matthews, 2001). The blood oxygenation
level dependent effect (BOLD effect) provides a comparative measurement
of oxygenated versus deoxygenated haemoglobin (Gjedde, 2001). In other
words, this measure is then used to determine whatareas are the most
active in the brain. Oxygenated haemoglobin does not have as much
impact on the magnetic field of the fMRI scanner. However, deoxygenated
haemoglobin does significantly impact the magnetic field. As activity in
the brain increases, deoxygenated haemoglobin decreases, this enhances
the variation in magnetic haemoglobin creating the BOLD signal. Since
fMRI is not designedandis not capable of detecting “absolute neuronal
activity” in the brain, it is used to detect the difference in brain activity (or
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BOLDsignal) betweena set of experimental conditions. Participants are
usually exposed to several experimental conditions and then a comparison
is made betweenthe conditionsto assess activation (Matthews, 2001).
2.3.1. fMRI Paradigms
During the {MRI experimentparticipants are typically required to perform
a series of tasks. These tasks are often alternated between an experimental
condition and a control or distracter condition (Donaldson and Buckner,
2001). These conditions are usually repeated several times and are often
separated by rest periods, which make up the {MRI paradigm. Most often
the stimuli used are audio or visual stimuli, however, the stimuli can also
include taste, odour, andtactile stimuli.
I used fMRI in twostudies incorporated in this thesis. The ability to
examine neural correlates along with the behavioural component makes
fMRI a very specialtool in psychological research. However, {MRI is not
withoutcriticism (Matthews, 2001). For instance {MRI has beencriticized
as a secondary measurementofphysiological activity. Thisis true,
however, that does notdiscredit the information that {MRI does provide.
fMRI provides an in depth look at brain function, not an exact
measurement of mental activity, but paired with behavioural informationit
can providea clearer picture as to what is occurring neurologically in
responseto the experimental question being investigated. Additionally, the
temporal resolution or timing of {MRI is not as fast as other methodslike
EEG.I elected to use {MRI in these studies because I wasvery interested
in the spatial localization of function. In the future I believe that ostracism
research could benefit from an examination ofthe timing (temporal
resolution) ofbrain function. Lastly, it can be said that {MRI research is
proneto localization, examining only onearea instead of a network.I
attempted notto isolate structures, but to look for a complete set of
structures working together to complete the task by using different
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comparison ofbrain activity during different tasks. I did not use, however,
connectivity modelling. Overall, I think that {MRI is a very useful tool for
psychological research. Because {MRI data is very sensitive and personal
material, all data was handled in an appropriate manner following the rules
and regulations enforced by the University of Liverpool and MARIARC.
2.4. Measures
2.4.1. Fundamental Needs Questionnaire/Social Exclusion Questionnaire
In all of the exclusion studiesin this thesis, I have elected to use the
Fundamental Needs Questionnaire/Social Exclusion Questionnaire
(Williams, Chang, and Choi, 2000; See Appendix 1.1.) to assess the impact
of social exclusion on four fundamental needs. The followingis a
description of the measure andofthe characteristics that are calculated.
The theory behind this questionnaire assumes that exclusion uniquely
targets and threatens four distinct fundamental needs. These needs are
belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence. This post-
experimental questionnaire is used to measure the degree to which
participants were impacted by exclusion or inclusion. Lowerratings on the
fundamental needsindicate that the level ofthose needs have decreased
comparedto participants that were included. Participants rated their
response on nine point scale ranging from 1= not at all and 9= always.
Thefirst part of the questionnaire contains a manipulation check, whichis
used to assess whetherornotthe participant actually realized that they
were excludedor included. The questions in the manipulation check
include the following questions: “What percent of the throws were thrown
to you?” and “To what extent were you included bythe other participants
during the game?” These questions are an important addition to the
questionnaire,as it is essential to know whetherornotparticipants actually
realized whether they were included or excludedin the study. The
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questionnaire also contains a series of questions that ask participants to
assesstheir level of satisfaction of four needs that they felt while they were
playing the game. Thefirst group of questionspertains to the need to
belong. These questions include the following:“I felt poorly accepted by
the otherparticipants,” “I felt as though I had made a connection or bonded
with one or more ofthe participants during the Cyberball game,” and “I
felt like an outsider during the Cyberball game.” Controlis the next need
that is assessed. Questions include the following: “I felt like I was able to
throw theball as often as I wanted during the game,”“I felt somewhat
frustrated during the game,” and“I felt in control during the Cyberball
game.” Self-esteem is another need assessed by the questionnaire. The self
esteem portion of the questionnaire includes the following questions:
“During the gameI felt good about myself,”“I felt that the other
participants failed to perceive me as a worthy andlikeable person,” and “I
felt somewhat inadequate during the Cyberball game.” Finally, meaningful
existence is the last need that is included in the questionnaire. Meaningful
existence is assessed by the following questions:“I felt that my
performance(e.g. catching the ball, deciding whom to throwthe ballto)
had someeffect on the direction of the game,”“I felt non-existent during
the Cyberball game,” and “I felt as though my existence was meaningless
during the Cyberball game.”Participants were askedto rate their mood.
They were given choices from the followinglist: bad, good, happy, sad,
relaxed, tense, aroused, and not aroused. Additionally, two supplementary
variables (or questions) were added the end of the questionnaire. These
questionsare “I felt angry during the Cyberball game” and “I enjoyed
playing the Cyberball game.” Limitations of the questionnaire will be
discussed at the end of the chapter.
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2.4.2. Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ)
I used the Adult Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (A-RSQ) (Downey,
Berenson, and Kang, 2006) to measure rejection sensitivity among
participants (See Appendix 1.2.). Downey and Feldman (1996) describe
The Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ), the precursorto the A-
RSQ:“This measure operationalizes rejection sensitivity as generalized
expectations and anxiety about whether significant others will meet ones’
needs for acceptanceor will be rejecting”(p. 132). The measure contains
questions that involve expressing a need or a desire to an importantother,
andit is believed that this possible vulnerability should elicit rejection
anxiety and expectations from those who havean increasedsensitivity to
rejection.
Participants are presented with nine scenarios. Some involve family and
friends and romantic partners, while others involve strangers. In each
scenario participants are asked to imagine that they are making a request of
someone: for instance, “Youcall a friend whenthere is something on your
mindthat you feel that you really need to talk about.” Participants are then
asked how concerned they would be about the response to what they are
asking and whether they would expect the person they are asking to accept
or reject their request. In the developmentofthe original Rejection
Sensitivity Questionnaire, from which the A-RSQ was derived, young
adults (college students) were askedto identify situations that were
relevantto their lives. The scenarios included in the RSQ are designed to
target that population and were developed from interviews with 20 young
adult students. I elected to use the Adult Rejection Sensitivity
Questionnaire (A-RSQ) questionnaire, as I thought that it was more
generalizable to a variety of age groups. Several of the studies for my
thesis were conducted online; therefore, I did not have control over the age
of myparticipants. I felt that the A-RSQ would be a better choice to reach
a larger age group. Additionally, while manyofthe participants were
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students, they were graduate students andI felt that there wasa distinction
in age and maturity of graduate students versus undergraduate students, so
the A-RSQ seemed more appropriate for graduate students.
The A-RSQ wascreated “by revising situations on the RSQ to have more
generally applicable wording, removing those that were specific to college
life, and generating additional items about potential rejection situations in
adults’ lives. The 9-situation Adult RSQ (A-RSQ; Downey, Berenson, &
Kang, 2006) correlated .87 with the original college based 18-situation
RSQ amongstudents” (Berensonetal., 2009).
As I mentioned previously, the responses to the scenarios provided vary
along two dimensions. Thefirst dimension is the degree of anxiety or
concern about the outcome. The second dimensionis the expectation of
rejection or acceptance (Downeyand Feldman, 1996). Systematic
covariation along these dimensions is common. Someparticipants respond
that they are anxious about making the request, but do not expect to be
rejected. Other participants with high anxiety about making the request do
report a similarly high level ofrejection expectation. Participants rate their
level of concern on a 6 point scale (1= very unconcerned to 6= very
concerned). The likelihood of rejection is also measured on a 6 pointscale
(1=very unlikely to 6=very likely). Expectations of rejection are
represented on the very likely end ofthe scale.
The validity of the A-RSQ has been demonstrated (Berensonet al., 2009).
The authors reported that the A-RSQ was completed by 685 participants
and that the results were consistent among genders and age groups. There
was however somevariation with level of education. After controlling for
level of education the A-RSQcorrelated with the following constructs:
neuroticism, social/avoidancedistress, self-esteem, attachment anxiety and
attachment avoidance, and interpersonalsensitivity and depression
(Berensonet al., 2009). Berenson etal. (2009) reported that the A- RSQ
has high internal validity (a = .74). The Adult RSQ (A-RSQ)has the
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following characteristics: Mean = 8.99 and Standard Deviation = 3.60;
(Berensonet al., 2009).
In someinstances it may seem that the questions on the RSQ and A-RSQ
are phrased differently, and this difference could impact one’s perception
of the question. For instance, in some ofthe questions from the A-RSQ
suggests a motive for the meeting between the individual and the
significant other(“...you call or approach your significant other because
you want to make up) whereasthe scenario from the RSQ does not
mention wanting to make up,just that the person wantsto see the other
(“You call your boyfriend/girlfriend after a bitter argument andtell him/her
that you want to see him/her”). While this concern may have somevalidity,
the purpose of the RSQ (and the A-RSQ),as stated in the article by
Downeyand Feldman (1996), is to assess vulnerability and rejection
anxiety when onein placedinsituations that involve expressing a need or a
desire to a significant other. Therefore, in the A-RSQ scenario, a need or
desire to make up is expressed. The scenariois in accordance with the
intentions of the measure as it expresses a needor desire. The authors
continue on to state (Downey and Feldman, 1996), ““Thus, situationsthat
involve expressing a needto a significant other should beparticularly
likely to activate generalized reaction anxieties and expectations, thereby
revealing the extent of a person’s sensitivity to rejection” (p.1329).
Furthermore, the fact that the A-RSQ correlated .87 with the RSQ suggests
that regardless of minor differences in wording and semantics, the two
measuresare similar.
The RSQ and the A-RSQare scored the same way. A score ofrejection
sensitivity is calculated for each situation by multiplying the response to
level of rejection concern by the response to acceptance expectancy (7-
acceptance expectancy). A meanis calculated for the scores for each item
and this producesthe overall rejection sensitivity score.
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2.5. Analysis
Two main software tools were used in the analysis ofmy data. I used the
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) to analyze behavioural data
and FMRIB Software Library (FSL) (Smithet al., 2004) for the analysis of
brain imaging data.
2.6. Conclusion
Hopefully, this overview of the methods used in the studies incorporated in
this thesis provides clarification for the reader, prevents repetition
throughout the manuscript, and provides a place to refer back to while
reading the data chapters to follow. Based on the background information
and existing research, the methodsusedin this thesis appear to be valid and
reliable tools and are suitable for the studies as they were executedin this
programmeofresearch.
While all of these measures appearto be valid andreliable that does not
mean that usage makesfor a flawless design in all of the studies. For
instance, one major problem exists with the use of Cyberball andthe post-
experimental questionnaire. These measuresare both valid andreliable
measures, but without a pre-experimental measureto assessthe
fundamental needsprior to the experimental conditions one cannot say
without exception that the results or differences between the inclusion and
exclusion groupsare the result of a decrease in the four fundamental needs.
For instance, throughoutthis thesis, it was my goal to show that individuals
exposed to exclusion were negatively impacted, and subsequently,
excluded participants demonstrated a decrease in the four fundamental
needs, but one cannot makethat claim becausethere is no data concerning
baseline measures of the fundamental needs. Withoutthe inclusion of the
pre-experimental measure one might aseasily say that participants in the
inclusion condition showedan increase in the four fundamentalneeds. This
is a limiting factor of the measures used throughoutthis thesis. Given the
43
previous research done on social exclusion andall ofthe existing literature
(Williams, 2001; Eisenbergeret al., 2006; Eisenbergeret al., 2003; Zadro
et al., 2004; Van Beest and Williams, 2006; Gonsalkorale and Williams,
2007; Zadro et al., 2006; Eisenbergeret al., 2007; Java and Oinonen, 2007;
Oatenet al., 2008; Mastenet al., 2009; Krill et al., 2008; Krill and Platek,
2009), evidence suggeststhat it is not likely that participants would
demonstrate an increase in the four fundamental needs and demonstrate no
effect when excluded, but given myresults I cannot confirm thatthis is the
case. These alternative explanations for the findings herein are important to
mention, but I maintain that the differences between the fundamental needs
are mostlikely related to the experimental condition. Furthermore, the
utilization of the experimental design set-up, that I used throughout, has
been used over a dozen times and has been used for over 10 years in social
exclusion research (Williams, 2001; Eisenbergeret al., 2006; Eisenberger
et al., 2003; Zadroet al., 2004; Van Beest and Williams, 2006;
Gonsalkorale and Williams, 2007; Zadroetal., 2006; Eisenbergeretal.,
2007; Java and Oinonen, 2007; Oatenet al., 2008; Masten et al., 2009;
Krill et al., 2008; Krill and Platek, 2009). While it may not be without
flaw, it is acommonly used and positively regarded paradigm insocial
exclusion research.
In the upcoming chapters I am going to describe four studies, which utilize
someorall of the methods and measures describedin this chapter.
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Chapter 3 The Impact of Cognitive Style on the Experienceof Social
Exclusion During the Cyberball Game
3.1. Introduction
This chapter describes an experiment designedto investigate how
empathizing and systemizing cognitive styles (cf. Baron-Cohen, 2003)
accountfor variation in the experience ofsocial exclusion (self-reported
distress and four fundamental needs) during aninternet ball toss game.
3.1.1. Social Exclusion
Social exclusionis the act of being excluded,rejected, or ostracized by
others without explicit explanation or negative attention. Within the
context ofthis, it can also be described as the reflexive experience of
distress as result of an actual or perceived psychological or physical
distance from others (Williams, 2007; Eisenbergeret al., 2003; see also
Gruter and Masters, 1986 for a review). Additonally, social exclusion has
the uniqueability to threaten four fundamental human needs: belonging
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995), self-esteem (Baumeister, 1994; Leary,
1990), control (Seligman, 1975), and meaningful existence (Williams,
2007; 2001). The importance of the aforementioned needs for motivation,
self-efficacy, and even survival has been supportedin the literature
(Baumeister and Tice, 1990; Williams, Cheung, and Choi, 2000). Evidence
has also shown that individuals seek to increase their sense ofbelonging,
control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence (Baumeister and Tice,
1990). Whenthese needsare lacking individuals experience pathological
effects that are more significant than an impulsive distress response
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995). In one study (Eisenberger, Lieberman, and
Williams, 2003), participants observed a scenario that emulated exclusion
as well as experiencinga real exclusion condition while they were in an
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fMRI scanner. While activation wasthe strongest during the exclusion
round,results indicated that the same parts of the brain were activated
during the observed roundas wereactivated during the exclusion round.
This suggests that participants do notactually have to be purposefully
excluded to be negatively affected by exclusion (Eisenberger and
Lieberman, 2004; Eisenbergeret al., 2003; Williams, 1997).
Zadro and colleagues (2004; see also Williams, Cheng, and Choi, 2000)
randomly assignedparticipants to play a ball toss game, Cyberball,
(Williamset al., 2000; Williamset al., 2002) with a computer or with
another humanvia an internet connection. They discovered that individuals
reported a decrease in the four fundamental needs(i.e. belonging, control,
self-esteem, and meaningful existence) after exclusion from the ball toss
game, independent of whetherornot the individual believed that they were
excluded by the computer or another human being. Thus, social exclusion
appears to have a pervasive negative impact uponthe target regardless of
the intention or the source of the exclusion.
Social exclusionis likely to have been of great evolutionary significance
both to the group and to excludedindividuals. It may have been
evolutionarily adaptive for a group to excludecertain individuals as a way
to maintain group cohesiveness. Kurzban and Leary (2001) suggestthat
ostracism goes hand-in-hand with punishment, and has evolved as a
mechanism to protect group members from individuals whoviolate social
norms(e.g. incest) or group rules (Barner-Barry, 1986; Gruter and Masters,
1986). For the individual, exclusion can have dire consequences(Gruter
and Masters, 1986; Kurzban and Leary, 2001). Excluded individuals can
becomecutoff from resources and from protection by the group. The
potential danger of social exclusion may haveled to the developmentof a
response system designed to prevent and counteract social exclusion.
Those individuals who are more perceptive to ostracism may have an
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advantage in that they can act quickly to avoid exile from the group
(Williams, 2007).
Decreasesin the four fundamental needs (Williams, 2001) as well as the
onsetof feelings of distress, humiliation, sadness, and anger, are examples
of the types of motivational and emotional mechanismsthat might drive
behavioural changes aimedat avoiding social exclusion or regaining
inclusion in the group (Robertson, Delton, and Klein, 2006; Williams,
2007). Whenindividuals are excluded or threatened with exclusion they
experience distress, which has beencalled social pain (Eisenberger,et al.,
2003; Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004). However, despite the potentially
hardwired nature of this response, there is no evidence as to whetherthis
distress response varies as a function of individual differences in social
cognition. Here I investigated whetherproclivity to empathize or systemize
had any bearing onthe perception and experienceofsocial rejection.
According to Williams’ model (See Chapter 1, Section 1.6. for a review),
cognitivestyle (e.g. brain type, discussed below)is classified under the
Moderator and Mediator module of the model; asit is an individual
difference of targets that may impact the outcomeofexclusion.I tested this
part of the model.
3.1.2. Empathizing-Systemizing Hypothesis
The Empathizing-Systemizing theory (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Baron-Cohen,
2003; Baron-Cohen and Hammer, 1997) claims that the female brain is
principally predisposed towards empathizing and the male brainis
principally predisposed towards systemizing (Baron-Cohen, 2003;
Goldenfeld, Baron-Cohen, and Wheelwright, 2005). Empathizing can be
definedas“the drive to identify another person’s emotions and thoughts
and to respondto these with an appropriate emotion” (Baron-Cohen, 2003,
p. 3). A key component to empathizing is theory ofmind (ToM), whichis
critical for the detection of information pertaining to the mentalstate,
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emotions, and intentions of others and to recognize how another’s feelings
may impact oneself (Bachevalier and Loveland, 2006). Without ToM there
would be considerable difficulty in changing one’s behaviour in response
to cues and changesin anotherindividual’s behaviour or emotionalstate.
This does not imply that individuals who rank low on empathy are ToM
impaired, but there appears to be an important link between empathy and
ToM. Empathy has been hypothesized as an essential key to the
developmentand maintenance of humanrelationships (Baron-Cohen,
2003).
Females tend to be better at empathizing than males (Baron-Cohen, 2003;
Goldenfeldet al., 2005). Baron-Cohen (2003) suggests that this sex
difference is related to the evolutionary hypothesis for division of labor in
hunter-gatherer societies. Baron-Cohen (2003) writes, “Some theories
suggest that our male and female ancestors occupied quite different niches
and had very differentroles. If true, the selective pressuresare likely to
have been very different for each, and could haveled to the evolution of
different types of cognitive specialization” (p.117). It is easy to imagine
how empathizing would be beneficial to mothering and to living peacefully
in a small community, becauseit is a critical componentin sociality and
relationship maintenance.In fact, many of the advantages gleaned by
superior empathizersare directly related to social inclusion,or alternatively
avoidanceofsocial exclusion.
Systemizing, the other endpoint of Baron-Cohen’s (2003) brain-type
continuum,is the drive to understand aphysical system. Additionally, the
drive to build a system is also an important part of systemizing. There are
many types of systems such as mathematics, machines, music,climate,
economics, etc. These systems have one thing in common:a set of rules.
Oncethe rules governing the system are known, they can be used to make
accurate predictions about the system (Baron-Cohen, 2003; Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Burtenshaw, and Hobson, 2007). Systemizing parallels
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empathizing in two ways: 1) individuals can have differing degrees of
systemizing, and 2)it is believed to have been selected for during evolution
in a similar way as empathizing(i.e. through frequency-dependent
selection based on sex-specific division of labor). The hypothesized
advantages associated with increased systemizing ability include using and
makingtools, hunting, warstrategies, social dominance and power,as well
as tolerating solitude (Baron-Cohen, 2003). It is of particular interest that
tolerating solitude is associated with increased systemizing ability.
Individuals whoare better at tolerating solitude would mostlikely be less
drivento socialize and therefore they can devote moreoftheir time to other
activities. Baron-Cohen (2003) suggests that in pre-industrial societies,
toleration of solitude might have been especially advantageous to hunters
whohadto go on long journeysin search of food. One might speculate that
males who hunted for longer may conceivably have been more successful,
which would haveresulted in more food and increased chance ofsurvival.
Furthermore, the tendency to systemize may engender behaviourthat
isolates an individual from therest of the group.
I hypothesized that individuals categorized as empathizers would report
greater levels of distress as a result of being socially excluded during a ball
toss game. Empathizers were predicted to show lowerself-reported
satisfaction levels ofbelonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful
existence. On the contrary, systemizers were predicted to report that they
experiencedless distress (self-reported satisfaction levels would not be
impacted by exclusion)as a result of exclusion from the ball toss game.
Specifically, I predicted that individuals at the extreme empathizing end of
the spectrum would be most“distressed” by social exclusion, showing the
lowest self-reportedsatisfaction levels of belonging,control, self-esteem,
and meaingful existence; furthermore, indviduals at the extreme
systemizing spectrum would beleast “distressed” by the social exclusion
condition. Individuals whofell into the balanced brain category, meaning
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they are no more empathic than they are systematic, were predicted to
report lowersatisfaction levels on the four needs, but not to report levels as
low as extreme empathizers or empathizers. Furthermore, I hypothesized,
that balanced brain individuals would report moredistress (lower
satisfaction on the four needs) than extreme systemizers and systemizers.
3.2. Methods
3.2.1. Participants
One hundred and nineteen participants (72 females; 47 males; Mage =
32.49, SD = 11.63), were recruited from the internet
(http://www.webexperiment.net) and university announcements system.
Data werecollected using online data collection software (Wathne and
Platek, 2007). The University of Liverpool School of Biological Sciences
Committee on Research Ethics approved the study. Participants were asked
to indicate what discipline they studied or workedin,as this has been
shown to correlate with systemizing and empathizing (Baron-Cohenetal.,
2007; Focquaert, Steven, Wolford, Colden, and Gazzaninga, 2007). The
Humanities group consisted of 39 individuals; the Sciences group consisted
of 48 individuals. There were 32 participants whoselected “neither”. The
majority of the individuals whoselected “neither” entered their profession
separately, some ofwhich included adminstration, law, public safety, event
planning, and finance.
3.2.2. Procedure
The sections below describe the methods and measuresusedin this study.
3.2.3. Empathizing — Systemizing Quotients
Participants completed the short forms of the Empathy Quotient (EQ-
Short) (Wakabayashiet al., 2006) (See Appendix 1.3.) and the Systemizing
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Quotient (SQ-Short) (Wakabayashiet al., 2006) (See Appendix 1.4.). The
scores from the SQ-S and the EQ-S hadto be converted into standardized
(T) scores (see Wakabayashietal., 2006 for more information). Then the
the EQ-S (T) score was subtracted from the SQ-S (7) score. Thisresulting
numberis called the D score, as it accounts for the difference between the
two brain types. A high D score(the difference between the SQ-S and EQ-
S) denotes a systemizing cognitive style (10 <D <20is type S). A score
above 20 is categorized as an extreme systemizing style. A low score
(including negative scores) denotes an empathizing cognitive style -10 <
D <-20is type E). Extreme empathizing style is categorized by a score of-
20 and below.
3.2.4. Cyberball Parameters
After completing the EQ and the SQ participants played Cyberball
(Williamset al., 2002; see Sections 2.1.4. and 2.2. for a review). The
Cyberball game was modified so the game could be played over the
internet. Cyberball was programmedto generate 60 tosses during each
round andto delay eachtoss for 0.5 to 3 seconds in an effort to make the
gameseem realistic. Players were randomly assignedto either an inclusion
round or an exclusion round. In the inclusion round, the subject was
involved in playing the game (throwing the ball) with confederates
(computerized opponents) throughout the duration of the game. In the
exclusion round,the participants were allowed to participate during the
beginning of the game(six throws). After six throws the game was
programmedto stop tossing the ball to the participant; the participant saw
the computerized confederates playing amongst themselves but no longer
received a throw during this exclusion period.
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3.2.5. Post game questionnaire
After the game ended,participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
(Fundamental Needs Questionnaire/Social Exclusion Questionnaire, see
Section 2.4.1. for a review) to assess their level of needs and distress while
being excluded from the ball toss game (Williamset al., 2002; Zadro,et al.,
2004). The questionnaire contained manipulation checks to ensure that
participants who where excludedactually noticed that they were excluded.
The questionnaire (Zadroet al., 2004) also contained questions that were
designedto assessparticipants’ levels of four basic needs during the game:
belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence. Additionally,the
questionnaire contained two questions about supplementary variables(i.e.,
‘I enjoyed playing the Cyberball game,’ and‘I felt angry during the
Cyberball game.’) and mood.Participants provided their responses on a
scale of 1 through 9 (1= notat all, 9= always). In some cases, questions
hadto be reverse scored, so that a higher score would be equivalent to a
morepositive response(e.g. the question “Overall in the last round, did
you feel rejected by the other players?”).
3.2.6. Debriefing
After participants completed the questionnaire the final screen in their web
browserpresented a debriefing statement about the experiment.
Participants were informedthat they had not been playing with real
individuals and that the computer game had been programmedto randomly
include or excludeparticipants. They were also provided with contact
details for additional information or questions abouttheir participation.
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3.3. Results
3.3.1. Manipulation Checks and Fundamental Needs
There were three manipulation check questionsincludedin the
questionnaire. Participants in the exclusion condition reported feeling
significantly less accepted and included, and morerejected, compared to
participants in the inclusion condition (F(/,117) = 225.7, p < .001,
partialf’ = 0.659). Results indicate that participants were able to correctly
identify their status of inclusion or exclusion during the game.
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)revealed that there was a
main effect for the inclusion/exclusion conditions. There was, however, no
main effect for sex ofparticipant. Furthermore, there was no interaction
betweeninclusion/exclusion condition and sex. Results also showedthat
participants in the exclusion condition reported lowerlevels of the
fundamental needs with the exception of meaningful existence (Belonging,
F(1,118) = 123.4, p < .001, partial? = 0.518; Control = F(1,118) = 76.1,
p<.001; partial’ = 0.398; Self-Esteem = F(1,118) = 10.2, p =.002,
partial’ = 0.081; Meaningful Existence = F(1,118) = 3.0, p = .089,
partial’ = 0.025). Theseresults replicate those found by Zadro and
colleagues (2004), with the exception ofthe meaningful existence variable
not being significant (see Table 3.1.).
 Inclusion Exclusion
Fundamental Needs
Belonging M=6.37; SD=1.05 M=3.45; SD=1.64
Control M=6.06; SD=1.60 M=3.45; SD=1.53
Self-Esteem M=6.95; SD=1.28 M=5.94; SD=1.85
Meaningful Existence M=4.62; SD=0.88 M=4.33; SD=0.84
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Table 3.1. Means and Standard Deviations of Variable Scores. Scores
range between |=notatall to 9=very much so; someitemsare reverse
scored. “Each ofthe fundamental needscores represents an average of three questions
from that category.
There were two supplementary variables in the questionnaire:“I felt angry
during the Cyberball game”(reverse scored) and “I enjoyed playing the
Cyberball game.” These two questions were combinedinto a composite
variable which I named the supplementary variable. An ANOVArevealed
that participants in the exclusion condition reported significantly lower
scores on the supplementary variable (F(1,118) = 9.378, p = .003,
partial’ = 0.272). In other words, they were significantly more angry and
experienced less enjoyment during the Cyberball game. Participants were
asked to rate their mood on sliding scale before the Cyberball game and
again after the game was completed. Results indicated that there was no
significant change in moodbefore or after the game no matter what
condition participants were assigned to (Fs< 1.0, ns).
3.3.2. SO, EQ andInclusion vs. Exclusion Conditions
Analyses were run to determine whetherthere wasa relationship between
scores on the SQ-S and EQ-S (Wakabayashiet al., 2006) and level of
distress (measured by the four fundamental needs) in the exclusion
condition (See Table 3.2. for a breakdown ofthe frequencies of each brain-
type category). A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed
that there was no interaction between sex and brain type. There was,
however, a main effect for the D score on the contro/ fundamental need
variable (see 3.1.), but there was not a main effect for the D score on the
other three fundamental need variables.
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Table 3.2. Frequency of Males in Brain-Type Category
 
     
. CumulativeFrequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Empathizing 5 10.6 10.6 10.6
Balanced Brain 26 55.3 55.3 66.0
Systemizing 8 17.0 17.0 83.0
Extreme-. 8 17.0 17.0 100.0Systemizing
Total 47 100.0 100.0
Table 3.3. Frequency of Females in Brain-Type Category
. CumulativeFrequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
Extreme Empathizing 7 9.7 9.7 9.7
Empathizing 18 25.0 25.0 34.7
Balanced Brain 40 55.6 55.6 90.3
Systemizing 5 6.9 6.9 97.2
Extreme Systemizing 2 2.8 2.8 100.0
Total 72 100.0 100.0     
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Figure 3.1. Cognitive Style and Control. Mean (+S.D.) control variable
score as a function of cognitive style.
A Bonferroni post hoc analysis illustrated that extreme empathizers (Mean
= 3.52; SD = 1.69) reported less control than systemizers (Mean = 5.69;
SD = 2.72; p = .019) and extreme systemizers (Mean = 5.73; SD = 2.12;p
= .026). It also revealed that individuals in the balanced brain (Mean =
4.20; SD = 1.68) category scored lower on control than systemizers (p =
.010) and extreme systemizers (p = .025). A linear stepwise regression
showedthat the assigned condition(i.e., inclusion and exclusion)
accountedfor 40% ofthe variance (R’= .412) and that Standardized D
score added 3.7% of the variance (R’ = .448) in differencesin the control
need variable scores.
3.3.3. Real Players?
At the very end of the experimentparticipants were asked whether they
believed that they were playing the game with “real” participants. Results
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indicated that 78.2% of participants did not believe that they were playing
the Cyberball game with “real” participants. Of those participants assigned
to the exclusion condition, 86% (n = 58)said that they did not believe that
the other participants were real players. Ofthose participants assigned to
the inclusion condition 67.3% (n = 35) said they did not believe the other
players were real. An ANOVArevealed that there wasa significant
difference between those who were excluded and included andbeliefin
real players (F(/,118) = 6.606, p = .001). Participants who were excluded
wereless likely to believe that they were playing with real players whereas
participants that were included were more likely to believe state that they
believed their opponents were real players comparedto the excluded
participants.
3.4. Discussion
Findings showthat social exclusion resulted in a significant difference in
self-reported levels of three out of four hypothesized fundamental needs
(belonging, control, and self-esteem, but not meaningful existence) and the
mean supplementary variable (anger (reverse scored), and enjoymentofthe
Cyberball game). It is important to note, that while supporting literature
suggests that the difference between the inclusion and exclusion groups on
the fundamental needsis due to a decrease in the four fundamental needs
on the part of the excludedparticipants, one cannot say without a doubt
that that is the case. There is no pre-experimental questionnaire for
comparison to indicate that the change is definitely in the directionsthat I
am suggesting. However, whileit is possible, it is unlikely that the
difference between the two groupsis dueto a significant increase in the
fundamental needsonthe part of the included participants and there was no
changefor the excluded participants. Herein, I interpret the results in
support ofthe precedingliterature, but I wanted to makeit clear that my
interpretation is not the only possible interpretation.
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In addition, cognitive style affected participants’ responses to the Cyberball
game. Individuals with an empathizing and balanced cognitive style
reported lowest levels of self-perceived control during the Cyberball game
(regardless of inclusion or exclusion) and differed significantly from
systemizers and extreme systemizers. Williams, Cheung, and Choi (2000)
suggest that exclusion from the Cyberball game challengesparticipants’
perceived control over the social interaction. Participants are unable to
interact or influence the actionsofthe other players in an effort to regain
inclusion. This results in a sense of loss of control. Perhaps empathizers
report feeling less control, as they may be moresensitive to others’
reactions and maybe looking for waystointeract or influence the other
players, but this is not possible in the game.
According to Baron-Cohenetal. (2003) empathetic individuals put
themselvesin “the other person’s shoes”andare consistently sensitive to
managingsocial interactions so that others are not hurt or offended.
Empathizersare also able to effortlessly judge when someoneelse’s
emotions have changed andto infer why their emotions have changed and
what might make them feel better. Therefore, when empathizersrealize
that they cannot influence the other players in the game, it seemstoresult
in lowerlevels of self-perceived control. While exclusion accounts for the
majority of variance in the four fundamental needs, cognitive style
accounts for additional variance for the Control need variable. In other
words, my findings suggest that empathizers have different needs than
systemizersin socialinteractions, particularly in relationship to controlling
whatoccurs in that interaction. Thus, knowing individual differences in
cognitive style addsto the understanding of the impacts of social exclusion
on individuals.
Furthermore, despite the fact that 78.2% of participants reported that they
did not believe that they were playing the game with “real” participants my
findings showedthat individuals werestill sensitive to social exclusion in a
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virtual environment. Regardless of whether the participants believed that
the other players were real, the results bear out my prediction that
exclusion from the game would haveself-reported negative effects, and are
consistent with earlier findings (Smith and Williams, 2004; Williamset al.,
2000; Zadro et al., 2004). Zadroet al. (2004) discovered that being
excluded during the Cyberball game waspainful regardless of whether the
exclusion came from a computer or a humanbeing. This supports the
notion that social exclusion has a profound effect on individuals. Human
beings’ sensitivity to social exclusion in fact appears to trump the
realization that one is being excluded by a computer program.It should be
noted, however, that I was unable to veryify the participants’ reports that
they did not believe they were playing against human opponents.
Understanding more aboutthat small percentage whobelieved the
opponents werereal would be interesting. Given the basic descriptive and
inferential statistics that I ran on this variable, results suggest that excluded
participants reported believing that participants were not real more often
than the includedparticipants. This is interesting to consider. Out ofpure
conjecture, one might speculate that exlcudedparticipants claimed that
they believed that the participants were not real as somesort of protective
mechanism to make themselvesfeel better about being excluded. They can
then justify to themselves that the game excluded them,as it was
programmedto do, not the other participants as they wereledto believe.
Asdiscussed above,participantsstill react negatively to exclusion
regardless of the source (computer versus human), but perhaps excluded
participants were able to make themselvesfeelbetter after the fact by
recognizing that the other participants were notreal.
Zadroet al. (2004) suggest that because ostracism from a groupcarries
such negative consequences, such asloss of contact with significant others,
loss of resources,and possibly death, that human beings have evolved a
sophisticated set of mechanismsfor detecting exclusion andostracism.
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These mechanismsfor detecting exclusion prompts emotional responses
which motivate individuals to react and respond in ways aimed toward
regaining inclusion into the group or cope with exclusion. Myfindings
suggest that the degree to which these emotional responses are mobilized
maybepartially dependent on cognitivestyle.
Thestudy is limited in several respects. First, because the study was
conducted via the internet, the conditions of participation, including who
took part in the study, were out of my control. Information about
participants’ state (e.g., tired) or the conditions(e.g., location) under which
they completed the study is not available. Whileit is unlikely, this may
have impacted the results. However, I wasableto track participation time
and networklocation (i.e. IP address) which allowed meto control for
multiple participation. Second, the Cyberball gameis a Java program
which runs in an internet browser. Somepotential participants were unable
to complete the game becausethey haddifficulty loading the gameor did
not have Javainstalled. In an effort to avoid this, I added a link at the
beginning of the game whereparticipants could downloadandinstall Java.
Third, studies (Kraut et al., 1998; Williamset al., 2000) suggest that
individuals who spend time on the internet pursuing social interactions,
may be moresusceptible to depression and loneliness. Krautet al. (1998)
discovered that spending time on the internet may replace face-to-face
relationships and interactions with weaker and moresuperficial internet
relationships. This mayresult in a decreased sense of belonging for high-
frequency internetusers. Since the participants in this study volunteered to
take part in an interactive online game, they may be morelikely to pursue
social relationships over the internet, and may be more likely to suffer from
depression andloneliness. Thus, this may be the population to which this
data can be generalized.In future studies, I plan to include the Rejection
Sensitivity Questionnaire (Downey and Feldman, 1996) to assess
sensitivity to rejection. Finally, the gender imbalance might be
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problematic. More females than males took part in the study. The
imbalanced sex ratio could have impacted theresults, since I was
examining empathizing and systemizing whichhasbeenclosely linked to
sex in the past (Baron-Cohen, 2003). I realise that it would be best to have
included equal numbers of males and femalesin each brain category
(empathizing, systemizing, etc.). I was unable to do that in this study, but
think that it would be an excellent sampling strategy to implicate in a
replication of the study.
In conclusion, a high empathizing cognitive style is associated with
decreased feeling of control during the Cyberball game. This study adds
information for Williams’ ostracism model suggesting that cognitive style
impacts the fundamental need for control, thus acting in a mediating or
moderating capacity. In future research, it would be interesting to apply
this investigation to the Reactions module of Williams’ model. For
instance, although the fundamental needs were only minimally different
due to brain-type, perhaps immediate and short-term reactions would be
impacted. Thereis a lengthy literature accounting for aggression as result
of exclusion (Twenge, 2000; Leary etal., 2003; Bingham, 2000; Crook,
1997; Lemonick, 2002) . Investigating the relationship between reaction to
exclusion and cognitive perspective might advance the understanding of
whois likely to turn to aggression as a result of social exclusion. Because
there seems to be a connection between brain type and gender (Baron-
Cohen, 2003), and there are gender differences in aggressive behaviour
(Bennett, Farrington, and Huesmann, 2005), perhaps a systemizing brain
type (tradionally male brain type) would predict a more aggressive
response following social exclusion. Additionally, it would also be
interesting to examinethe neural correlates of social exclusion and
cognitive style to see if there are differences in the neurological response to
social exclusion dependant on cognitivestyle.
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Chapter 4 Cognitive Bias Associated with Threat-Related Information
Pertaining to Social Exclusion
4.1. Introduction
Primates, and especially humans, have remarkably large brains for their
body size (Aeillo and Wheeler, 1995; McHenry, 1994; Ruffet al., 1997).
However, these large brains do not come without a cost. The brain is very
metabolically costly for its size and weight, using approximately 20% of
the body’s energy (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995). Additionally, the significant
weight of the human head makesthe neck moresusceptible to breakage,
and the girth of the head makeschildbirth more difficult for women.
Evolutionary theorists believe that the costs associated with increased brain
size and metabolic rate are outweighed by the adaptive benefits that are
endowed to organismswith large, encephalized brains (Aiello and Dunbar,
1993; Byrne and Whiten, 1988; cf. Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1980). The
large modern humanbrainis very sophisticated and allowsfor abstract
thinking, reasoning, learning, scenario building (Geary, 2009; Stone,
2006), and mentalizing about others mental states (Premack and Woodruff,
1978; Frith and Frith, 1999; Dunbar, 1998). It is hypothesized that the
environment our hominid ancestors faced forced brain evolution alongthis
path to solve adaptive and social problemsin the social domain (Aiello and
Wheeler, 1995).
The Ecological-Dominance-Social-Competition Hypothesis (EDSC)
(Alexander, 1989; Geary, 2009; Flinn, Geary, Ward, 2005 for a complete
review) claims that human dominance overecological challengeslike the
weather and earthly elements allowed for the developmentofa novelset of
selection pressures, which appearedin the form of competition from other
humans. Asselective pressures changed,social intelligence became
essential for survival and wasselected for. Social group living and
interaction requires social intelligence in order to detect deception, punish
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cheaters, form coalitions, and to abide by social hierarchical rules and
regulations. This model presents a framework for thinking about the
evolution and developmentof intelligence as well as incorporating the key
features of the ecological and climatic models of brain development (Ash
and Gallup, 2008; Geary, 2009). However the EDSC doesnot explain why
only primates would require the larger brain when other animals were
exposed to the same climatic and ecological pressures. The Social Brain
Hypothesis (Dunbar, 1992) also referred to in the past as Machiavellian
Intelligence hypothesis (Byrne and Whiten, 1988) offers an alternative
perspective on the developmentofintelligence. The crux of these
hypotheses rests upon neocortical developmentand its importance in social
intelligence. The large increase in neocortex size (which sets humans and
primates apart from other animals) is thought to be responsible for their
uncannyability to navigate and operate successfully in a social
environment. Research showsthat neocortical size is correlated with social
group size (Dunbar, 1992), the size of grooming cliques (Kudo and
Dunbar, 2001), social strategies employed in mating contexts (Pawlowski
et al., 1998), and frequencyofsocial play (Lewis, 2001). Together these
findings point toward the conclusionthat brain size impacts the number of
social relationships an organism is capable of maintaining. Indeed, the
social brain hypothesis argues that the large neocortex found in the human
brain evolved to assist with human and primate socialintelligence and
interaction (Dunbar, 1992).
Despite the disputes on what events spurred the developmentof greater
intelligence, both general and social in nature, the anatomical data supports
the theory that the primate brain is larger, and it is because ofthis large size
that primates havespecial cognitive abilities that are not shared with other
mammals (Aiello and Wheeler, 1995; McHenry, 1994, Ruff et al., 1997).
Given this schemeofevolutionary neurocognitive development,
characteristics of intelligence that are innate to the humanspecies are those
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that are closely embedded with successful group living and sociality such
as cooperation, observance/obeyingofsocial rules, group loyalty, and
avoidanceofsocial exclusion (Brewer, 2004).
4.1.1. Group Membership and the Cognitive Impact ofSocial Exclusion
Intelligence andsocialstructure are two of the mostsignificant adaptations
unique to the human species (Baumeister,et al., 2002). Since social living
has been large part ofhuman evolution, and humansare equipped with a
complex neuroanatomyallowing for enhancedsocialization skills, it is not
surprising that a great deal of humanattention is focused on maintaining
social interactions (e.g. theory ofmind andintentionality). Living in a
group provides many benefits for human beings, and being accepted as a
memberofa group is presumedto be adaptive, from a good design
perspective, because it provides protection, food sharing, access to
resources, access to shared information and knowledge, and accessto
mating resources,all of whichare essential to survival (Baumeisteretal.,
2002). Whensurvivalis at stake expulsion from a group is something that
is very serious and could have dire consequencesfor the expelled.
Therefore, one might hypothesize that when oneis excluded from the
group he would benefit from focusingall ofhis intellectual resources
toward reinclusion, which mightresult in regaining someofthe benefits
associated with groupliving (e.g., survival; Baumeisteret al., 2002).
However,it is possible that intelligence is designed to facilitate social
interaction (e.g. Social Brain Hypothesis), not to stand in as a substitute for
group membership. According to this line of reasoning, an individual who
is excluded would havea lesser need forintelligence because he is no
longer working to navigate the complex social environment of group
membership/inclusion,nor is he engaged in cooperative interaction where
suchintelligence is necessary (Baumeisteret al., 2002).
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A review ofthe literature reveals that exclusionis in fact related to
impaired performance onintelligence tests as well as impaired memory
(Baumeisteret al., 2002). In a series of studies, Baumeister and colleagues
(2002) conducted the aforementioned study when they were stumped by
the incongruity in behavioural responsesto social exclusion. For instance
results revealed that social exclusion triggered aggression (Twenge,
Baumeister, Tice, and Stuck, 2001), decreased prosocial behaviour
(Twengeet al., 2007), and increased self-defeating behaviour (Twenge,
Catanese, and Baumeister, 2002), but it producedrelatively little emotional
change(cf. Williamset al., 2002; Zadroet al., 2004). Because there was no
consistent explanation for these findings, Baumeisteret al. (2002) began to
think that cognition might be acting as a mediating variable. Before
continuing onit is important to mentionthat intelligence,as it is referred to
herein, is a measurementofintelligence as a trait (Horn, 1972) and the
short-term impact of exclusion on cognitive processes(e.g. intelligent
thought) is being discussed.
4.1.2. Cognitive Processing and Exclusion
Asmentioned previously (refer to Section 4.1.1.) Baumeisteret al. (2002)
reported that participants exhibited cognitive decrements onintelligence
tests after they were informed that they would most likely end up alone in
life (i.e. excluded). Participantsin the life alone condition showed the
largest decrements in performance onan intelligence test when answering
questions that required recalling information from a difficult passage and
on a test of logic and reasoning. However, performance was unaffected
whenparticipants had to answer questions regarding a noncomplex
passage and performing a rote-memory task. When excludedparticipants
were debriefed about the experimentprior to attempting the information
recall, they were significantly better at recalling the information which
suggests that they were able to encode the information but unable to
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retrieveit in the exclusion condition. The threat of social exclusion reduced
individual’s capacity for “intelligent thought” during the study. The authors
proposethatintelligence is a key part of social group membership (social
inclusion) and whenthatis threatened individuals suffer a reduced capacity
for cognitive processing.
Cognitive processes, dependent on executive control, seem to be impacted
by social exclusion (Baumeister and DeWall, 2005). It has been found that
self-regulation is also negatively impacted by exclusion (Baumeister,
DeWall, Ciaracco, and Twenge, 2005). Baumeister et al. (2005) discovered
that self-regulation decreased when people were subjected to exclusion. In
one instance participants were given oneofthree scenarios: future alone,
control, and future belongingness (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1. for a review
of this paradigm). In the future alone (exclusion) condition, participants
drank less ofa bad tasting health drink than individuals assigned to the
other conditions. Furthermore, participants who were informedthat they
werenot selected to join a group (excluded) showed impaired self
regulation in a cookietaste test. Rejected participants in the first study were
unable to make themselves imbibe a substantial amountof a healthy drink,
even though they were fully aware of the health benefits. In the second
study excludedparticipants ate significantly more cookies than those in the
other control and belongingness conditions. Results were interpreted as
evidence that individuals who were faced with exclusion had an inhibited
ability to self-regulate, possibly because of an impact in cognitive or
executive function. In a study by Pickett, Gardner, and Knowles (2004),
participants were given a Vocal Emotional Stroop Test where they were
asked to determine the voice tone (positive or negative) of words. In one
condition the words are incongruent with the voice tone (negative tone +
positive word; positive tone + negative word) andin the other condition the
words were congruent with the tone (positive tone + positive word;
negative tone + negative word). Participants with an increased need to
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belong andthosein the rejection condition showedlatency in the positive
incongruent category. Pickett and colleagues (2004) argue thatthis result
indicates that participants are showingan attentional bias towardspositive
words, not just negative words; therefore they are attuned to both positive
and negative cues “indicating both potential acceptance andrejection”(p.
1105). This seems to be an adaptive strategy, which allowsindividuals to
focus on salient cues that may be essential to changing their inclusionary
status as well as maintaining group membership.
4.1.3. Attentional Bias
Individuals with clinically diagnosed anxiety as well as those with
normally aroused anxiety demonstrate attentional biases towardsthreat-
related information (Jansson, Lundh, and Oldenburg, 2005). The
relationship between anxiety and cognitive bias for threat-related
information has been well establishedin theliterature. For instance,
individuals with clinically diagnosed anxiety show attentionalbiasto
threat-related information stimuli (Yovel and Mineka, 2004; Mineka,
Rafaeli-Morand Yovel, 2002; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Matthews,
1997). As an example of a non-clinical study which showsthis same
pattern, Thomson,Patel, Platek, and Shackelford (2007) discovered that
whenparticipants were primed with a sexual infidelity scenario their
response time in processing wordsrelated to infidelity were significantly
slowerthan their response time to neutral words. Thus whenindividuals
were primed with a negative scenario that had someself-relevant
importance (which increased anxiety), they tended to show anattentional
bias to stimuli relating to information aboutthat negative scenario.
Williams, Mathews, and MacLeod (1996), suggest two strategies for
assessing attentional bias: the emotional Stroop task and testing audio and
visual thresholds; herein I will focus on the former.
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Theoriginal version of the Stroop test (Stroop, 1935) has been in use for
many decades. The Stroop effect showsthat individuals experience a delay
in colour naming of a word whenthe wordalso relates to a colour. For
instance, oneis asked to say the colour of the word BLUE,but the word is
printed in green. Individuals show a markedinterference in processing.
McKennaand Sharma (2004)arguethat the traditional Stroop test (Stroop
effect) is the effect of “contrast of incongruent stimuli”(p. 382). In the case
of the emotional Strooptest the effect is such that the response time slows
as the emotional significance of the stimuli increases. In the emotional
Stroop task, emotionally valenced wordsare presented to the participant
and they are askedto say the colour of the ink ofthat word. Wordsthat are
negatively emotionally charged(e.g. evil) usually cause a delay in response
time compared to wordsthat are neutral(e.g. ocean). It is important to note
that it has been suggested that it is erroneousto refer to the task as an
emotional version of the Stroop task (McKennaand Sharma, 2004)
becauseit is not actually a Stroop test; however, I will use the refer to the
task as the emotional Stroop becauseforall intents and purposesthatis the
recognized nameofthe task. The emotionalStrooptest is relevantto this
study, and it shows howattentional bias to emotionally relevant stimuli can
slow responsetime, indicating a possible impairment in one’s processing
of information (Williamset al., 1996).
4.1.4. Rejection Sensitivity
Individual differences in the need to belong can impact a person’s
sensitivity to their social environmentandinteractions. For instance, one’s
need to belongis highly correlated with a successful ability to decode
social cues and increased attention to vocal tone, amongother things
(Pickett et al., 2004). However, humans cannotpossibly attend to all of the
social information in the environmentat once; therefore, people tend to
seek out evidencethat reinforces what they already believe is true
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(Cacioppo and Hawkley, 2005). In many waysindividuals often create
self-fulfilling prophecies for themselves. For example, if individuals have a
high self-esteem and believe that other people will like them, then those
individuals tend to act in a more open and friendly manner drawing people
to them, thus, appearing morelikeable and popular, and boosting their self
esteem. On the other hand, lonesomeindividuals tend to have an increased
negative evaluation of the world andsocial interactions, which only works
to increase their feelings of loneliness and isolation (Ducket al., 1994).
The sameis true of rejection. Individuals who are sensitive to rejection
have increased anxiety about the possibility of being rejected and the
likelihood ofbeing rejected (Cacioppo and Hawkley, 2005).
4.1.5. Aims andHypotheses
The aim ofthis study wasto use an emotional Stroop task to investigate the
effect that social exclusion had upon cognitive processing. This experiment
was designedto test the Reactions module of Williams’ ostracism model
(1997; See Chapter 1, Section 1.7. for a review). It was hypothesized that
whenparticipants experienced an episode of ostracism from a group and
were then presented with wordsrelating to ostracism (as well as other
emotional and control words)participants would demonstrate inhibited
cognitive processing and have a delayed response timeto the specific word
class. Second, I hypothesized that individuals who scored high onrejection
sensitivity would report higherlevels ofdistress as a result of being
excluded and would demonstrate a slower response time to words in the
exclusion class on the emotional Stroop task.
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4.2. Methods
4.2.1. Participants
The participants were 20 people from the University of Liverpool (10
males and 10 females, Mage = 28, SDage = 10.09)’. Participants wereall
asked to sign a consent form before taking part in the study. Permission to
run the study was granted by the School of Biological Sciences Committee
for Research Ethics at the University of Liverpool. Participants were
recruited through the university announcement system.
4.2.2. Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire
All participants completed the Adult Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire
(Downey, Berenson, and Kang, 2006; Downey and Feldman, 1996) for
adults. The Adult Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (A-RSQ) contains 9
questions (each with twoparts: a and b) pertaining to rejection concern and
acceptance expectancy. Participants were presented with a statementat the
beginning of each question and then answered the questions based on their
reaction to that statement. For instance, the statement says, “You ask your
parents or another family memberfor a loan to help you througha difficult
financial time.” The rejection concern question reads as follows: “How
concemedor anxious would you be over whetheror not your family would
want to help you?”Participants rated their concern on a scale from 1 to 6
 
' Tt is important to mention that while 44 individuals took part in the study, only 20 people
are included in the analysis of data. I programmed the Cyberball game to randomly assign
participants to an inclusion or exclusion condition; however an error occurred and the
program/software only excluded a fraction of the participants. Overall, the excluded
participants weresignificantly fewer (n = 10) than the numberin the included condition (n
= 34). In order to compare the two groups, I randomly selected 10 participants from the
inclusion condition for comparison to the 10 in the exclusion condition.
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(1 = very unconcerned and 6 = very concerned). The acceptance
expectancy question states, “I would expect that they would help me as
muchas they can.” Participants then rated their level of agreement with
that statement on a scale from | to 6 (1= very unlikely and 6 = very likely).
Questionsrelating to acceptance expectancy (part b) have to be reverse
scored (7 - acceptance expectancy). Rejection concern score and the
reverse-scored acceptance expectancy score is multiplied together to create
a score for each question. The meanofthe resulting nine scores is taken to
find the overall rejection sensitivity score.
4.2.3. Cyberball
After the A-RSQ was completed, participants played Cyberball on the
computer. All participants were told that they were playing with other
participants over the internet. Participants were randomly assigned to the
inclusion or exclusion condition. Participants in the inclusion condition
tossed the ball back and forth with the two other “players” for the entirety
of the game. Participants in the exclusion condition received the ball on an
average of6 times and then were nolonger included in the game. Forthe
remainderofthe game they watched the other two “players”toss the ball
amongst themselves.
4.2.4. Emotional Stroop Test
Immediately following the end ofthe game participants completed the
emotional Stroop task. The emotional Strooptest is designed to investigate
neutral versus anxiety provoking words. A slower response to words in the
anxiety provokingclass, or in this case an exclusion class ofwords,is
interpreted as an attentionalbiasor interference in attention due to some
emotional self-relevance or valence of the word (Teachman, Smith-Janik,
and Saporito, 2007; Thomson,Patel, Platek, and Shackelford, 2007).
Participants were presented with twenty-five words that were each
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presented four times. There were five categories of words and each
category contained 5 words. The categories included the following:
inclusion, exclusion,neutral, positive emotional, and negative emotional.
The neutral, positive, and negative words were taken from McKenna and
Sharma(2004). The words includedin these classes were GLORIOUS,
HAPPY, LOVE, PEACE, PLEASURE, AGONY, AWFUL,EVIL,
FAILURE, TERRIBLE, HILL, LEAVES, OCEAN, ROAD, TUNNEL.
Since there wasnot a pre-existing list of words for the inclusion and
exclusionclass, I selected a list of twenty words for each category and had
a group of 30 individuals rate the words fortheir relationship to each class
(1 = closest to inclusion or exclusion to 5 = notpertaining to inclusion or
exclusion). The top five words with meansclosest to 1 were used in the
study. These wordsinclude the following: ACCEPT, BELONG, GROUP,
INCLUDE, BANISH, EXCLUDE, IGNORE, OSTRACISE, REJECT.
The word TOGETHERwasalso selected to be includedin the study;
howeverbecause of a typo the word was excluded from theresults. I was
afraid that the typo would interfere with participants’ processing of that
word and their response time. Each word waspresented four times in a
random order. The emotional Stroop task waspresented using PX-Lab
(http://www.pxlab.de) (Irtel, H., 2007) on a HP Laptop with a 15 inch
screen and a standing microphone wasusedto record their responses.
Participants were given instructions verbally as well as on the screen. They
were presented with a word onthe screen, but instead of reading the word,
they namedthe colour of the word. For instance, if “HAPPY”appeared on
the screen in redink, the participant was instructed to say “red”into the
microphone. The microphonerecorded the responses and the computer
recordedthe time (response time to begin an utterance) it took for
participants to respond (namethe colour of the word). Before analyzing the
data the response times were converted to z-scores.
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4.2.5. Post Game Questionnaire
Participants completed a questionnaire assessing their feelings associated
with the Cyberball game. The post game questionnaire/fundamental
needs questionnaire (Williamset al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004) is designed
to measure participants fundamental need states and level of distress
following the game. Thefirst portion of the questionnaire focuses on
manipulation checksto ensure thatparticipants in the exclusion condition
recognized that they were excluded. The second portion of the measure
assessesparticipants’ levels of four basic needs: belonging, control, self-
esteem, and meaningful existence. Moodis also measured. Responses
were provided on a scale of 1 to 9 (1 = notat all and 9 = always). In some
instances, the questions had to be reverse-scored so that the higher
response would be equivalent to a more positive response.
4.2.6. Debriefing
Immediately following the completion of the experiment participants were
debriefed. They were informedthat the other players werefictitious and
that they were playing Cyberball with the computer. Additionally, they
were told that they were randomly assignedto inclusion and exclusion
conditions. Participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about
the study.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Manipulation Checks and Post Game Questionnaire
Three manipulation checks were includedin the questionnaire to assure
that participants in the exclusion condition demonstrated that they were
aware ofthe exclusion. Participants in the exclusion condition reported
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feeling significantly less accepted, included, and more rejected compared
to included participants (F(1,19) = 53.85), p < .001; See Table 4.1. for
means). A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA)revealed that
participants in the exclusion conditionreported significantly lowerlevels
of the fundamental needs belonging and control (Belonging, F(1,19) =
49.96, p < .001, partialy’ = .720; Control, F(1,19) = 34.85, p < .001,
partialf’ = .659). There wasnosignificant impact on self-esteem and
meaningful existence. Two additional questions were included at the end of
the post game questionnaire: “I felt angry during the Cyberball game,” and
“T enjoyed playing the Cyberball game.” I combined the variables and
calculated a mean response An ANOVArevealed that participants in the
exclusion condition felt more angry during the Cyberball game and
experienced significantly less enjoymentthan participants in the inclusion
condition (F(1,19) = 17.99, p < .001). There wasno effect for mood.
 
 
Fundamental Mean Standard Mean Standard
Needs" Exclude Deviation Include Deviation
Condition Exclude Condition Include
Belonging Jo 1.079 6.667 1.155
Control 3.400 1.215 6.400 1.052
Self-esteem 5.800 1.450 7.100 1.343
Meaningful 4.867 0.740 5.233 0.876
Existence      
Table 4.1. Means and Standard Devaitions of Variable Scores. Scores
range between ‘1 = notatall’ to ‘9 = not very much’; someitemsare
reverse scored. “Eachofthe fundamental needscores represents an averageofthree
questions from that category.
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4.3.2. Response Time on the Emotional Stroop Test
Participants in the exclusion condition respondedsignificantly slower to a
majority ofthe words on the emotional Stroop test (See Table 4.2 for mean
response times). However,results ofthe MANOVAindicated that
participants were sloweron all classes of the emotional Stroop test with the
exception ofthe inclusion word category (Exclusion: (F(1,19) = 4.492, p =
.048, partial f° = .200); Positive emotional: (F(1,19) = 5.695, p = .028,
partial i’ = .240); Negative Emotional: (F(1,19) = 4.771, p = .042,
partial 7° = .210); Neutral: (F(1,19) = 5.114, p = .036, partial rf = .221);
Include: (ns: F(1,19) = 3.804, p = .067, partial if = .174) See Table 4.1.).
An ANOVAwasused to test the relationship between the number of
correclty named wordsandinclusion and exclusion condition. Results
indicated that there was nosignificant difference (p > .05) between the
two groupsandtheir ability to say the color of the words withouterror.
 
 
Word Class Mean(z- Standard Standard Error
scores) Deviation
Exclusion Words
Exclusion 0.724 1.696 0.537
Inclusion -0.457 0.475 0.150
Positive Emotional
Exclusion 0.842 1.673 0.529
Inclusion -0.467 0.455 0.149
Negative Emotional
Exclusion 0.734 1.673 0.529
Inclusion -0.466 0.471 0.149
Neutral
Exclusion 0.740 1.603 0.507
Inclusion -0.474 0.558 0.176
Inclusion Words
Exclusion 0.770 1.785 0.564
Inclusion -0.366 0.456 0.144     
Table 4.2. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Standard Error of Response
Time to Word Class. Response times have been converted to z-scores.
Meanz-scores are shown above.
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4.3.3. Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire
The Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire did not correlate with the
responses on the post game questionnaire or with the participants response
times on the emotional Stroop Test.
4.3.4. Response Time andFundamental Need
A regression equation predicted that a decrease in the fundamental need of
control accounts for 21% (R = .455; R square = .207; b = -.325, p = .044)
of the variance in responsetime across both the inclusion and exclusion
groups. A decrease in feeling ofbelonging did not account for any variance
in responsetime.
 
   
 
 
 
  
GeExclusion
1.50000 (i PesitiveBi Negative
Bi Neutral(inclusion
L.oo0007
0.50000
0.00n007
-0.50000-4
~1,.000007
1 T
Exclude Include
Condition
76
Figure 4.1. Mean Response Times(z-scores) for Word Class and Inclusion
and Exclusion Condition. Excluded participants showedsignificantly latent
response times comparedto included participants on all word classes, with
the exception of the inclusion wordclass.
4.4. Discussion
Participants in the exclusion condition reported lowerlevels oftwo of the
four fundamental needs. Theseresults partially replicate findings reported
in Chapter 3. Excludedparticipants indicated they felt a lower level of
belonging and control when excluded from the Cyberball game. However,
self-esteem and meaningful existence were not impacted. Most
importantly, there was a significant difference between the two groupsin
response time on the emotional Stroop; these differences can beattributed
to feelings of loss of control, and possibly belonging;as the loss of control
accounted for 21% variance in latent response time. There wasnoeffect
for rejection sensitivity on the four fundamental needsor on response time
in the emotional Stroop.
Indeed,the results indicate that being excluded causedparticipants to show
a delay in their response to words on an emotional Stroop task. Previous
studies have shown that there is impairmentin intellectual functioning
whereparticipants in the exclusion condition were unable to complete as
many questions on an intelligencetest as participants in the inclusion
condition (Baumeisteret al., 2002). However, my study was designed to
test whetheror not participants would have a slowerreaction to certain
types of stimuli, particularly exclusion-related stimuli. I hypothesized that
participants in the exclusion condition would show anattentional bias to
wordsspecifically associated with exclusion. Howeverthat wasnot the
case. It appears that the latency occurs for almostall word classes. Thatis,
excluded participants were significantly slower in providing their
responsesfor all word classes (exclusion, positive, negative, and neutral)
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except for the inclusion word class. There wasa trend towardssignificance
for this word class, as well. It is possible that if the sample size had been
greater than 10 for each group, there might have been a significant
difference in response time for this word class as well; howeverthat is
purely conjecture and there is no evidence to accompanyit. While the
findings are not in accordance with my hypothesis they are not beyond
explanation. If excluded participants had only showedlatency to the
exclusion wordclass this would have shed somelight on the cognitive
processes that are impacted by exclusion. It would suggest that focus,
attention and sensitivity are directed towards exclusion, as is common with
people with anxiety and panic disorder focusingattention to threat andfear,
and possibly suggest that anxiety is a key underlying componentin fear of
social exclusion. Individuals with anxiety and panic disorder show latency
in response to wordsrelating to anxiety and panic. In the currentstudy,
participants showeda general attentional decrement in latency, which can’t
be described as a specific attentional bias because they showedlatency for
all words. Theresults indicated that regardless of the emotional content or
meaning of the word,participants in the exclusion condition were
significantly delayed in their response time. Exclusion doesnot only
diminish the fundamental needs of control and belonging, butit also
impacts an individual’s ability to complete a word-naming task (emotional
Stroop). Thus, it seems that cognitive processing, generally, is delayed by
exclusion andparticularly the loss of the feeling of control. If the results
had shown that participants were sensitive to the kind ofword stimuli and
showedbias in reaction time to words associated with exclusion, it might
have indicated that there was an emotional biasto increasedsensitivity to
rejection information. However, that was not the case in this sample.
There were several additional limitations to this study. First, the between
groups could seen asa limitation. An alternative, within groups design
could have tested people on the emotional Stroop before and after
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exclusion, and thus allowed for the examination oflatency differences as a
function of treatment. However,I do not feel, nor doestheliterature
suggest (Baumeisteret al., 2002; Pickett et al., 2004) that this sort of
design would have revealed something aboutthe effect of social exclusion
because it would have been flawed with priming the participants with the
emotional Stroop producingthe possibility of practice effects. Perhaps
incorporating a control group that did not play the Cyberball game butjust
took the emotional Stroop would have been beneficial to the experimental
design. The addition of a cognitive pre-test, to show that the difference on
the emotional Stroop task wasactually related to the experimental
condition and not a general cognitive difference in the two groups would
have been beneficial to the study. Had a measureofthis sort been included
then it would have beeneasier to argue that the conclusions drawn in this
study are the most likely ones possible. However, since no such measure
wasused, I cannot claim that there is no other reason, despite its
unlikelihood, that participants in the exclusion condition showed a delayed
response time and reduction in cognitive processing. Additionally,it can be
somewhatdifficult to generalize from the emotional Stroop task to general
cognitive function, so in the future use of a neutral task would help to
bolster generalizations.
Second,a critical limitation is the sample size. A programmingglitch
caused the Cyberball program to assign 80% ofthe participants to the
inclusion condition. Left with this imbalance in the sample I elected to use
the 10 excluded participants and then randomly selected 10 included
participants. A larger and more representative sample would have made the
results more generalizable.
Overall, my interpretation of the results offer support to the hypothesis put
forth by Baumeisteret al., (2002). They argue that social exclusion impacts
executive function and controlled processes. Therefore, when excluded
participants were completing the emotional Strooptask their concentration
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and focus was mostlikely interrupted by attempts to suppress emotional
distress from exclusion(specifically decrease in feelings of control),
resulting in latent responsetime.Ifparticipants had shown latency to a
specific word class it might have indicated that a specific attentional biasto
exclusion wasat play; howeverparticipants were sloweroverall, regardless
of wordclass. Participants were not moresensitive to exclusion cues after
exclusion; they were slower completing the Stroop task because their focus
was captured by attempts to suppress their emotionaldistress. In support of
this interpretation, other studies (Eisenbergeret al., 2003; Krill and Platek,
2009) have shown thatin the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)the distress
responseto social exclusion was mitigated by the right ventral prefrontal
cortex (RVPFC). In other words, as activation in the RVPFC increased,
activation in the ACC decreased. The ACC is known to be key neural
substrate for social pain, and Eisenberger and colleagues (2003) suggested
that the activation in the RVPFC mitigated the distress response. Increased
activation in the ACCis correlated to increased distress, while increased
activation in RVPFCislinked to decreased distress in social exclusion
(Eisenbergeret al., 2003). The RVPFC appearedto be regulating the distress
response. Sincethis part of the brain is also involved in executive function
and other importantrelated tasks, it is possible that it was employed to
diminish or inhibit distress, and was unable to attend to other tasks. This is
whereI think that brain imaging research may have implications for the
findings in the present study. Excluded participants exhibited a delay in
responsetime or impaired cognitive function and this may comeasa result
of parts of the brain being recruited to cope with distress as a result of
exclusion. However, these conclusions cannotbe fully supported by the
data; they are only suggested by the data. Sternberg (1997) makes a good
point about cognition andintelligence research: “Mental processes are
always evaluated through behaviour of some kind. We draw conclusions
about these processes from behaviour, but these conclusions are not always
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justified. For example, poor performanceonanintelligence test might
reflect poor processing of information but also mightreflect test anxiety,
lack of motivation, inattention, or any numberofother variables” (p. 1032).
The aforementionedholdstrue for this study, whileit is likely that the
results are a reflection of the experimental conditions, it is impossible to rule
out the other causes and factors of these behavioural outcomes, especially
this instance since there was no pre-experimental assessmentof cognition.
I began this chapter with a discussion of how intelligence evolved and how
the evolution of intelligence may have a bearing on the decrease in
intellectual function that is apparent after exclusion. Myinterpretation of
the results, whichis not the only interpretation possible, points towards an
explanation suggesting that intelligence did not evolve to compensate for a
loss of social group access (see also Baumeisteret al., 2002). Instead,
intelligence, or portions of cognitive processes associated with executive
function, is incorporatedin facilitating social interactions. After exclusion a
portion of the cognitive processes is compromised, and this may occur in
order to alert an individual, generally, to the exclusion. The exact nature of
the interruption in cognition is unclear. The interruption could beattributed
to distress or anxiety or any numberoffactors that can impact cognitive
function.
The present findings add to Williams’ ostracism model (1997; 2007),
specifically to the Reactions module, by suggesting that one ofthe short-
term responsesto exclusion is stifled cognitive processing. Further research
might investigate the long-term impact on cognition.Is this impact
permanent until inclusion is regained,or doesit pass after a terminal period
of time? Additionally, further investigation into how participants are
suppressing emotions,if in fact they are, would be enlightening.
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Chapter 5 In-Group and Out-Group Membership andits Effects on
Responsesto Social Exclusion
5.1. Introduction
In this experiment, functional magnetic resonance imaging (f{MRI) was
employed to examinesensitivity to social exclusion in three conditions:
same-race, other-race, and self-resembling faces.
5.1.1. Group Membership
People have a powerful need to belong in a social group and they spend a
great deal of time developing and maintainingsocial relationships
(Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Individuals tend to show inclusive
preference for membersoftheir own group (Allport, 1954; Brewer, 1999).
A great deal of Social Psychological research has been conducted
regarding group formation (Allport, 1954; Sumner, 1906; Sherif, 1966;
Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel and Turner, 1986; Brewer, 1991; Brewer, 1999). These
theorists focused on the developmentof individuals“ideas” regarding in-
groups and out-groups and the involvementofcognitive processes in their
development. Evolutionary psychologists trace the importance of group
membership back to an “environmentofscarcity”and it is suggested that
individuals needed group support andalliance in order to compete with
other groupsfor survival (Brewer, 1999). Furthermore, Brewer (1999)
states, “In other words, as a species we have evolvedto rely on cooperation
rather than strength, and on social learning rather than instinct as basic
adaptations” (p. 433). When group membership andsocialrelationships are
threatened by exclusion, people have a negative emotional response
(Williamset al., 2000). Neural substrates involved in response to physical
pain are also activated whena personis excluded or experiencing social
pain (Coghill, McHaffie, and Yen, 2003; Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman,
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and Naliboff, 2006; Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Eisenbergeretal.,
2003; Panksepp, 2005; Rainville, Duncan, Price, Carrier, and Bushnell,
1997). The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) is one componentof a
more generalized pain matrix that is responsible for acting as a “neural
alarm system”(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, and Cohen, 2001;
Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Ochsneret al., 2008) when oneis
experiencing physical or emotional pain. Specifically, the dACCis linked
to the affective (but not the physical) distress response associated with pain
(Rainville et al., 1997). Negative reactions to social pain, such as social
exclusion, are pervasive. Research has demonstrated that the experience of
exclusion is robust because the neural correlates of exclusion persisted
even whenparticipants observed a scenario that emulated exclusion
(Eisenbergeret al., 2003). This suggests that imagined exclusion evokes
reactions similar to actual exclusion (Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004;
Eisenbergeret al., 2003; Williams, 1997).
I conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study to examine
how responsesto social exclusion would be impacted by appearance of the
excluder. Specifically, I investigated how level of resemblance to one’s
self, impacted activation associated with being excluded. Participants
experienced exclusion in three conditions: same-race face, other-race face,
and self-face resemblance. There were three main aimsin this study. I am
going to discuss each aim separately along with the background
information that accompaniesit.
5.1.2. Social Exclusion and Level Self-Resemblance
Thefirst aim was to investigate how brain activation to exclusion would
differ across the three conditions when playing Cyberball, a three-person
ball toss gamethat can be programmedto exclude participants.I
hypothesized that participants would showthe greatest level of activation
in the dorsal anterior cortex (dACC) when they were excluded during the
83
self-resemblance condition relative to the other conditions(self
resemblance > same-race > other-race). This hypothesis is guided by
evidence suggesting that in humans,self-facial resemblance appears to act
as a kin detection mechanism (Daly and Wilson, 1982; Platek, 2002;
Platek, Critton, Burch, Frederick, Myers, and Gallup, 2003; Platek,
Keenan, and Mohamed, 2005; Platek, Keenan, Gallup, Mohamed, 2004;
Platek and Thomson, 2007). Self-resembling faces are perceived more
favourably (Daly and Wilson, 1982; Platek, Keenan, Gallup, and
Mohamed,2004), rated as more trustworthy (DeBruine, 2002; Platek,
Krill, and Wilson, 2009; Platek and Thomson, 2007) and moreattractive
(DeBruine, 2004) compared to non-self-resembling faces (see also (Platek,
Krill, and Kemp, 2008). Self-face resemblance might unconsciously tap
cues of kinship producingstronger feelings of cohesion with, and hence
greaterdistress as a result of exclusion from, this group. Furthermore,
Roberts, et al. (2005) discovered that unrelated but genetically similar
individuals are rated more attractive, perhaps not only because of
phenotypic similarity but also because ofMHCsimilarity.
I also reasoned that there would be increased brain activation in the same-
race condition as comparedto the other-race condition because same-race
faces represent in-group membership whereasother-race faces represent
out-group membership (Platek et al., 2008). People responddifferently to
same-race facesrelative to other-race faces (Cunninghametal., 2004;
Eisenbergeret al., 2005; Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, and Eberhardt, 2001; Hart
et al., 2000; Herrmann et al., 2007; Kim etal., 2006; Love, 2001; Meissner
and Brigham, 2001; Phelps, 2000; Pinkhamet al., 2008; Platek et al., 2008;
Stahl, Kiefer, and Bukach, 2008; Tanaka, Kiefer, and Bukach, 2004).
Because brain mechanisms can quickly categorize faces by race (Platek et
al., 2008), this can be an important componentofsocially-based
judgements, which are combined with in- and out-group facial stimuli. If
the brain is able to quickly process faces, with respect to race or group
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membership,then that information should be utilized when making
decisions about behaviour during social interactions.
5.1.3. Fundamental Needs and Exclusion
The second aim ofthe study was to determine whetherlevels of self
reported distress as a result of being excluded correlated with the brain
activation. Previous studies have shown a positive correlation with self
reported distress and dACCactivation during social exclusion
(Eisenbergeret al., 2005; Eisenbergeret al., 2003). Behavioural
investigations of social exclusion haverevealed that targets of exclusion
report a decreasein satisfaction of four fundamental needs: belonging, self
esteem, control, and meaningful existence (Williamset al., 2000; Zadro et
al., 2004). In accordance with myfirst hypothesis, I predicted that when
participants were excludedin the self-resembling condition they would
report greater distress relative to the other face conditions.
5.1.4. Implicit Bias
Thefinal aim of the study wastotest for a correlation between amygdala
activation during exclusion andthe effect of implicit racial bias (same-race
v. other-race). People tend to show implicit racial bias in favour oftheir
own race even if they explicitly express no bias for or against other race
faces. For example, when participants are asked to categorize a same-race
face as good, they are quick to do so. However, when askedto categorize
an other-race face as good, they are considerably slower (Dasgupta,
McGhee, Greenwald, and Banaji, 2000; Greenwald, McGhee and
Schwartz, 1998; Phelps, 2000). I hypothesized that as implicit racial bias
increased, activation would decrease in the ACCbutincreasein the
amygdala. This would suggest that participants who are moreracially
biased wereless distressed by exclusion in the other-race condition.
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5.1.5. Application to Williams’ Model
This experiment is concerned with two modules of Williams’ ostracism
model: the Antecedents and Mediators or Moderator modules (See Chapter
1, Section 1.7.). It applies to the Antecedents module as it manipulates
physical characteristics of the source of exclusion, namely their race and
degree of self-resemblance to the target. Indeed, the target’s race also plays
an important role and acts as a moderatoras their impression of the
excluder may be impacted by a shared race or different race.
5.2. Methods and Materials
5.2.1. Participants
Twelve Caucasian (3 males; 9 females; Meanage= 27.9; S.D.age= 11.7)
participants from the University of Liverpool volunteered forparticipation.
Each participant provided written informed consent and the study was
executed with approval from the university Committee of Research Ethics.
5.2.2. Stimuli Creation
Participants were digitally photographed undercontrolled lighting. Their
image wasthen subjected to a morphing transformation using specialist
software (Tiddemanet al., 2001). In order to create the average, morphed
image, two-dimensional shapesofthe participants’ digital photographs
were delineated at 179 points using specialist software (Tiddemanetal.,
2001). Next the vector differences at each delineation point and an average
face template were calculated, which provided a measure ofhow much
each face differed from average. Images were then altered by 50% of the
averageface to create self-resembling images. Images were matched as
best as possible for luminance and quality using Adobe PhotoShop CS2.
Twoself-resembling faces were made for each participant. Males and
females were paired with and viewed same-sex partners for each condition
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(Composite faces were created as follows: Base Male Face 1 + Male
Participant’s face = Male Self-resembling face 1; Base Male Face 2 + Male
Participant’s face = Male Self-resembling face 2; Base Female Face 1 +
Female Participant’s face = Female Self-resembling face 1; Base Female
Face 2 + Female Participant’s face = Female Self-resembling face 2).
Same-race, and other-race faces were randomly selected from a freely
available database and subjected to similar morphing procedureto retain
stimulus consistency and appearance.
5.2.3. Imaging Procedure and Parameters
Participants were scanned using {MRI while they played seven rounds of
the virtualball toss game, Cyberball. Participants were scanned using a
Siemens Symphony 1.5 Tesla scanner. Functional images were collected
using an EPI sequence (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 45 ms, FOV 192x192mm,
slice thickness = 3.5 mm, gap = .5, numberofslices = 35). Participants also
underwent a 7-minute structural scan (MPRAGE:176 slices, TR = 1660
ms, TE = 3.04). Participants were given instructions on howto play
Cyberball using an MRI compatible response pad (Current Designs,
www.curdes.com) and told that during the scan they were going to be
playing with twootherplayers, via an Internet connection, located in
computer labsat other locations on the university campus (Williamset al.,
2000). In actuality the other two players were computerized confederates
programmedbythe investigators.
In the first three roundsparticipants played Cyberball with the same-race,
other-race, and self-resembling groups (condition order was randomized
across participants), and these three rounds wereall inclusion rounds. In
the three following rounds (rounds 4-6), the same players excluded
participants (order also randomized). For the exclusion conditions, the
game beganasit did in the first three rounds, but as time passed (~30
seconds), the other players stopped tossing the ball to the participant. The
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data were pre-processed (Jenkinson and Smith, 2002; Smith 2002) and
analyzed using the FMRIB Software Library (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl)
(Smith et al., 2004). Statistical thresholds were cluster corrected and the z-
score ofthe cluster was greater than or equalto 2.3,p < .05 (unless
otherwise stated). What are reported within is the peak activation voxels
within the clusters.
5.3. Results
5.3.1. Effect ofExclusion as a Function ofFacial Resemblance
Results indicated that activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was
highest during the self-resembling and same-race exclusion rounds of the
game.I tested the hypothesis that participants would show the greatest
level of activation in the dorsal anterior cortex (dACC) when they were
excluded (comparedto inclusion) during the selfresemblance condition
relative to the other conditions(self-resemblance > same-race > other-
race). This contrast revealed activation in several areas ofthe ACC (MNI
coordinates: z = 3.64, -2, 46, 12; z= 3.31, 6, 44, 2; z=3.85, 16, 20, 34). To
further investigate the nature ofthis relationship an ROI was computed in
the ACC anddiscovered a non-linear (quadratic) relationship that revealed
that the ACC was mostactive to self-resembling and same-race faces
relative to other-race faces during exclusion (See 5.1.).
5.3.2. Effects ofSelf-Reported Needs
It was anticipated that participants’ self-reported fundamental needs would
be affected in the exclusion conditions.In particular, I hypothesized that
participants would report a decrease in four fundamental needs asa result
of exclusion in the self-resembling condition and that there would be a
correspondingincrease in ACCactivation.I anticipated that activation in
the ACC would follow a linear pattern of self-resemblance > same-race >
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other-race; instead, results showed a quadratic model wasthebestfit.
Participants exhibited the greatest ACC activation in conjunction with the
self-reported distress or impact on fundamental needs when they were
excluded in the same-racerelative to the other-race and self-resemblance
conditions (anterior cingulate gyrusz = 3.5, -6, 28, 24; posterior cingulate z
= 3.49, -4, 64, 20). A correlation between ACC activation and mean needs
revealed that in the same race condition activation in the ACC showed a
significant negative correlation with mean needs (r(11) = -0.734, p = 0.01)
(Figure 5.1.). In other words, the less impact that a person felt on their
sense of belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence the less
the ACC wasactivated.
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Figure 5.1. ACC Activation to Exclusion in the Three Conditions.
a) Mean (+S.E.M)percent signal changeandstatistical parametric maps for
activation in ACCin responseto self-resembling condition (black bars), same-
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race condition (gray bars), and other-race condition (white bars) during exclusion
round.b) Inlaid plots show the correlation between ACCactivation and mean
needs. Only the same-race condition (gray diamonds) showeda significant
negative correlation with mean needs (r(11) =-0.734, p=0.01) (Inlaid plots: black
diamonds= self-resembling condition; grey diamonds = same-race condition;
white diamonds = other-race condition).
Previous investigations have observedactivity in the right ventral
prefrontal cortex (RVPFC)during social exclusion (Eisenbergeretal.,
2003). In this study the correlations between mean needs and percent
signal change for ROI’s localized to the left and right VPFC (ventral
prefrontal cortex — also called the OFC). There was a trend toward
decreased activation in RVPFCto other-race faces (r(/ 1) = -0.407, p >
.05) and a significant decrease in LVPFCto other-race faces (7(11) = -
0.604, p < .05) (See Figure 5.2.). Additionally, I correlated ACC activation
with right and left VPFC activation because activation in these two areas
has been shown to havea negative correlation. Results showed an increase
in RVPFCactivation as activation in the ACC decreased. This suggests
that activation of the RVPFC mitigates the distress response that is
activated in the ACC. However,the results revealed that activation in the
ACCwaspositively correlated with activation in the left (r = .841; p =
.001) and right VPFC (r = .697; p < .05) in the other-race exclusion
condition only.
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Figure 5.2. Ventral Prefrontal Cortex Correlation With Mean Needs.
Correlations between mean needs andpercent signal change across subjects for
ROI’s localized to the left and right ventral prefrontal cortex (VPFC). There was a
trend for a decrease in right VPFCactivation to other-race faces and a significant
decrease in left VPFC to other-race faces (black diamonds = self-resembling
condition; gray diamonds = same-race condition; white diamonds = other-race
condition.)
5.3.3 Effect ofImplicit Racial Bias
In the investigation of implicit racial bias (using the Implicit Association
Test, IAT) I contrasted self-resembling, same-race, and other-race faces
using a quadratic model where self and same-race bias were predicted to
be higher than the other-race condition. Analysis revealed that amygdala
activation correlated positively with the IAT score. This contrast revealed
activation in several areas of the brain suchas:the left frontal operculum (z
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= 3.46;-46, -18, 4), left postcentral gyrus (z = 3.69; -38, -18, 38), left
precentral gyrus (z = 3.16; -62, -2, 10), and the right and left paracingulate
gyrus (z = 3.09; 0, 54, 16). In a subsequent ROIanalysis a correlation
between IAT D scores (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz, 1998) and
percent signal change for ROI’s localized to theleft (r(J1) = -0.497, p =
.05) and right amygdala (7(/1) = -0.380, p = .112) was evident (See 5.3.).
Furthermore, a correlation between ACCactivation to same-race and
other-race faces as a function of IAT D score (r(/1) = .400, p = .09) was
not significant.
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Figure 5.3. Implicit Associations Test Correlation with Amygdala
Activation. Plots show correlations between IAT D scores and percent signal
change for ROI’s localized to the left and right amygdala. Decreasesin left
(r(11)=-0.497, p=. 05) and right(r(/ 1) =-0.380, p=.112) amygdala to same-race
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condition (gray diamonds) andonlyslightly increasing left amygdala activation to
other-race condition (white diamonds).
5.4. Discussion
In summary,results indicated that activation in the ACC varies as a
function of resemblance to the participant when individuals are excluded.
Activation in the ACC increased during exclusion conditionsas the other
players’ facial resemblanceto the participants increased. Although it was
predicted that the activation from the different conditions wouldfit a linear
function(i.e. self-resemblance > same-race > other-race), findings showed
increasedactivation in the ACCin both the same-race and self-resembling
conditions. The activation in the ACC wasless during the other-race
exclusion condition, indicating that individuals have a stronger
neurological response to exclusion by membersofself-referential and
same-race in-group. Thisis not entirely surprising; as past research has
suggested that cues of relatedness (self-resemblance, shared ethnicity,
MHCsimilarity) engenderpositive pro-social feelings (DeBruine, Jones,
and Perrett, 2005; Platek et al., 2009; Rushton, 1984). Individuals show a
preference towards familiar stimuli; which, at the most basic level, would
include individuals of the samerace. It would be very helpful in teasing
apart the result if I had run analyses showingfacial resemblance activations
for the participants. Because I do not have proofofthese activations,I
cannot showthat the increase in ACCactivation during the selfresembling
exclusion condition is unequivocally related to the fact that the other
players resembled the participant. So while I am drawing the conclusion
that the increase in ACCactivation is mostlikely related to being excluded
by self-resembling individuals, I can’t determine that with any degree of
accuracy.I will say that after the experiment manyofthe participants
asked or commentedthatthey felt like the other players looked like them.
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So from an anecdotal perspective, participants did seem to recognize that
they shared resemblance with the otherplayers.
Individuals do not only show impactin brain activation, but participants
also reported a decreasein satisfaction of four basic needs (belonging,
control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence) when excluded. However,
contrary to my prediction, participants’ ACC activations showed a
correlation to self-reported needssatisfaction in the same-race exclusion
condition only. I hypothesized that there would be a correlation among the
ACCactivation and the self-resembling condition as well. Perhapsself-
resembling and other-race faces represent the opposite endsof a self
referential distribution. For instance in the self-resemblance condition, one
could be upset by exclusion from this class of stimuli, generally, without
evaluation. On the other hand, exclusion by an other-race face is not
upsetting becausethis class of stimuli may represent an out-group
membership. However, in the same-race condition the players may
represent persons who are membersofthe samesocial group, and whom
might share genes in commonwith the participant. Perhapsin this
instance, in the absence ofostensible cues to relatedness, the emotional
feelings aboutthe situation and the person modulate one’s reactions to
exclusion. That is, the lower individuals’ rate their feelings ofcontrol and
self-esteem, the more it hurts to be excluded bythis person.It suggests that
exclusion by individuals outside of our kin or other race groupsis
modulated by feelings and needsassociated with that person or group, but
this idea demands moreresearch.
Additionally, findings showedthat activation in the ACC wascorrelated
with activation in the right and left VPFC during the other race exclusion
condition. I did not predict this activation pattern. It was hypothesized that
activation in the VPFC would increaseas activation in the ACC decreased,
particularly during the self-resembling and same-race exclusion conditions.
The VPFCis involvedin the regulation and inhibition ofthe social pain
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response during exclusion (Eisenbergeret al., 2003). It is possible that I
found a positive correlation between ACC activation and VPFCactivation
in the other-race condition becauseactivation in the ACC waslow to begin
with in this condition. Alternatively, perhaps I found different activation
patterns between the ACCandthe areas of the frontal cortex than the
previous study (Eisenbergeret al., 2003) becausethis study displayed faces
to represent the other players. Thus, I may have unwittingly introduced
another componentthat the frontal cortex wasattendingto in place of
mediating ACCactivation. Haxbyetal., (2002) describe the OFC (which I
refer to as VPFCinthis paperasthey are in close proximity and overlap)
as part of a neural system that participates in face perception and discussits
role in evaluating potential reward. This area seemsto be instrumental in
evaluating the information in faces that is relevant to social reinforcement,
such as identity and expression (see Rolls, 1996). It is plausible that VPFC
activation waspositively correlated with ACCactivation in this study,
particularly in the other-race condition, because the participants were
paying specific attention to and assessing the faces for cues to emotional
expression, as well as identity.
Finally, the results supported the hypothesis regarding the [AT and neural
activation. Individuals who showedincreasedpositive bias towards same-
race images, showeda trend towardsincreased activation in the left and
right amygdala during the other-race exclusion conditions. I also found a
significant decrease in amygdalaactivation in the left amygdala in the
same-race exclusion round. This suggests that as IAT score increased
(implicit bias against other race increased), participants showed a decrease
in left amygdala activation when excluded by the samerace faces. This
finding supports previous research regarding the importanceofthe
amygdala in responseto in- and out-group determinations and judgements
(Phelps, O'Conner, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, Gore, and Banaji,
2000). Phelps et al. (2000) found that amygdala activation was correlated
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with both IAT reaction time as well as a startle eye-blink response when
white participants were shown black faces. Thus,it appears that the
amygdala is a primary componentin the neural system involvedin the
indirect appraisal of social groups.
Overall, the current result showedthat individuals respond differentially to
exclusion based upon level of resemblance to one’s self and one’s same-
race group. Thesefindings are significant in understanding how people
respondto othersin social situations based upon two importantsocial cues:
race and kinship. Theresults show that sharing race tends to make
exclusion a more powerful and negative experience whereas exclusion by
an other-race individual has less of an impact. This experiment adds to
Williams’ classification model of ostracism. The race ofthe target of
exclusion as well as the race of the source of exclusion are important
factors in exclusion falling under two categories: the Moderators or
Mediators module (target’s race) and the Antecedents module (source’s
race and similarity to the target). The target’s race, as well as the source’s
race and resemblanceto the target, impacted the target’s response to
exclusion via a decrease in the fundamental needs and increased neural
activation in the ACC. Unfortunately, I was not able to identify the
mechanisms by which exclusion was more distressing in responseto self
resembling and same-race faces. One possibility might involve differences
in the feeling of developmentofa closer bond with the other players during
the game. This would be fertile area for future research.
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Chapter 6 Hyperscanning and the Neural Correlates of Social
Cooperation
6.1. Introduction
As Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) pointout in their seminal work on the
evolution of cooperation, “The theory of evolution is based on the struggle
for life and the survivalofthe fittest. Yet cooperation is common between
membersofthe same species and even between membersofdifferent
species” (p.1390). This suggests that cooperation, as well as competition,is
employedas integral to facilitating survival. Kin selection theory
(Hamilton, 1964) describes why individuals and animals would cooperate
and behave altruistically toward genetically related individuals. It has been
illustrated that both humansandother animals are morelikely to engage in
acts of reciprocity and cooperation with those who share genes in common
with them; that is, within the realm of natural selection cooperation can be
favourable if the recipientofthe altruistic act is genetically related to the
individual performing the act because of the incurred benefits to genes
dispersed throughout one’s family (i.e. the cost of cooperation is presumed
to be dissipated by the fact that the benefits are being received by an
individual who shares genes in common with the cooperator, hence the
cooperation mayactually be serving one’s own genetic information;
Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006). However, the theory of kin selection does
not fully explain why humans(and someother species) have evolved to
cooperate beyondthe realm oftheir kin and often do so in ways were
reciprocity is not direct or instantaneous.
6.1.1. Direct and Indirect Reciprocal Altruism
Both direct andindirect reciprocalaltruism require a more complex system
of analyses to determine whetherit is truly beneficial to partake in such
cooperation. Ratherthan genetic relatedness requirements, direct reciprocal
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altruism is determined by the probability of repeated encounters (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). Nowak (2006) has created an equation
to demonstrate the relationship between probability of repeated encounters
and the cost benefit analysis for cooperating: w > c/b. The probability of
meeting a cooperator again (w) mustbe greaterthan the cost (c) to benefit
(b) ratio. Furthermore, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) argue that
cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game (which simulates and examines
cooperation between two people) will mostlikely be beneficialif one
adopts tit for tat strategy. That is, if someone cooperates in the previous
round,then in turn the other person will also cooperate in a subsequent
round. Trivers (1971) generated a parsimoniousphilosophy regarding
reciprocalaltruism:if I cooperate now, then perhaps you will cooperate
later (See also Nowak, 2006). While this line of thinking makessense,it is
difficult to imagine how indirect reciprocity would be beneficial to human
evolution.In the instance ofindirect reciprocity, one person has something
to give and the other has nothing,andthe likelihood ofthem ever meeting
again is low.In this case it actually may payto cooperate if helping the
individual will bolster one’s reputation (Nowak, 2006). Therefore,
reputation can serve as the rewardor benefit to cooperation. Research has
illustrated that those whoare helpful are more likely to receive help from
others:“Natural selection favours strategies that base the decision to help
on the reputation of the recipient” (Nowak, 2006, p. 1561). In other words,
a boost to one’s reputation can be beneficial and can be seen as a reward
for cooperating (Nowak, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). Despite all of
this, there must be a mechanism in place to help individuals to resist the
temptation to defect and not reciprocate altruism (Frank, 1988).
6.1.2. Social Exclusion and Cooperation
In many ways defecting from cooperation can be beneficial; one can reap
the benefits of others’ good faith and cooperation at no cost to themselves.
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In order for cooperation to work there must be a mechanism through which
those who cheat are punished (Kurzban and Leary, 2001). In a one-on-one
exchange, defection can be easily detected, and it can be combated by
defection from the other memberof the dyad. Social exclusion is a strategy
that can be used to punish defectorsin larger group situations. Ouwerkerk
et al. (2005) reviewed research by Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) as well as
Nowakand Sigmund(1998), and they proposed, “Social exclusion of non
cooperating members mayin fact sustain cooperation in situations where
other mechanismssuchas direct and indirectreciprocity fail” (p. 329).
Furthermore, when a “bad apple”is introduced to the group other members
have a tendency to mimicthe “bad apple’s” behaviour and defect
(Ouwerkerket al., 2005). Group members seem to cooperate at a level that
is slightly higher than the least cooperative member;this is also called
minimalreciprocity. The threat of ostracism can help to assuagethis trend
and increase cooperation among group members. This might occur because
of an inherent fear of exclusion as well as the fact that exclusion represents
a greater cost than cooperating. Results from Ouwerkerket al.’s (2005)
research suggests, “The merethreat of ostracism could attenuate the bad
apple effect even when exclusion did not have any economiccosts,
suggesting that the anticipated psychological costs of ostracism are
sufficient to deter people from following the bad example of an
uncooperative other” (p.325).
Asthese forms of reciprocity and consequences of defection become more
complex, a more complex system is required to untangle all the details. For
instance, cognitive demandsincrease because one has to rememberhis
interactions as well as keep tabson the relentlessly shifting social dynamics in
the group (Nowak, 2006). Additionally, because indirect reciprocity depends
upon reputation, which can be built by gossip, the ability to form languageis
necessary; language is the mechanism for spreading gossip. Nowak and
Sigmund (2005) presumethat indirect reciprocity and language have been
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integral in the development of humanintelligence (cf. Dunbar, 1992). These
factors help to explain why humansare oneofthe only species to practice
indirect reciprocity and for whomit is a successful strategy (Nowak, 2006).
Furthermore, the human brain appears to guide humansin realising that
accepting altruism without reciprocating is only beneficial in the short-term.
Humanbeings have the capacity to weigh long-term rewards and
consequencesresulting in decisionsthat allow for the survival of mutual
cooperation (Rilling et al., 2002; Frank, 1988).
6.1.3. Neural Correlates ofCooperation: Theory ofMind
Humanprimates have the most sophisticated selfawarenessof all animals;
they are endowedwith the ability to represent their own physical and
mental states including motoric, mental, emotional, perceptual, and
visceral (Gusnard, 2006). This highly developed sense of self-awareness
has allowed humansthe unique capacities to not only think about
themselves but to also considerthe states ofmind in others (Gallup, 1982;
cf. Platek et al., 2004; Vogeleyet al., 2001). Certainly, mentalizing about
the self can be a helpful tool when mentalizing about others (Davis and
Stone 1995a; Davis and Stone, 1995b; Mitchellet al., 2006). If one can’t
think about himself and his own state, it would be difficult to consider
another person’s state. Many of the sameparts of the brain used forself
reflection are used for mentalizing about others (Mitchell et al., 2006;
Platek, 2006; Saxe, 2006). Theory of mind (ToM)is a distinct aspect of
social cognition in humans(and great apes), allowing one to make
inferences about the mental states of others (Rillinget al., 2004; Premack
and Woodruff, 1978). It is the cornerstone of the humanability to deceive,
empathize, cooperate, and to assess body language (GallagherandFrith,
2003). Gallagher and Frith (2003)state, “It (ToM) underlies our ability to
explain and predict the behaviour of ourselves and othersby attributing to
them independent mental states suchas beliefs, desires, emotions, or
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intentions” (p.77). Research has indentified a series of neural structures
that form a network which appearsto be active during theory of mind
(ToM). This network includes, but may notbelimited to, the following
structures: anterior paracingulate cortex, posterior superior temporal areas,
tempo-parietal junction, and the temporal pole (Rilling et al., 2004; Saxe
and Kanwisher, 2003; Gallager and Frith, 2003). There is also support for
ToMactivation in the amygdala, medial frontal cortex, orbital frontal
cortex/frontal pole (Stone, 2006; Stoneet al., 1998, Stoneet al., 2003; Fine
et al., 2001; Frith and Frith, 2003; Stuss, Gallup, and Alexander, 2001).It
is important to note that the areas betweenthe frontal pole and the anterior
cingulate cortex are not only involved in ToM,but also in self-reflection
and assessing other’s thoughts and perceptions (Lisseket al., 2008).
Studies incorporating cooperation and defection have shown that the
purported reward system in the brain is involved in ToM anddecision-
making(Rilling et al., 2002; Glimcheret al., 2008). For instance, Rilling
et al. (2002) discovered that activation in the anteroventral striatum and in
the subgenual anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) with connectionsto the
caudate and nucleus accumbens(key reward substrates that receive
midbrain dopamineprojections) are involved with reward processing (see
also Schultz, 1998). Another reward processing area (Rolls, 1999) was also
activated: the ventromedial/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). This activation was
evidentafter participants chose the lesser rewarding game outcomes:
cooperation from both partners (CC) and defection from both (DD). These
outcomes, however, maybe reinforcing because they arestable.
Theory ofmind is essential in the current study because the primary aim is
to determine whatoccurs in the brain when twopeople worktogether, or
cooperate, to complete a task. I hypothesized that activation in the TOM
network wouldbe significantly greater when participants were working
together compared to when they completed the task on their own.In
particular the ToM network would be active when participants were in the
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instruction condition (a more in depth discussion of my hypotheses can be
foundin section 6.1.4.).
6.1.4. Hyperscanning and Hypotheses
Hyperscanning (Montagueet al., 2002) involvesthe linking of two, or
more, fMRI scanners allowingparticipants to interact with each other
during real-time behavioural tasks. King-Casaset al. (2005) describe
hyperscanningas follows: “The motivating idea behind this approachis
simple: To probe neural substrates of social interactions, we scan the brains
of multiple subjects engagedin social interaction”(p. 78). Collecting data
on both brainsat the same time allowsfor the researcher to have a record
of the neural processes of both participants’ behaviour. The unique
prospect of acquiring brain imaging data simultaneously while two brains
are working together has the possibility of increasing the chance offinding
important neural relationships and could lead to the development ofnew
approachesto and increased understandingofthe neuralbasis of social
interactions and cooperation (Montagueet al., 2002). However,
hyperscanning can be a very challenging meansofdata collection. In this
study manyofthe benefits of hyperscanning were counterbalanced by the
drawbacksofhaving to accountfor different field strengths, coordinating
precise timing, and complicated analyses. While Montagueet al. (2002)
and King-Casasetal. (2005), as cited above, describe manyofthe benefits
of hyperscanning,it can bea difficult means of data collection. Its main
benefits for this study were 1) the expedited data collection process, since
two subjects were scannedat once, and 2) participants were able to interact
and respondto thetask in real time.
Mygoalin this study was twofold: 1) to determine whetherareas in the
putative ToM neural network were activated whenparticipants worked
together to complete the task and 2) most importantly, to compare the
pattern of activation whenparticipants completed the maze by themselves
102
to activation when completing the maze in cooperation with the other
participant. I predicted that there would be increasedactivation in the ToM
network and reward centres when participants worked together.
Furthermore, I hypothesized that in instances where participants completed
the maze while instructing their partner, activation in the reward network
would be higher than the activation in the reward network when
completing the mazealonein the self-drive condition.
6.2. Methods
6.2.1. Procedure
Participants (n = 28, 14 pairs; Mage = 24.5; SDage = 4.04; 18 females; 10
males) were recruited from the University of Liverpool and the
surrounding community via the University of Liverpool announcement
system to take part in this experiment. The University of Liverpool School
of Biological Sciences Committee on Research Ethics approved the study.
All participants provided signed informed consent and met criteria for MRI
scanning. Participants were randomly assigned toeither of the two
scanners available for research use at MARIARC.Pairs ofparticipants
were pseudo-randomly assigned based uponavailability of both
participants and availability ofboth scanners.
6.2.2. Paradigm
To examinethe neuralcorrelates of cooperation participants were asked to
work together to complete a series of mazes.In this interactive task both
subjects cooperatedin real time to reach the end of a maze. A form of
“blind driving” was used which required the participants to rely upon one
another and worktogether to reach the end of the maze. Participant is
called the instructor. The instructor can view the mazefield; however he
cannot interact with the maze. In order to navigate the maze he must send
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directions, using the keypad, to his partner, Participant B,or the driver. The
driver then receives the instructions, which appearin the form of numbers,
and are coordinated with directional instructions(left, right, forward, and
backward). The driver presses the appropriate button on his keypad to
movethrough the maze, buthe is blind to the maze environment. This
would be tantamountto getting into the driver seat ofan automobile with a
blindfold on and taking instructions on whatactionsto take from the
passenger(e.g., press accelerator, press brake,turn left, right, stop, etc).
See Figures 6.1. and 6.2. for a visual display ofthe maze environment and
the hyperscanningset up.
 
Figure 6.1. A View of the Maze Environment
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Figure 6.2. Visual Display of the Hyperscanning Design
Sixty seconds wasallotted for the completion of each maze. Mazes were
presented in pairs of 2 with a 20 secondrest (scrambled imagescreen) at
the beginning, end, and in between mazes. Participants undertooktherole
of instructor for four mazes(instruct condition), completed 4 mazes on
their own (self-drive condition), and finally undertook therole of driver
(drive condition) for 4 mazes. Participants were randomly assigned a
starting role as instructoror driver and participants completed the self-drive
condition while the other participant received their structural scan to reduce
overall time in the scanner environment.
Becausethis task proved challenging, participants had an opportunity to
become familiar with the task and to practice using the keypadoutside of
the scanner. Furthermore, they were given a very specific series of
instructions regarding how to operate the keypad and navigate the maze
prior to, and after, entering the scanner. Instructions were repeated as
needed while participants were in the scanner.
The mazetask used in this experimentis not a typical ToM task. One
might question the degree to which this paradigm qualifies as a ToM task
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because the task did not require both participants to think about whatthe
other participant was thinking or feeling. However, the instructing partner
wasrequired to considerthe driver’s point of view at all times, thus
requiring ToM. While this experimentis not the ideal ToM experiment,
this task requires the use of theory of mind. For instance, would any other
organism other than a human, whohas advancedtheory of mind, be able to
complete this task? My prediction would be no. Therefore, according to
this rationale I would like to argue that while this experiment may not be
an ideal ToM paradigm,it is assessing a specific component of ToM.
Furthermore, experts in the ToM field describe the advantage ofToM as
follows: “Through having ToM wecan recognize that another person’s
knowledgeis different from our own. I know what’s behind the rock, but
he doesn’t because from whereheis he cannotsee that there is a scorpion.
Having a ToM allowsus to manipulate other people’s behaviour by
manipulating their beliefs. If he is my friend I can warn him about the
scorpion. If he is my enemyI cantell him it is safe... Human interactions
predominantly involve the dissemination oftrue or false knowledge for
good orill” (Frith and Frith, 2005, R644). In the maze experiment, for
example, the instructor knowsthat the driver can’t see the maze
environment, so he or she couldtrick the driver by directing him or her into
the wall, never allowing him or her to complete the maze. Now this was
avoidedin this task becausethe instructor and the driver shared the
established goal of reaching the end ofthe maze, but the instructor could
use his or her knowledgeaboutthe driver’s knowledgeto trick him or her
as mentionedin the Friths’ example. (Note: in the example of driving the
car blindfolded, this might be dire for both driver and passenger). Frith and
Frith (2005) go on to explain that understanding another person’s point of
view different from one’s own involves “a translation between egocentric
and allocentric spatial co-ordinates.” This ability to translate between the
self and the otheris essential in spatial navigation, and in development the
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ability to solve spatial viewpoint problemsoccurs concurrently with the
ability to solve false belief tasks (Frith and Frith, 2005). According to the
aforementioned definition and description I believe that this task does
involve ToM asit is described above. The instructor was required to think
about what the driver knowsorseesor is thinking. Theinstructor has to
consider the driver’s knowledge and then proceed with giving him or her
instructions about the maze. Additionally, the instructor can see the
driver’s progress through the maze, so he or she can see that the driver
either understands or does not understandthe directions(i.e. he or she must
think that I said to go left, when in fact I meant for him or her to turn
right...). These types ofToM issues were encountered consistently through
the task. So, overall the task appears to be a ToM task forthe instructor,
but for the driver it is more of an instruction following task.
6.2.3. Imaging Parameters
Participants were scanned at the University of Liverpool’s MARIARC,
using one of two scanners: Siemens Symphony 1.5 Tesla and a Trio 3
Tesla scanner. Each sequence was optimized (with the assistance of the
resident radiographer) to make the imaging parameters as analogous as
possible across scanners in an effort to make comparison more accurate. In
the Symphony scanner, functional images were collected using an EPI
sequence (TR = 3000 ms, TE = 45 ms, FOV 192x192 mm,slice thickness
= 3.5 mm, gap = .5, numberofslices = 35). Participants also underwent a
7-minute structural scan (MPRAGE:176 slices, TR = 2040 ms, TE = 3.93
ms). The remaining participants were scanned using a Trio 3T scanner (TR
= 3000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FOV = 192x192 mm,slice thickness = 3.0 mm,
gap = 3.3 or 10%, numberof slices = 42). The parameters of the MPRAGE
structural scan are the same as above except that the TE = 5.5 ms.
Participants were given instructions on how to navigate the maze using an
MRI compatible response pads (Current Designs, www.curdes.com). All
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participants completed 2 driving runs, 2 self-driving runs, and 2 instructing
runs. As noted above (See Section 6.2.2.) each run consisted of 2 mazes for
a total of 4 mazes per condition. This allowedall participants to complete
each portion of the experiment.
6.2.4. {MRI Imaging analysis and Contrasts Part 1
For pre-processing and statistical analysis of the {MRI data I used the
FMRIBSoftware Library (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Single subject pre-
processing was donefor each participant, correcting for motion using
MCFLIRT(Jenkinson and Smith, 2002) and brain extraction using the
BETtool (Smith, 2002). Images werealso intensity normalized and
smoothed (full width halfmax = 6). All higher-level analyses were
performed using {MRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT)version 5.98 part of
FSL (Smith, 2002) and mixed effects modelling. After the pre-processing,I
createdfirst level contrasts for each condition: drive, self-drive, instruct.
Then I entered them into higher-level mixed effects analyses to get the
combinedresults from both scanners: collapse drive (drive condition 1.5T
+ drive condition 3T), collapse instruct (instruct condition 1.5T + instruct
condition 3T), collapse self-drive (self-drive condition 1.5T + self-drive
condition 3T), collapse instruct versus collapse drive (collapse instruct—
collapse drive), collapse self-drive versus collapse instruct (collapse self
drive — collapse instruct), collapse self-drive versus collapse drive (collapse
self— collapse drive). Finally contrasts were combinedfor the pair (drive +
instruct conditions) versusself-drive contrast ([collapse drive + collapse
instruct] — [collapse self-drive]) and the self-drive versus pair contrast
([collapse self-drive]- [collapse drive + collapse instruct]) to show the
activation when oneparticipantis instructing andthe otheris driving and
they are working together to solve the maze. All higher level contrasts
wereset to a z = 2.3, p< 0.05, unless otherwisestated.
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6.3. Results Part 1
6.3.1. Instruct Condition
First level Instruct contrasts were collapsed across both scanners. Images
were thresholded (z > 2.3) using corrected clustered significance threshold
ofp< .05 unless otherwise stated. Activation was evident in the following
areas: bilateral frontal pole, bilateral medial frontal gyrus, right precentral
and postcentral gyrus, right subparietal lobe and right inferior temporal
gyrus. Furthermore, there was activation in areas that have been implicated
in the ToM network:the precuneus,left anterior cingulate gyrus (ACC),
the left superior temporal gyrus, and bilateral medial temporal gyrus (See
Table 6.1. for coordinates).
6.3.2. Self-Drive Condition
First level self-drive contrasts were collapsed across both scanners. The
following areas showedsignificant levels of activation during this task:
bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, bilateral precentral and postcentral gyrus,
bilateral posterior middle temporal gyrus, right paracingulate gyrus, and
left precuneus cortex (See Table 6.2. for coordinates).
Table 6.1. Instruct Condition Coordinates and Activation.
 
       
Anatomical Right/Left xX Y Z Z-score
Region
Frontal Pole R -22 42 24 4.94
Frontal Pole L -20 40 38 4.66
Precuneus L -4 -40 68 5.98
cortex
Superior L -56 -24 4 5.74
temporal gyrus
Medialfrontal R 22 36 22 4.42
gytus
Medialfrontal L -26 32 36 4.51
gytus
Anterior L -4 10 28 5.75
cingulate cortex
Inferior R 52 -54 -8 3.75
temporal gyrus  
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 Precentral gyrus R 50 8 40 4.4
Postcentral R 6 68 6.11
gytus       
6.3.3. Drive Condition
Novoxels survivedcluster correction in the collapsed drive condition.
6.3.4. Collapsed Instruct versus Collapsed Self-Drive Contrast
This contrast reveals activation that survived after all activation from the
instruct condition was combined andthen the collapsed activation from the
self-conditions was subtracted (collapse instruct — collapse self). This contrast
illustrates which areas were moreactive in the instruct conditions (e.g. what
sets them apart from the self-drive condition). The areas where activation was
seen are: occipital pole, left precuneus,left inferior temporal gyrus, and right
lateral occipital cortex.
Table 6.2. Self-Drive Condition Coordinates and Activation
 
  
Anatomical Right/Left X Y Z z-score
Region
Postcentral gyrus R 54 -56 26 4.24
Orbitofrontal cortex R 42 24 -6 5.16
Oribitofrontal L -40 32 -8 5.13
cortex
Lateral occipital R 36 -70 40 4.19
cortex
Medial temporal R 62 -36 -2 5.46
gyrus(posterior)
Medial temporal L -56 -52 6 5.9
gytus
Paracingulate gyrus R 4 28 44 5.12
Precuneus Cortex L -/4 -40 68 5.98      
6.3.5. Collapse Self-Drive versus Collapse Instruct Contrast
Noactivation survivedthis contrast.
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6.3.6. Collapse Self-Drive versus Collapse Drive Contrast
Activation survivedthis contrast in the left inferior frontal gyrus,
precuneus cortex and posterior cingulate gyrus, right paracingulate gyrus,
and left middle temporal gyrus.
6.3.7. Pair versus Self-Drive Contrast
This contrast combined the driving andinstruct conditions and contrasted
them againstthe self-driving condition ([collapse drive +collapse instruct]
— self-drive). Significant activation was evident in the precuneuscortex,
orbital frontal cortex, postcentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus (anterior and
posterior division), left caudate and putamen,as well as the lateral occipital
cortex. Areas associated with reward are active in this contrast suggesting
that participants feel more reward when working together to solve the maze
relative to when they work on their own (See Table 6.3.).
6.3.8. Self-drive versus Pair Contrast
In this contrast the self-drive condition was contrasted with the paired
driving and instruct conditions (self-drive — [drive + instruct]). Activation
was foundin the inferior frontal gyrus, precuneus, posterior cingulate
gyrus, paracingulate, and middle frontal gyrus (See Table 6.3.).
Table 6.3. Pair versus Self-Drive Contrast. Activation coordinates and z-
scores from Pair versus Self-Drive (top) and Self-drive versus Pair
 
 
(bottom)
Pair Activation Hemisphere xX Y Z z-score
Precuneus Cortex L -8 -56 62 4.28
Superior Frontal L -22 4 -12 4.88
Gyrus
Postcentral Gyrus L -28 -40 44 3.91
Supramarginal L -28 -40 44 3.91
Gyrus(anterior
and posterior)
Superior Parietal L -12 -60 62 3.68     
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Lobule
Putamen L -22 2 -6 4.23
Caudate L -16 18 0 3.88
Lateral Occipital R 34 -88 6 3.48
Cortex
Occipital Pole R 36 -88 10 3.36
Self Activation
Inferior Frontal i -46 16 18 4.86
Gyrus
Precuneus L -2 -58 42 4.68
Superior Frontal L/R 0 20 52 4.02
Gyrus
Paracingulate R 6 24 54 3.84
Gyrus
Middle Frontal L -44 10 34 4.68
Gyrus
Posterior R 12 -52 34 4.04
Cingulate Gyrus
6.4. Discussion Part 1
Participants showedincreased activation in putative ToM substrates (e.g.
precuneus cortex, OFC, supramarginal gyrus, paracingulate gyrus) and
reward centres (e.g. caudate and putamen) when cooperating with others (See
Tables 6.1., 6.2., and 6.3.) The activation patterns for the collapsed instruct
condition (occipital pole, left precuneus,left inferior temporal gyrus, and right
lateral occipital gyrus) suggest that participants wererecruitingparts of the
ToM network to process information as they gaveinstructions. In fact,
substrates associated with the ToM network were evidentin all of the
contrasts: instruct, self-drive, pair versus self-drive, and self-drive versuspair.
Becausethe task required instructing participants to think abouttheir
behaviour in all conditions, as well as to considerthe actions of others, the
ToM networkactivation makes sense. Even in the conditions were the person
was working alone, some of the sameareasthat are recruited for thinking
about others mayberecruited. I will discuss this in more detail in a later
portion ofthe discussion.
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Figure 6.3. Collapse Self-Drive and Collapse Instruct. Overlay of Collapse
Self-Drive (yellow) and Collapse Instruct (blue). Figures are in
neurological orientation.
 
First, precuneusactivation waspresentin all conditions. Activation in the
precuneushas been associated with mentalizing about cooperation. Lissek
et al. (2008)report that in stories describing deception, cooperation, or
combined cooperation and deception the precuneus seemsto be
particularly involved in processing information pertaining to cooperation.
In part, the findings correspondto this suggestion, as the instructor was
working to cooperate with the driver on the maze task, activation was
evidentin the precuneus. The findings of Ochsneretal. (2004) also
provide support for this idea. They argue that the left precuneus is one of
the regions activated whenattributing emotions to other people andthe self
(see Lissek et al., 2008). Because of the connections between activation in
the precuneus and mentalizing about the self and others, finding activation
in the precuneusinall conditionsofthis study is not surprising (cf. Lou,
2004; Platek, Mohamed,and Gallup, 2005). Additionally, the precuneus
has also been connected to visuo-spatial imagery. Cavanna and Trimble
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(2006) reported that the precuneusis linked to motor imagery and abstract
mental imagery tasks. Because of the nature of the maze task, some of the
precuneusactivation mayberelated to the visuo -spatial imagery whichis
occurring while participants try to complete the maze task.
Furthermore, activation in the superior and medial frontal gyri was evident
in all of the conditions and evident in all contrasts that survived
thresholding. Lissek et al. (2008) reported activation in the superior frontal
gyrus and the medial frontal gyrus in response to cooperationstories.
Activation in these areas has been related to both cooperation and
deception, but there were some differences in the degree of activation
given the typeofstory (e.g. cooperative or deceptive) (Lisseket al., 2008).
Portions of the superior frontal gyrus and the medialfrontal gyrus are also
consideredpart of the medial prefrontal cortex (with connectionsto the
OFC)and are consistently reported in ToM tasks (Brune and Brune-Cohrs,
2006; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe, 2006;
Lissek et al., 2008). Intuitively, it makes sense that activation would be
presentin these parts of the brain as past research has shown that the
medial prefrontal cortex and the ACC are implicated in making the
distinction between self and other (Lissek et al., 2008; Platek et al., 2006;
Vogeley et al., 2001.). During the instruct condition one could interpret
these findings as suggesting that participants were thinking about what
they were doing and what needed to be communicatedto their partner-
participant to facilitate movement through the maze.
6.4.1. Overlap in Neural Activation on Self-Drive and Instruct Conditions
Theself-drive condition revealed activation in many of the same substrates
that were activein the instruct condition. An overlap in the brain areas
associated with working alone to complete a task and cooperating with
another person emergedin this condition; that is, participants may have
been thinking about one’s self in a situation and possibly modelling the
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mental state of another (Gallup, 1982, Vogeley et al., 2001; Plateket al.,
2004). Many of the sameareasrecruitedfor self-reflection are also
recruited for ToM (Lisseketal., 2008). Johnsonet al. (2002) found anterior
medialprefrontal activation and posterior cingulate activation in their
examination ofself-reflection. A similar situation arose in this study.
Participants in the self-drive condition showedactivation that overlapped
with the pair drive and instruct activation, suggesting that the active
substrates may notbe specifically self-reflective of ToM functions, but that
they are involved in metacognitve functioning, generally.
Figure 6.4. Cooperative Pairing vs. Self-Drive Condition
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6.4.2. Executive Function and Reward: OFC Activation
In this experimentthe collapsed self-drive condition showedactivation in
areas associated with executive function and reward. Thelateralorbital
frontal cortex (OFC) showedbilateral activation. In an attemptto tease
apart the functions of the OFC,Elliott et al. (2000) hypothesized that the
lateral OFCis heavily involved in the decision making processin situations
that are “incompletely specified” and in suppressing previously rewarded
responses(p. 310). Circumstances requiring individuals to make judgments
with an incomplete set of information creates an element of
unpredictability, and this appearsto activate areas ofthe lateral OFC
(Elliott et al., 2000). Furthermore, Elliott et al.’s (2000) research supports
that the OFC monitors reward values, and in a novel(or uncertain)
situation an appraisal can be maderesulting in appropriate response
evaluation and selection. Knutson and Cooper (2005) reported that lateral
OFCand caudate activation was evidentin instances of short-term reward
prediction. In accordance with this Tanakaet al., (2004) discovered that
“when subjects learned actions on the basis of immediate rewards,
significant activity was seen in thelateral orbitofrontal cortex and the
striatum”(p. 887).
These findings provide support for the role that the OFC may have played
in the present study. Participants were unsure of the outcomeofthe task
and the OFC mayhavebeenintegral in assessing the task and making
decisions about howto proceed. Additionally, the OFC may have also been
activated upon the immediate anticipation and receipt of the reward, which
was the completion of the maze’.In particular the OFC may have been
linked to the reward system in the pair versusself-drive contrast, as the
 
' While I did not experimentally assess how participants felt after the scanning, many participants
anecdotally reported during my debriefing that they felt a particular sense of accomplishment
whentheyinstructed the other person to the completion of the maze. I can recall many subjects
reporting the feeling of success, and that they felt a sense of pride and reward upon successfully
completing the mazes.
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caudate nucleus and putamen,areas that have been implicated in reward
(Glimcheret al., 2008) werealso active. It is my interpretation that where
other components of the reward networkare activated the OFC activation
is likely linked to reward activation. However,it is important to note with
structures like the OFCit is hard to know with certainty exactly whatit is
being respondedto becauseit has myriad of functions(Elliott et al., 2000).
6.4.3. Reward Centre Activation
In the pair versusself-drive condition activation was evidentin three areas
associated with reward: OFC, caudate, and putamen (Figure 6.6.). The
caudate and nucleus accumbensare known for their reward response
(Glimcheret al., 2008), and they receive dopamineprojections from the
midbrain (Rilling et al., 2002; Schultz, 1998). It appears that the OFCis
essential in the control of goal directed behaviour (Schultz et al. 2000;
Damasio, 1994; Rolls, 1996). Lesions of the OFC lead to impaired
decision-making regarding the outcomeofactions (Becharaet al., 1998).
Because rewards are imperative to the primary goals of behaviour, human
motivation maybelinked to the processing of reward stimuli in the OFC
(Dickenson and Balleine, 1994). In other words, positive reinforcementis
one of the primary functions of rewards, and the OFCisintegral in this
process.
Figure 6.6. Activation in the Caudate in the Pair versus Self-Drive
Condition.
 
The ultimate goalin this study was to examine how cooperating (two
minds working together on a task) differed from doing the task alone. The
controltask, or self-drive condition was designed to provide a basis of
comparison for activation when one is working alone. While there was a
great deal of overlap in the self-drive condition and the instruct condition,
there wasa distinct difference in the pair (or combinedbrain vs.the self
drive). Reward centresin the brain were active in the pair contrast. Thus,it
appears that variation in the reward system is activated depending upon
whether one completes the mazealoneor in cooperation with another
person. This activation difference might suggest that the participants
experienced someanticipation about the successful completion of the maze
via communication with their partner. While it is rewarding to complete
the maze by oneself, as evidenced byactivation in the OFC,it may be
more rewarding to complete the task underconditions of real time
cooperation. Activation in the OFC wasevidentin this contrast and most
importantly caudate and putamenactivation waspresent. The activation in
the caudate and putamenis uniqueto this contrast, and these parts of the
brain seem to play a special role in cooperation and reward (Schultz, 1997).
Knutsonet al., (2001) dissociated parts of the reward system network and
found that anticipation of reward resulted in activation in the caudate and
the putamen, whereasnotification that the reward was earned revealed
activation in the medial prefrontal cortex. Glimcheret al. (2008) report that
the caudate is associated with cooperation when one is making decisions
aboutsocial reward for their partners during a game.Rilling etal. (2002)
report activation in the caudate and anterior cingulate gyrus following
cooperation in a Prisoner’s dilemma game. Specifically, this response is
isolated to the condition where participants were cooperating with another
humanbeing. Perhaps the caudate and putamenare particularly sensitive to
humaninteraction and the rewards associated with it. As Rilling suggests
(2008) the incorporation of the reward system in cooperative interactions
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has helped to lay the groundwork and maintain human cooperation among
individuals who are not kin.
6.5. Part 2
In this portion of the analysis I compared brain activation between those
who completed the maze and those who did not complete the maze.
Ultimately, comparisons were made betweenthese four conditions: Instruct
Complete (IC), Self Complete (SC), Instruct Did Not Complete (IDN), and
Self Did Not Complete (SDN). Comparisons were made between all
possible conditions.
Table 6.4. Description of the Conditions
 
Condition Description
 
Instruct Complete (IC) The maze was completed during the
instruct condition.
Self Complete (SC) The maze was not completed during
the self-drive condition.
Instruct Did Not Complete (IDN) The maze wasnot completed during
the instruct condition.
Self Did Not Complete (SDN) The maze was not completed during
the self-drive condition.  
6.5.1. fMRI Imaging Analysis and Contrasts Part 2
In the secondpart of the analysis, the same pre-processing andstatistical
analyses were performed in the same wayas discussed previously (See
Section 6.2.4. for a review). After pre-processingI createdfirst level
contrasts at the individual level for the all of the instruct and self-drive
conditions. The drive conditions, except for self-drive, were not included in
the contrasts because participants were not given feedback about whether
or not the maze was completed; therefore they did not know if they had
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successfully completed the mazeornot. In the secondlevel analysis,
conditions were contrasted at the individual level. For exampleif a
participant completed the maze during the self-drive condition in the first
part ofthe round, but did not complete it in the second part of the round
(*rememberthat each mazeset has 4 mazes- 2 pairs of 2 mazes), and then
completed both rounds of the mazes during the instruct condition then his
contrast would be somethinglike this: self-drive complete — self-drive not
complete; self-drive complete — instruct complete; self-drive not complete
— self-drive complete; self-drive not complete — instruct complete; instruct
complete — self-drive not complete; instruct complete — self-drive
complete. In other words, each participant’s condition was contrasted at
the individual level with the other possible outcomes.
Third-level analysis brought everything to the group level. Contrast
Parameter Estimate (COPE)files were combinedforall participantsthat
fell into each category. Using the previous example,that participant’s
COPEfiles would have been combined with other participants’ for each
contrast. So all participants COPE files were combined under the proper
category to create group activation means. FMRI data processing was
carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) version 5.92, part of
FSL (FMRIB’sSoftware Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Z
(Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded at p = .05
(uncorrected). Images were thresholded (z > 1.6) using non corrected
significance threshold ofp < .05 unless otherwisestated.
6.6. Results Part 2
Activations for all contrasts are described below. Additionally, the
coordinates and z-scoresare listed in Table 6.4.
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6.6.1. Instruct Complete versus Instruct Did Not Complete (IC — IDN)
This contrast compared those who completed the maze duringthe instruct
condition versus those who did not complete the maze when they were
instructing. Activation was evidentin the following areasofthe brain:left
caudate, bilateral temporallobes, left posterior cingulate gyrus, andleft
putamen.
6.6.2. Instruct complete versus SelfDid Not Complete (IC-SDN)
Brain activation from the IC condition (those who completed the maze
during the instruct condition) was contrasted with that from the SDN (those
whodid not complete the maze duringthe self-drive condition) condition.
Activation was evident in the right andleft frontal lobes, precentral gyrus,
precuneuscortex, paracingulate gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, middle
frontal gyrus.
6.6.3. Instruct Complete versus SelfComplete (IC — SC)
In this contrast, activation was contrasted between participants who
finished the maze during the instruct condition and participants who
completed the maze during the self-drive condition. Activation appeared in
the following substrates: left precentral gyrus, right precuneus, cerebellum,
left superior frontal gyrus, right lingual gyrus, right postcentral gyrus, left
post central gyrus,left precentral gyrus.
6.6.4. Instruct DidNot Complete versus SelfDidNot Complete (IDN-
SDN)
This contrast revealed activation that remained after a contrast between
those that did not complete the maze duringthe instruct condition (IDN)
and those that did not complete the maze duringthe self-drive condition
(SDN). Activation was evidentin the following substrates: right precuneus
cortex, right postcingulate gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus, left
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precuneuscortex, left superior frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus
posterior division,left inferior temporal gyrus,andleft lateral occipital
cortex.
6.6.5. Instruct Did Not Complete versus Instruct Complete (IDN-IC)
Brain activation ofparticipants who did not complete the maze during the
instruct condition was contrasted with that of those who completed the
maze duringthe instruct condition. Activation was evident in the following
substrates: bilateral middle frontal gyrus, right precentral gyrus,left
paracingulate gyrus, right supramarginal gyrusposteriordivision,left
anterior cingulate gyrus, left paracingulate gyrus, bilateral superior frontal
gytus, left precuneus,bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus, right precuneus
cortex.
6.6.6. Instruct Did Not Complete versus SelfDid Not Complete (IDN-
SDN)
This contrast revealed activation which remained after the IDN group was
contrasted with the SDN group. Activation was evident in the following
substrates: left post central gyrus, bilateral middle temporal gyrus
(posterior division), bilateral orbital frontal cortex, bilateral superiorfrontal
gytus, posterior cingulate gyrus, precuneus,
6.6.7. SelfDid Not Complete versus Instruct Complete (SDN-IC)
No activation evident.
6.6.8. SelfDid Not Complete versus SelfComplete (SDN-SC)
This contrast revealed activation remaining after a contrast between SDN
and SC groups. Activation was evident in the following substrates: right
superior frontal gyrus, bilateral frontal pole, bilateral orbital frontal cortex,
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paracingulate gyrus, superior frontal gyrus, right pallidum, insular cortex,
right putamen, right caudate.
6.6.9. SelfDid Not Complete versus Instruct DidNot Complete (SDN-
IDN)
Activation was evident in the following areas of the brain in the SDN
versus IDN contrast: right precentral gyrus, right superior parietal lobule,
right insular cortex, middle frontal gyrus.
6.6.10. SelfComplete versus Instruct DidNot Complete (SC-IDN)
In this contrast activation from the participants that completed the maze by
themselves was contrasted withthat of participants who did not complete
the maze during the instruct condition. Activation was evidentin the
following substrates: left middle frontal gyrus, left putamen,left precentral
gytus, left precuneuscortex,bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus, nightinsula,
caudate, planum polare, and left supramarginal gyrus(posterior division).
6.6.11. SelfComplete versus SelfDid Not Complete (SC-SDN)
Activation was evident in the following substrates: Bilateral paracingulate
gyrus, right anterior cingulate gyrus, left posterior cingulate gyrus,bilateral
precuneuscortex, bilateral middle frontal gyrus, left precentral gyrus,
bilateral inferior frontal gyrus, bilateral frontal pole, left supramarginal
gyrus.
6.6.12. SelfComplete versus Instruct Complete (SC-IC)
Activation wasevidentin the left anterior cingulate gyrus,bilateral frontal
pole, caudate, paracingulate gyrus, bilateral superior temporal gyrus
(posterior division), bilateral middle temporal gyrus, and the precuneus
cortex.
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Table 6.5. Complete versus Incomplete by Instruct and Self-drive
Conditions Activations
 
 
 
 
      
Hemisphere xX Y Z Z-score
IC-SDN
Frontal lobes L -16 16 50 2.93
Precentral gyrus L -38 -22 50 2.30
Precuneus L -2 -60 40 1.93
Paracingulate L -6 20 46 2.62
Superior frontal L -24 16 46 1.98
gytus
Middle frontal L -40 22 30 2.85
gytus
IC-IDN
Temporal L -32 -50 -20 1.80
occipital fusiform
gyrus
Temporal R 28 -44 -18 2.07
occipital fusiform
gytus
Caudate L -18 -26 22 2.00
Posterior L -4 -24 28 1.83
cingulate gyrus
Putamen L -26 16 4 2.33
Juxtapositional L -14 -16 44 2.01
lobule cortex
Juxtapositional R 12 -8 50 2.13
lobule cortex
Anterior cingulate R 12 4 36 1.93
cortex
Superior frontal L -28 -12 62 1.68
gytus
Precentral gyrus L -30 0 32 2.43
IDN - IC
Middle frontal L -24 2 52 2.25
gyrus
Middle frontal R 26 2 52 1.71
gytus
Precentral gyrus R 26 -10 44 2.38
Paracingulate L -2 20 44 1.96
gyrus
Supramarginal R 44 -44 44 2.68
gyrus
Anterior cingulate L -4 6 30 1.64
gytus
Anterior cingulate R 2 0 32 2.79
gytus
Superiorfrontal R 24 2 48 1.81
gytus
Superiorfrontal L -22 2 56 2.23
gytus
Precuneus L -4 -52 52 1.62 
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 IC —SC
 
 
 
  
Precentral gyrus__| L -34 -22 50 2.16
Precuneus R 14 -50 62 1.62
Cerebellum R. 26 -50 -32 2.43
Superior frontal L -18 0 62 1.71
gyrus
Lingual gyrus R 22 -40 -8
Supramarginal L -22 -40 38 2.49
gytus
Postcentral gyrus_| L 36 -28 50 2.07
Superior parietal L -22 -52 50 2.63
lobule
SC-IC
Anterior cingulate L -2 36 16 2.49
gytus
Frontal pole L -20 52 16 3.81
Frontal pole R 22 54 16 3.48
Caudate L -14 10 16 3.01
Caudate R 16 8 16 2.24
Paracingulate L -2 48 18 2.87
Superior temporal L -60 -34 4 2.97
gyrus (posterior)
Superior temporal R 58 -34 2 3.97
gyrus (posterior)
Middle temporal R 62 -32 -4 3.087
gyrus
Middle temporal L -60 -32 -2 2:33
gytus
Precuneus L -2 -38 52 3.06
IDN —- SDN
Precuneus/post R 8 -52 32 2.04
cingulate gyrus
Cingulate gyrus L -4 -48 16 2.07
Cingulate gyrus R 2 -38 18 1.72
Superior frontal L -20 38 46 2.22
gytusMiddle temporal R 58 -14 -22 1.86
gytus
Anterior cingulate L -54 -22 -22 1.70
gytusOFC L -48 20 -8 1.82
OFC R 50 22 -8 1.64
SDN - IDN
Precentral gyrus R 44 0 50 1.65
Superior parietal R 44 -44 60
lobule
Insula R 34 16 8 1.63
Middlefrontal R 34 2 62 1.63
gytus
SDN -SC
Superior frontal R 8 44 40 1.63
gytus      
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Frontal pole L -40 44 -10 1.89
Frontal pole R. 32 44 10 2.44
OFC L -32 22 10 2.43
OFC R 22 22 -12
Paracingulate L -8 22 44 2.09
gytus
Superior frontal R 6 46 42 1.92
gytus
Pallidum R 14 0 -6 1.97
Insula L -32 20 -8 2.51
Putamen R 20 22 -6 1.92
SC —-SDN
Paracingulate L 0 22 44 2.61
Paracingulate R 6 -44 -4 1.77
Anterior cingulate R 6 14 20 1.78
gytus
Posterior L 0 -38 26 2.64
cingulate gyrus
Precuneus L 0 -62 40 2.12°
Precuneus R 4 -60 50 1.94
Middle frontal R 40 32 26 2.56
gytus
Middlefrontal L -38 32 26 2.03
gytus
Inferior frontal L -48 14 26 2.36
gyrus
Inferior frontal R 50 20 26 2.04
gyrus
Frontal pole R 50 38 -4 1.63
Supramarginal L -38 -36 38 2.10
gytus
SC -IDN
Middle frontal L -32 36 26 1.60
gytus
Putamen L -32 10 -2 1.58
Precentral gyrus L -12 -34 46 3.18
Precuneus L 0 -58 38 251
Anterior cingulate R 0 36 -4 1.98
gytus
Insula R. 36 20 -2 1.88
Caudate L -14 16 0 1.82 
6.7. Discussion Part 2
Whenthe IC (Instruct Complete) activation was contrasted with IDN
(Instruct Did Not Complete) and the SC (Self Complete) was contrasted
with IC (Instruct Complete) conditions substrates ofthe reward system in
the brain were activated, specifically the OFC/MPFC, caudate and
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putamen. Additionally reward network activation survived several ofthe
other contrasts, and this activation appears to be linked to completing the
maze by oneself or during the cooperation condition, but the main
componentis that the reward areas are active during successful maze
completion.
Precuneusactivation was evident in a majority of the contrasts. It has been
well documented that precuneusactivationis related to selfprocessing
(Cavanna and Trimble, 2006). The capability to distinguish between one’s
own perspective and another’s perspective is essential in theory ofmind
which allows one to recognize and act upon the knowledgethat another
person’s perspective or knowledgeis different from one’s own. Cavanna
and Trimble (2006) state, “Overall, it emerges that the intentional self
componentis an important factor in precuneus involvement. These results
fit well with Damasio’s hypothesis (1999), according to which medial
parietal areas, together with the secondary somatasensory cortices and
insula, help to subserve the primitive representation ofthe self in
relationship with the outside world (proto-self)”(p. 576).
Activation in the theory of mind areas wasalso evident.In all of the
instruct contrasts, regardless of whether the maze was completed,
activation in the ToM network wasevident: orbitofrontal cortex, anterior
cingulate cortex, temporoparietal junction, temporal lobes, and the
precuneus. In theself-drive contrasts, some of the same ToM areas showed
activation particularly the frontal pole, paracingulate cortex, and the
anterior cingulate cortex, which have beenrelated to selfreflection (Lissek
et al., 2008). Lissek et al. (2008) state, “The area extending from the
anterior cingulate cortex to the anterior frontal pole, particularly the
paracingulate cortex, is supposed to be engagedin self-reflection, person
perception and in making inferences aboutothers’ thoughts” (p. e2023).
Overall, these contrasts did not reveal, nor were they meantto, anything
particularly different from the previous contrasts regarding theory of mind
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and reward. The main aim in running these analyses wasto take a closer
look at the relationship between the reward activation and completion of
the maze.
A higher level contrast was run between (IC — IDN) — (SC — SDN) and (SC
— SDN) — (IC -IDN)to investigate the unique brain activation between
instruct complete and self complete conditions, controlling for activation in
the instruct did not complete (IDN)andthe self did not complete (SDN)
conditions. Results indicated that the caudate and putamen were
significantly more active (p < .05) in the (IC — IDN) — (SC — SDN)
contrast. This meansthat in the incidents where the participants were
working together and completed the maze, activation in the putamen and
caudate, reward centres ofthe brain, was significantly stronger than in the
conditions where participants completed the maze alone. Haruno and
Kawato (2006), suggest that the caudate and putamen serve the following
functions: “The putamenis involved mainly in evaluating actions in terms
of sensory contexts and rewards, whereas the caudate nucleusis involved
mainly in comparing actual and predicted rewards for learning” (p. 948).
Knutsonet al. (2001) suggest that putamen and caudate activation are
related to anticipation of reward. Furthermore,this finding appears to
provide support for my previous conclusion that the caudate and perhaps
the putamen as well, may be uniquely related to the reward that
accompanies engaging in successful cooperation to achieve a goal with
another human beingor the anticipation of such a reward.
6.8. General Discussion
6.8.1. Limitations
Onelimitation in this study is the interscanner variability. When using two
different scanners it is necessary to accountfor the different operating
characteristics between scanners. For instance, scanners may have
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different gradient strengths, head coil sensitivity, and different gains
(Montagueet al., 2002). In an effort to account forthis in my study I
attempted to optimize the sequences of both scannersto limit
differentiation to a minimum. This was done via repeated consultation with
the resident radiographer at MARIARC.Additionally, the use of a task like
the maze task, whichis not a well developed ToMtask, complicated
things. Investigating ToM and reward when working together could have
been accomplished using a moreestablished task, and this could have
improvedthe study.
6.8.2. Conclusion
This study has shown that the theory ofmind networkis associated with
cooperation in this task and considering the other participant’s instructional
requests/needs. Additionally, many ofthe same neural correlates associated
with cooperation are also incorporatedin self-reflection, as evidenced by
the activation patterns in theself-drive condition. Most importantly,
activation in the caudate nucleus and putamen was apparent only when the
participant was cooperating and working with the other participant, in the
combinedbrain contrast. In the secondpart of the studyresults indicated
that in fact, caudate and putamen were the unique remaining activations in
the critical contrast between the instruct complete condition and the self
complete conditions: (IC — IDN) — (SC — SDN). This suggests that
participants found it more rewarding to complete the maze with their
partner, than to completeit alone. I think that this unique activation may
suggestthat thereis a particular part of the reward system, possibly
residing in the caudate or putamen, that is involved in the reward
associated with humansocial interaction. However, caudate and putamen
activation wasstill evident in someofthe self complete contrasts, as well
as the otherinstruct complete conditions. So while it may be most
rewarding to complete the maze during a cooperativeeffort,it is still
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rewarding to complete the maze by oneself. Overall, this study
demonstrated that working together to complete the mazeresulted in the
greatest activation in the caudate and putamen reward areas, comparedto
other conditions. Future research may provide evidence to support that
these areas are part of a unique network that is more responsive to
cooperation and success when working with a humanpartner.
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Chapter 7 General Discussion
7.1. Social Exclusion and Cooperation
The dynamics underlying social exclusion and cooperation are intricate and
multifarious (Maneret al, 2007). The experiments presentedin this thesis
were designed to dissect the nature of responses to exclusion and
cooperation, and to this end I attempted to research variable responsesat
the behavioural, cognitive, and neurological levels. Each experiment
provides an importantlink to the role of social exclusion and cooperation
during human evolutionary history, as well as adding to the understanding
of the individual variability in responses to social exclusion as applied to
Williams’ model of ostracism. Generally, what is well known,andis
reiterated in this thesis, is that social exclusionis hurtful and distressing,
and cooperation is pleasing and beneficial. I replicated the social exclusion
effect several times here and also show that dyadic cooperation is pleasant.
This begs the question, “What is new and potentially important about this
thesis?” First, if one accepts the notion that exclusionis hurtful(e.g.
impacts fundamental needs)as true, then whatthis thesis doesis help
describe the contexts — psychological and social — under which experiences
associated with exclusion vary across participants.
In Part 1 of my thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) I have shown that being excluded
is hurtful regardless of‘brain type’ and that exclusion is so psychologically
powerful that it appears to capture portions of the attentional systems
indiscriminately. Because of the unwavering nature ofthe behavioural and
cognitive responses of myparticipants, I feel that this suggests that social
exclusion waslikely a recurrent threat experienced by our hominid
ancestors and thus variance in psychological brain type (empathizing,
systemizing) haslittle effect on the experience. Rather, in the latter case of
cognitive responses (Chapter4), it appears that exclusion is powerful
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enough to impact executive functionssignificantly. Albeit this is conjecture
at this stage, this could serveto allocate attentional resourcesto incidents
of exclusion producing quick andefficient modifications in behaviour
aimedat regaining inclusion. As noted throughoutthis thesis,
inclusion/group membership brings with it many benefits, not the least of
whichare protection, sharing of resources, and possibility of allo-
mothering, thus making inclusion and group membership a covetedstatus.
In Part 2 of this thesis (Chapters 5 and 6) I utilized {MRI brain imaging to
“peer”into the brain in order to gain deeperinsightinto 1) a potentially
evolutionary important context that might drive variation in experience of
distress due to social exclusion (in versus out-group exclusion) and 2) the
neural correlates of shared cooperation. In the former (Chapter 5), data
showedthat group membership andfacial self-resemblance had an impact
on the neural correlates associated with brain activation to social exclusion.
Specifically, participants showedactivation consistent with a neural alarm
response hypothesis when being excluded by “players” that shared some
type of appearance based group membership (myproxies for group
membership were same-race andself-face resemblance). When exclusion
cameat the handsof individuals who might share group membership
(same-race) or genes in commonwiththe participants (self-resemblance),
activation in specific areasofthe brain intensified. In the latter (Chapter 6)
I specifically investigated the neural correlates of cooperation during a
real-time cooperative task. In this task participants had to cooperate with
one anotherin order to reach the end of the maze. Therelationship between
the areas activated in response to cooperation suggests that this exercise
was rewarding(i.e. that solving the maze activated shared reward centres
across the two participants’ brains). To me, this suggests that evolution
may have favoured cooperation since the brain appears to show reward
centre activity in response to cooperation.
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Onecould theorize that the reward activation I observedis the proximate
neural correlate to the ultimate benefits of cooperation. In other words,
cooperation in groups tends to result in sharing of resources, protection,
and survival, and these benefits appear to have capitalized on activation in
the reward system in the brain. This, I think, can be clearly linked to social
exclusion. Exclusion posesa threat to the fundamental needs such that it
requires that humansarevigilantoftheir level of social inclusion, and have
a system in place by which they respond with the appropriate coping
strategies when in danger of exclusion (Ouwerkerket al., 2005; Leary et
al., 1995; Pickett and Gardner, 2005). Indeed, possession of a system with
such a purposeis indicative of the magnitude ofthe threat of exclusion,
suggesting thatit is a tool that can be employed by groups to encourage
behaviours, particularly behaviours that benefit the group. Consequently,
cooperation is rewarded and can be promotedbythe threat of exclusion
(Kerr, 1999). Below I summarize my main findings in more detail and
draw somefinal conclusions aboutthis research.
7.2. Summaryof Findings
7.2.1. Summary ofChapter 3
In Chapter 3 results indicated that cognitive style, specifically empathizing
and balanced cognitive style, impacted participants’ perceptions of control
during the Cyberball game. Social exclusion impacted the participants’
fundamental needs independentof cognitive style; howeverthis
experiment revealed that empathizers have different needs than systemizers
when it comesto the amountof control they feel comfortable with in social
interactions. Therefore, an individuals’ cognitive perspective, present
during any social interaction, appears important to sociality. Interestingly,
this suggests that a degree of individual variation exists surrounding the
target of exclusion and responses to actual exclusion andthreats of
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exclusion. Baron-Cohen (2003) has suggested that cognitive style —
empathizing to systemizing — is a trait that selection acted on during our
humanevolutionary history. He suggests that this spectrum can best be
represented as a continuum between extreme male-like and extreme
female-like psychological/cognitive tendencies, thus lending to the
selection for the division of labour among the sexesin early hunter-
gatherersocieties. My finding suggeststhat those closer to the extreme
female-like cognitive style are more attuned to threats of exclusion;
specifically they feel a heightened loss of control. This corresponds with
the division of labour hypothesis which suggests that females were more
likely to spend significantly more time in proximity to other other
females, young males, and children — relative to adult males who might
have had to spend longperiodsin isolation during hunting excursions.
While myresults did not reveal any gender differences, this may have been
as aresult of the fact that most of the participants in this study did not fall
into the extreme empathizing and extreme systemizing categories; however
empathic individuals did differ from the other groups on their need for
control during the Cyberball game.
7.2.2. Summary ofChapter 4
Chapter 4 focused on the impact of exclusion on cognitive processing in
the excluded target. The results indicated that exclusion caused a delay in
cognitive processing, generally attention. Participants demonstrated a latent
response time on the emotional Stroop task, with no specificity effect for
word class. This suggests that participants’ attention was captured when
excluded, which I assumeare either attempts to suppress their emotional
distress or to channel cognitive resources towards regaining inclusion. The
relationship between the four fundamental needsand their ties to anxiety
(losing sense of belonging,control, self-esteem, and lack of meaningful
existence lead to anxiety), provide support for the latter, suggesting that
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anxiety directs attention to problem areas and this channelling of attention
is a mechanism by which people quit doing things that may jeopardize
inclusion and allow them to re-evaluate their behaviour and look for a way
to regain inclusion (Baumeister and Tice, 1990).
7.2.3. Summary ofChapter 5
Group membership impactsthe effects of social exclusion. The {MRI study
in Chapter 5 showedthat activation in the ACC varies as a function of
resemblanceto the participants when individuals are excluded. The ACC
has beenlinked to social distress (Eisenbergeret al., 2003; 2006; Masten,
2009) and I discovered that activation in the ACC increased during
exclusion conditions whenthe other players’ shared race and facial self
resemblance. In other words, there was a stronger neurological response to
exclusion from in-group/same-race membersandself-resembling faces.
These findings suggest that exclusion can be impacted by wdois doing the
excluding. Thisis consistent with literature on kin selection (Hamilton,
1964). For example, DeBruine (2002) showedthat self-resembling faces
are trusted more than non-self-resembling faces and Platek and his
colleagues have shown similar trustworthy and appetitive behavioural
responsesto self-resembling faces (Platek et al., 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2007). Similarly, there appearsto be a distinct neural responseto faces of
the samerace, relative to other race faces (Phelpset al., 2000). Other-race
faces tendto activate areas associated with anxiety and fear, namely the
amygdala. Although most of the neuroimaging studies on same versus
other-race faces are across ostensible phenotypic groups (white versus
black faces), one could conjecture that similar mechanismsexist even
wherethese ostensible phenotypic variations are not apparent to you orI.
Take for example primitive African tribes that would appear to resemble
one anotherin skin colour. I would hypothesize that across these groups
individuals canefficiently detect out-group members and would behave
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accordingly and show similar neural activation patterns, and this would be
an interesting area of further research.
7.2.4. Summary ofChapter 6
Finally, Chapter six shifts direction a bit to investigate cooperation during
an fMRI hyperscanning task. When comparingacross conditions of
instructing versus self-driving many of the same areas (precuneus,
postcentral gyrus, frontal pole/prefrontal cortex) showedactivation.
Activation in the theory ofmind network wasalso evident, especially in
the instructing condition (precuneus, anterior cingulate gyrus, superior
temporal sulcus, and medial temporal gyrus). Aside from this, the most
compelling finding wasthe activation in substrates associated with reward
(orbital frontal cortex, caudate, and putamen) that was evident when
contrasting cooperating brains with instances of those participants working
in isolation. The uniqueactivation in the caudate and putamen suggests
that there is a specific part of the neural reward system that is involved in
the rewards associated with human cooperation (Rillinget al., 2002).
Additionally, results indicated that when participants successfully
completed the maze with their partner activation in the putamen and
caudate areas was stronger comparedto those instances when the maze
was successfully completed alone.
7.2.5. Implicationsfor the Ostracism/Social Exclusion Model (Williams,
1997/2007)
What is the sum ofall of these parts? Well, at the outset it may have
seemedthat the two themesincorporated in this thesis were unrelated:
social exclusion and cooperation. However, I hope that I have now madeit
apparentthat there is the possibility of cyclical relationship between the
two — the nature of whichis outside the scopeofonethesis. It was my goal
to demonstrate that putative evolved cognitive adaptations modulate
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feelings and neural correlates associated with social exclusion and
cooperation. Linking these important mechanisms of humansocial
behaviour with neural activation associated with exclusion and cooperation
leadsto a better understanding ofhow social groups are formed and the
proximate mechanismsthat regulate social group maintenance.
So, at it the most basic level, cooperation may be considered adaptive
because it allows humansto work together, share resources and protection.
Furthermore, ostracism eliminates burdensome members from the group to
maintain group cohesion (Williams, 2007). Under these assumptions,
cooperation and social exclusion appearto be a system of checks and
balances that have evolved to work together and each provides support for
the other. The first three experiments (Chapters 3, 4, and 5) focus on social
exclusion. Chapters 3 and 5 illustrate that responses to social exclusion can
be idiosyncratic and are affected by characteristics of the target and the
source. Chapter4 indicates that cognition/attention is impacted by social
exclusion, and basic cognitive processesare stalled because of the negative
impact ofsocial exclusion. Humans have evolveda brain and biology
whose functioning benefits from the formation of and maintenance of
sociality and whenthatis disrupted individuals feel a decreased sense of
belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence (Cacioppo and
Hawkley, 2005). This was evident in my experiments,althoughnotall of
the needs were impacted equally. Furthermore, these findings add
additional information to Williams’ ostracism model (1997; 2007), which
providedthe theoretical frameworkfor this research (See Figure 7.1.).
These experimentshaveillustrated that race, self-resemblance, and brain
type can act as mediating and moderating variables in exclusion.
Moreover, exclusion impacts cognitive processing, and the results of
Chapter 4 are applicable to the Reactions module, suggesting that a
temporary inhibition of cognitive processing results from exclusion. Figure
Lay
7.1. illustrates the application of the researchin this thesis to William’s
model for social exclusion.
  
Taxonomic Dimensions
Visibility: Physical, cyber, social
Motive: Not ostracism, role prescribed,
punitive, defensive, oblivious
Quantity: Low to High
Clarity: Low to High
Antecedents
(why sourcesostracize)
Individual Differences:
Non- confrontational, avoidant, stubborn,
in — out group membership
Role-Differences: Low Relative Power
Situational Pressures: Concernsfor social desirability   NO ¥
 
Mediators or Moderators
Attributions: Taking or deflecting, responsibility/control, self-
derogation versus other blame
Individual Differences: Attachmentstyles, needs or belonging,
self-esteem, control, terror management, brain type, group
membership
 
Threatened Needs
Belonging, Self-Esteem, Control, and Meaningful Existence/
Fear of Death
 
Reactions
Immediate: Adversive impact, bad mood,hurt feelings,
psychological arousal, impact on cognitive performance
Short-term: Attempts to regain needs by strengthening bondsto
others, makingself-affirmations, taking control, maintaining
cultural buffers
Long-term:Self-imposedisolation, learned helplessness, low-
self esteem, despondency
Figure 7.1. Williams’ (1997) Model of Ostracism with
applications fromthis thesis in bold italics.
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Additionally, exclusion activates areas ofthe brain involved in physical
and emotionalpain, and the social pain system may have piggy backed off
of the pre existing pain system (Eisenbergeret al., 2003). This may suggest
that humans have evolvedto avoid social exclusion and rejection (just like
weavoid physical pain), which are detrimental to survival and mental well-
being, and to enjoy cooperation andto find it pleasurable and rewarding.
Whenfeelings of inclusion and belongingare threatened people feel
distressed and anxious and are motivated to regain inclusion, whichis
rewarding. Because exclusion has been fingered as a strategy for
maintaining group cohesion and norms,it is likely that human biology
evolved to support that. Therefore, cooperation has developed to be a
rewarding experience for humanbeings. Activation in the reward centres
of the brain (the striatum, caudate, nucleus accumbens and the OFC) may
be helpful in “sustaining cooperative relationship(s)” becauseoftheir
importanceto survival and as a counter to the costs associated with
exclusion (Ouwerkerket al., 2005). Exclusion may have evolved to keep
people honest among groupliving situations, and the anxiety that
accompanies it may work to motivate individuals to regain inclusion andto
regain the rewarding experience of cooperation. See Figure 7.2. for a
hypothesized insertion of cooperation into William’s model ofsocial
exclusion.
7.3. Conclusions
7.3.1. Future Directions
Expanding uponthe social exclusion experiments using techniques other
than Cyberball would be interesting. While Cyberball is a very good way
to create an exclusive environmentfora study in laboratory settings, it may
havespecific effects that accompanyit. For instance, I did not find that
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Figure 7.2.4 hypothesized revision to Williams’ (1997/2007) model of social exclusion. Note,I
have included a box for Drive to Cooperate. I hypothesize that an individual whoafter feeling the
effects of, or threat of, social exclusion tries to cooperate, the group is forced with making a
decision about that individual’s reinclusion. The drive to cooperate might be considered a short-
term reaction under William’s model
meaningful existence was impacted by social exclusion in any ofmy
studies. This effect could be the result ofusing the Cyberball game and
becausethe social interaction is so removedparticipants do not feel that
exclusion has any impact on meaningful existence. Furthermore,
continuing to combinethe study of social exclusion and cooperation may
reveal a moreholistic view ofsocial interaction.
Further investigation ofthe effects of exclusion on group membership
could be fertile for our understanding ofhow groupsandindividuals utilize
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exclusion to maintain, dissolve, and setup social groups. Many ofmy
findings suggest that exclusion and cooperation have been shaped by
humanevolution and that the humanbrain and biology is specifically
adapted to cope with the social requirements ofhuman survival.
Continuing to look at social exclusion and cooperation through
evolutionary lenses helps to highlight why individuals have such a strong
drive to cooperate and why responsesto exclusion can be so dramatic.
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APPENDIX 1
Appendix 1.1. Social Exclusion Measure/Fundamental Needs
Questionnaire (Williamset al., 2002; Zadroet al., 2004)
All questions are answered ona scale of 1 to 9:
1 = Notat all to 9 = Always
1. In the last round, what percent of the throws were thrown to you?
1=0%
2= 25%
3=50%
4=75%
5=100%
2. To what extent were you included bythe participants during the last
game?
3. Overall in the last round did you feel accepted by the other players?
4. Overall in the last round did you feel rejected by the other players?
5. I felt poorly accepted by the other participants.
6. I felt as though I had made a connection or bonded with one or more of
the participants during the Cyberball game.
7. I felt like an outsider during the Cyberball game.
8. I felt like I was able to throw theball as often as I wanted during the
game.
9. I felt somewhatfrustrated during the game.
10. I felt in control during the Cyberball game.
11. During the gameI felt good about myself.
12.I felt that the otherparticipants failed to perceive me as a worthy and
likeable person.
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13. I felt somewhat inadequate during the Cyberball game.
14. I felt that my performance(e.g., catching the ball, deciding whom to
throw the ball to) had someeffect on the direction of the game.
15. I felt non-existent during the Cyberball game.
16. I felt as though my existence was meaningless during the Cyberball
game.
17. Please select an adjective from each group that best describes your
mood after playing Cyberball.
Bad, Good, Happy, Sad, Tense, Relaxed, Aroused, Not aroused
18. I felt angry during the Cyberball game.
19. I enjoyed playing the Cyberball game.
20. I believed that I was playing the Cyberball game with other people?
Yes
No
143
Appendix 1.2. Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (Downey Berenson,
and Kang, 2006; Downeyand Feldman, 1996).
The items below describe situations in which people sometimesask things of
others. For each item, image that you are in the situation, and then answerthe
questionsthat follow it.
Each questionis rated on a scale from to 6:
Very unconcerned = | to Very concerned = 6 or
Very unlikely = 1 to Very likely = 6
1. You ask your parents or another family memberfor a loan to help you
througha difficult financialtime.
How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not your family
would want to help you?
I would expect that they would agree to help as muchas they can.
2. You approacha closefriend to talk after doing or saying somethingthat
seriously upset him/her.
How concerned or anxious would you be over whetheror not your friend
would wantto talk with you?
I would expect that he/she would wantto talk with meto try and work things
out.
3. You bring up an issue of sexual protection with your significant other and
tell him/her how important you think itis.
How concerned/anxious would you be overhis/her reaction?
I would expectthat he/she would be willing to discuss our possible options
without getting defensive.
4. You ask your supervisor for help with a problem you have been havingat
work.
How concerned or anxious would you be over whetheror not the person
would wantto help you?
I would expect that he/she would wantto try to help meout.
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5. After a bitter argument, you call or approach your significant other because
you want to make up.
How concerned or anxious would you be over whetheror not your significant
other would want to make up with you.
I would expect that he or she would be as eager to make up, as I would be.
6. You ask yourparents or other family members to cometo an occasion
important to you.
How concerned or anxious would you be over whether or not they would
want to come?
I would expect that they would want to come.
7. At a party, you notice someoneonthe other side of the room that you’d
like to get to know, and you approach him orherto try and start a
conversation.
Howconcerned or anxious would you be over whetheror not the person
would want to talk with you?
I would expect that he/she would wantto talk with me.
8. Lately, you’ve been noticing some distance between yourself and your
significant other, and you ask him/herifthere is something wrong.
Howconcerned or anxious would you be over whetheror not he/shestill
loves you and wants to be with you?
I would expectthat he/she will show sincere love and commitmentto our
relationship no matter what else may be going on.
9. You call a friend when there is something on your mindthat you feel you
really needto talk about.
Howconcernedor anxious would you be over whetheror not your friend
would listen?
I would expect that he/she would listen and support me.
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Appendix 1.3. Empathy Quotient
Empathy Quotient-Short (A. Wakabayashiet al., 2006)
1. I caneasilytell if someone else wants to enter a conversation.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
2 I really enjoy caring for other people.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
3. I find it hard to know whatto do in a socialsituation.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
Oo
4
. STRONGLY DISAGREE
~ I often findit difficult to judge if somethingis rudeorpolite.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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5. In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughtsrather than
on what mylistener might be thinking
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
6. I can pick up quickly if someone says something and means
another.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
Ts It is hard for me to say why somethings upset people so much.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
8. I find it easy to put myself in somebodyelse’s shoes.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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9, I am goodat predicting how someonewillfeel.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
10. Lam quick to spot when someonein a group is feeling awkward or
uncomfortable.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
11. I can’t always see why someone should havefelt offended by a
remark.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
12. I don’t tend to find social situations confusing.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
148
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
13. Other people tell me I am goodat understanding howtheyare
feeling and what they are thinking.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
14. [can easilytell if someoneis interested or bored with what I am
saying.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
15. Friends usually talk to me abouttheir problemsas they saythat I
am very understanding.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
16. I can sense if I am intruding, even if another person doesn’t tell me.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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17. Other people often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t always
see why.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
18. I can tune into how someoneelsefeels rapidly and intuitively.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
19. I can easily work out what another person might wantto talk about.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
20. I can tell if someoneis maskinghisor her true emotion.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
21. I am goodat predicting what someonewill do.
150
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
22. I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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Appendix 1.4. Systemizing Quotient
Systemizing Quotient- Short (Wakabayashiet al., 2006)
1. If | were buying a car, I would wantto obtain specific information about
its engine capacity.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
2. If there was a problem withthe electrical wiring in my home,I’d be able
to fix it myself.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
3. I rarely read articles or web pages about new technology.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
4. I do not enjoy gamesthat involve a high degreeofstrategy.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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5. 1 am fascinated by how machines work.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
6. In math, I am intrigued bythe rules and patterns governing numbers.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
7. I findit difficult to understand instruction manuals for putting appliances
together.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
8. If | were buying a computer I would want to know exactdetails aboutits
hard disc drive capacity and processor speed.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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9. I find it difficult to read and understand maps.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
10. When lookat a piece offurniture, I do not notice the details of how it
was constructed.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
11. I find it difficult to learn my way around a newcity.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
12. I do not tend to watch science documentaries on television or read
articles about science and nature.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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13. If I were buying a stereo, I would want to know aboutits precise
technical features.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
14. I find it easy to grasp exactly how odds workin betting.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
15. 1am not very meticulous whenI carry out doit yourself projects
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
16. WhenI look at a building, I am curious about the precise way it was
constructed.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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17. I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on
different investment and saving systems.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
18. Whentravelling bytrain, I often wonder exactly how therail networks
are coordinated.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
19. If I were buying a camera, I would not look carefully into the quality
of the lens.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
20. WhenI hear the weather forecast, I am not very interested in
meteorologicalpatterns.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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21. WhenI look at a mountain,I think about how precisely it was formed.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
22. I can easily visualize how the motorwaysin myregionlink up.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
23. When I’m in a plane, I do not think about the aerodynamics.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
24. I am interested in knowingthe path river takes from its source to the
sea.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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25. Iam not interested in understanding how wireless communication
works.
A. STRONGLY AGREE
B. SLIGHTLY AGREE
C. SLIGHTLY DISAGREE
D. STRONGLY DISAGREE
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